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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.0 Background and Rationale 
The electricity supply industry (ESI) structures in most African countries are dominated by 
vertically integrated utilities which are publicly owned and which hold monopoly power over all the 
core activities of the industry. The utilities of these countries, with the exception of South Africa, are 
relatively small in size and have different financial and technical capabilities. Their activities are 
concentrated mainly in the urban areas, and as a consequence there are very low rural electrification 
rates. At present, national grids of very few countries are fully interconnected. However, in 
recognition of the potentially cheap power available in other countries and the need to increase 
reliability, African countries, particularly those in southern Africa, which form the Southern Africa 
Power Pool (SAPP), are now making a concerted effort to interconnect their grids. 
As a result of their fairly similar structures, the power sectors of these countries are faced with 
problems and challenges of a similar nature. They are characterised by unreliable, inadequate and 
inefficient power supplies. The sector is plagued by major revenue shortfalls due to non-cost-
reflective tariffs and poor revenue collections. Failure to raise funds to finance expansion 
programmes of the sector, which are necessary to meet the rising demand, has also been a major 
problem. These, and a number of country-specific factors, are the main driving forces behind 
restructuring and reforms of power sectors in African countries and also in the rest of the world. 
The reforms are expected to bring about an increase in the capacity and provision of reliable and low 
cost power and will also help governments to avoid incurring further debt in financing the power 
sectors. Indeed, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are concerned 
specifically with this issue of reducing government involvement in financing the power sector. The 
future of the power sectors of these countries depends entirely on the reforms that will be introduced 
in this vital area of economic activity. 
It is anticipated that these reforms will introduce competition which will in tum create a need for 
new regulatory bodies/organisations to monitor and ensure fair competition in the sector and also to 
protect their consumers. In these countries, since their independence, there have been no regulatory 
authorities responsible for electricity, meaning that the ministries in charge of energy affairs have 
had to do both the work of policy formulation for the sector and that of regulation ofthe industry. In 
some countries, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that electricity utilities were responsible 
for regulating themselves. Enacting the right legislation will, among other things, offer incentives to 
investors as well as promote efficiency in the sector as a whole. Thus, enacting the right legislation 
is of utmost importance and should be done with great care and forethought. Failure to attract 
private investments from abroad will result in the total failure of such reforms and the consequences 
to the already crippled sector will be devastating. 
In view of the above concerns, this area needs to be closely studied and analysed to explore and 
evaluate various options for restructuring and reforming electricity utilities in order to generate a set 
of focused policy recommendations for improving the performance of the power sectors. The whole 
process of the involvement of the private sector, the reform of the power sector, as well as electricity 
regulation, is still fairly new. It is therefore important to ensure that there are communication and 
feedback between the different parties with regard to policies and strategies on how countries can 
best handle such processes of reform and transformation. 
This research project will enable countries that are in similar situations and are undergoing such 
reform processes to learn from the experiences of one another thereby helping them to avoid the 
same pitfalls. 
1.1 Thesis Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to undertake a comparative review of the power sector reforms and 
regulation in seven eastern and southern African countries, namely Uganda, Botswana, Kenya, 
Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania1• As this objective is a fairly general one, the following questions 
have been formulated to clarify the more specific objectives of the thesis. The questions are also 
intended to elucidate the actual research process and to guide the final writing-up and presentation 
of the research results. The questions are: 
Question One: 
What is the status of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), its restructuring and regulation in the 
countries under review? 
The current trend worldwide is to restructure and set up regulatory frameworks to govern the 
electricity industry, with the aim of improving its overall performance and creating conditions for its 
sustainable development. It is postulated that this trend will also broadly apply to the countries 
under study. One of the objectives ofthis thesis is thus to explore and describe the current status of 
the ESI and restructuring initiatives in these countries, as well as the status of the regulatory regimes 
which have been or are being set up. 
1 A parallel Masters thesis is investigating the same questions in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe countries. 
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Question two: 
What are the drivers for reforms in these countries and what are the objectives? 
The current efforts on restructuring, privatising and setting up of regulatory frameworks have been 
triggered by various factors. This research project looked at the different drivers for change in the 
context of the power industries and the various objectives these countries want to achieve from these 
reforms. 
Question Three 
Why are different approaches to restructuring and reforms being adopted in the respective 
countries, and are they the most appropriate solutions to power sector performance and other 
policy objectives of these countries? 
Depending on the sizes of the various electricity industries, drivers for the reforms and many other 
factors, which will be discussed in more detail herein, it is likely that each country will have 
different approaches to restructuring and reforming their own power sectors. The research assessed 
the existing approaches, their practicality and their expected effects on the power sectors and on 
· their economies as a whole, and has tried to suggest alternative approaches in the case of those 
which were regarded as inappropriate. With regard to those countries which presently have no plans 
in place on how they will structure their electricity industries, this research study suggested various 
suitable approaches. 
1.2 Research Methodology 
An analysis of the driving forces for electricity supply restructuring, privatisation and regulatory 
reform, and the nature of the reforms experienced in other countries (outside Africa), which have 
already undertaken power sector reforms, was conducted by means of a literature survey. Direct 
contact was also made with experts in the field. 
An extensive literature review on the power sectors of the countries being studied was also 
conducted. The ESKOM Library and SAD-ELEC offices in Johannesburg were visited in order to 
access annual reports of the utilities and other documents with information regarding the power 
sectors of these countries. SAD-ELEC has substantial experience of and detailed information 
available on the power sectors of Southern African countries. Other relevant materials in the UCT 
libraries and on the websites of the utilities and ministries responsible for energy in these countries 
were also reviewed. Some utilities and ministries have no websites and those which do, provided 
insufficient and outdated information. Consequently summary sheets of the power sectors of 
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individual countries were developed and later sent to the relevant countries for confirmation and for 
securing hitherto unavailable data. 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaires relating to institutional structure, performance and the future of the ESI were sent to 
these countries. The questionnaires were targeted at officials in government departments responsible 
for energy issues, electricity utilities and regulators, as well as at institutions, boards, or 
commissions - other than departments of energy - responsible for public enterprises or parastatal 
reforms. 
Discussions and Interviews 
In addition to the fact sheets and the questionnaires that were sent out, interviews were conducted 
with the stakeholders and government officials responsible for ESI reforms to assess the status and 
direction of the power sector reforms in their respective countries. Personal face-to-face interviews 
and discussions took place in the researcher's home country, Tanzania, but in the other countries, 
this was limited to telephonic interviews. A round table discussion with Dr. Xolani Mkhwanazi, 
Chief Executive Officer of the National Electricity Regulator (NER)- South Africa and Mr. Siseho 
Simasiku1, Chief Executive Officer of the Electricity Control Board (ECB) -Namibia, was held in 
the NER's headquarters in Pretoria. A few NER senior staff members were also present at the said 
meeting. The discussion centred on the role of the electricity regulatory authorities in the reform 
process and how the newly formed Regional Electricity Regulatory Association will help to ensure 
that members of this Association achieve a greater level of autonomy in their respective countries. 
The reason for this is that in some countries the regulatory authorities experience government 
interference which makes them unable to perform their duties effectively. 
1.3 Limitations of the Study 
Actual visits to the countries under study were not made, which limited the research to 
correspondence and interviews with utility and government officials. As a result, the general public 
could not be contacted for their views on the issue of power sector reform and regulation. Further, 
the research was carried out in a dynamic environment. The reforms and the setting up of regulatory 
regimes are ongoing processes in most of the countries, thus definite information on some aspects of 
the reforms was difficult to obtain. 
1 Mr Simasiku is the current chairman of the Regional Electricity Regulator Association (RERA) 
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1.4 Overview of the Chapters 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one furnishes the background information to the 
study, outlining the rationale and the objectives, as well as the research methodology and concluding 
by indicating the limitations of the study. 
Chapter two explores the experiences of power sector reforms in the rest of the world by giving a 
few examples. It also provides details of the essential aspects and different forms of reforms and 
regulation in a more general terms. 
Chapters three to eight present the case studies of the six Sub-Saharan African countries, namely 
Uganda, Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania. Each chapter covers one country. , 
Each chapter starts by giving background information on the specific country, its location, 
demography, economy and status of the energy sector. Thereafter it provides more detailed 
information on the power sector, before- providing an analysis and explanation of the sector's 
reforms and regulations. 
Chapter nine is a comparative study of the relevant issues raised in the preceding chapters. It 
presents observations and conclusions arrived at and puts forward various policy recommendations 
in general terms. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Drivers for Change and the Nature of the Power Sector 
Reforms 
2.0 Introduction 
Worldwide,, the reforms in the power sectors are at different stages of development. These reforms 
are driven by a number of factors, both general and country specific, and are expected to bring about 
a wide range of gains such as increased efficiency and capacity and the provision of reliable and low 
cost power, as well as the achievement of other country-specific objectives. Different countries have 
chosen different strategies, or patterns, for reforming their power sectors in view of country -
specific goals and objectives. However, regardless of the type of strategy adopted by a particular 
country, in order for the reforms to work efficiently and to achieve all of their objectives, there must 
be an independent and capable regulator to oversee adherence to market rules and a number of other 
aspects. This chapter discusses the main driving forces behind power sector reforms in general 
terms. It also examines expected gains from such changes in the electricity sector, as well as the 
main elements of the reforms. The need to have autonomous regulatory boards and different forms 
of regulation is also discussed, as well as the importance of putting in place proper measures to 
enhance public benefits as the countries embark on reforms. 
2.1 Drivers for power sector reforms 
The experience of the leading reformers and the benefits which they have so far gained from the 
reforms, suggest that many other countries will embark on power sector reforms. In fact, countries 
which are now embarking on reform programmes are seeing the reforms as the only way forward for 
the development of their power sector. It should be noted that the experience and the benefits gained 
so far have given further impetus to these reforms. Other countries, particularly developing 
countries, had to wait until they could see how successful the reforms would be. At present many 
countries are seriously embarking on these reform programmes. However, one should also expect 
the developing countries to first stand aside, as history has shown that they normally tend to follow 
the development models of the developed countries after the models have worked in those countries. 
Nevertheless, these models may not necessarily produce the expected results in developing 
countries, and may need to be modified to suit specific conditions. In this regard developing 
countries are gradually joining the world's movement on ESI reform by embarking on various 
reform strategies, some of which are substantially different to those implemented in developed 
countries. 
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Drivers for changes in the electricity sector may be characterised as: 
• The desire to improve allocative and operational efficiencies, 
• A desire to widen customer choice, 
• Technological change, 
• Financing needs, 
• Environmental pressure, 
• A number of country-specific needs. 
2.1.1 The desire to improve allocative and operational efficiencies 
Under normal circumstances there are few incentives for the publicly owned utilities to improve 
efficiencies. This is evident both in the developed and developing countries, though it is even worse 
in the latter. For instance, the old Central Electricity Generating Board of England, which was 
regarded as operating with high efficiency, has subsequently (in the new companies) shown marked 
efficiency gains in a competitive market (Eberhard, 2000:4). In developing countries, most of the 
state run electricity utilities have recorded poor performance in terms of poor investment decisions, 
high operating costs, inadequate expansion of access to electricity for the population and unreliable 
supply. With the aim of improving investment (allocative) and operating efficiency levels, many 
countries are now introducing a commercial and competitive environment in the power sector 
through restructuring and by attracting private participation. 
2.1.2 A desire to widen customer choice 
Previously customers were forced to obtain their electricity requirements from the monopolistic 
state owned utilities. Consequently these utilities were able to pass on to their customers costs 
associated with their failure to operate efficiently through tariffs which were set by them. Business 
and industries for whom electricity is a significant part of their overall costs were the most affected 
by high costs of electricity. Customers are now tired of carrying utilities' burdens and they are 
demanding the right to choose their supplier. This has forced many countries to reform their power 
sectors in order to give customers a right to choose their supplier, thus encouraging industrialisation. 
Under the reforms, not only will the customers, especially the big customers, be flexible in 
determining their own terms of electricity purchase agreement, but those who have been allowed to 
generate electricity for their own use and not allowed to sell will now be allowed to sell the surplus 
to the grid. This will help them offset capital expenditures on generating equipment which was 
operating below capacity (African Energy, 2001) The right to choose will also force greater 
competition and as a result lower prices to customers, which is an important factor for attracting 
foreign investors to invest in manufacturing industries. 
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2.1.3 Change in technology 
Up to the 1980s, power sector development was seen to require utilities with extensive technical and 
financial resources. Projects like hydropower and nuclear power, which were extremely capital 
intensive, were seen as the only means of obtaining economies of scale in the industry. However, 
recently, developments in generation technologies have made possible a new set of actors in the 
industry. Private developers, owners of cogeneration facilities and energy services companies have 
been introduced to the industry and they can compete in the generation portion ofthe industry. The 
recent development of combined cycle-gas turbines (CCGT) which can be constructed at lower unit 
costs (lower capital costs), in much smaller plant size and usually in a short period, has enabled 
independent private producers (IPPs) to participate in the industry competitively. Development of 
information and control technologies such as control systems and metering have also influenced the 
day-to-day operation of the industry and have enormous effects on the types and arrangements of 
services offered. There are now separate and privately owned companies operating as independent 
system operators and there are big and small companies competing in retail supplies. However, due 
to the nature of transmission and distribution technologies, these portions of the industry will remain 
as natural monopolies (Clark, 2001b:7). 
2.1.4 Financing needs 
Generally electricity system expansion requires huge investment and it has been one of the sources 
of the many governments' debts due to the fact that utilities are not able to finance the expansion 
projects on their own. Furthermore many utilities are no longer credit worthy and have been 
borrowing under government guarantee. Their failure to pay means that the governments have to 
pay on their behalf. The governments are now tired of contracting further debts and have more 
pressing needs, given the limited resources which they have. Moreover, the financiers such as the 
World Bank and the IMF have now changed their way of financing new power sector expansion 
projects. The financiers have started to channel their loans through the private sector. For instance in 
Tanzania, the World Bank is funding a gas to electricity project through the private sector. This has 
forced the governments to open up their power sectors for private capital, which will make them 
become self-financing. 
2.1.5 Environmental pressure 
Currently the world is facing the challenge of expanding and developing the power sector while at 
the same time protecting the environment. Large nuclear and coal fired power plants, which 
traditionally played a great role in meeting growing power demands, are now facing huge resistance 
form the public due to environmental concerns. This has made governments throughout the world 
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search for alternatives which entail reforming their power sectors to allow private sector 
participation to invest in new and clean technologies such as gas and renewable energy. 
2.1.6 Country-specific needs 
There are a number of country-specific needs, which drive the reform agenda. For instance in 
Namibia and South Africa, there is a specific requirement to widen economic ownership and to 
promote black economic empowerment (NamPower, 2000:1; Eberhard, 2000:5). In some other 
developing countries where there is cross subsidisation, reforms are needed to remove these 
subsidies in the power sector in order to release resources for other pressing public expenditure 
needs. A desire to raise immediate revenue for the government through the sale of the assets from 
the power sector has also driven the reform in some countries (Bacon, 200 I). In the United 
Kingdom (UK), the first country to reform, the government wanted to undermine the power of the 
coal mining trade union, and institutional reform was bound to challenge the old coal contracts and 
lead to a new reduced reliance on coal as new investments were made in combine cycle gas turbines 
(Eberhard, 2000:5). 
2.2 Main characteristics of the reforms 
The drivers for change to some extent differ from one country to another, as do the reform strategies 
or patterns. Developed and developing countries' power sectors are at different stages of 
development. Whereas developed countries are embarking on the reforms with 100% electrification 
rates, in developing countries a lot of work has to be done to widen access and increase efficiency 
and reliability as well as capacity. Consequently, the reforms which are being introduced tend to 
follow different paths, although, the ultimate goal is to attain full competition, where technically 
feasible, in the electricity supply industry (ESI). The fact that one reform path might be more 
applicable than another, especially in developing countries, is one of the factors influencing 
reformers to adapt different strategies. Much of the available literature on power sector reforms, 
such as the writings of Marandu (2000), Eberhard (2000) and Horvei (2001), has highlighted the 
steps that many countries are following when reforming their power sector. These steps are: 
• Commercialisation and corporatisation, 
• Restructuring and introduction of competition, 
• Privatisation of the unbundled ESI, 
• Setting up or change in regulatory framework. 
However, Marandu (2000) notes that the steps in the above framework should be thought of as an 
overall approach to reforming rather than a rigid set of rules to be followed in the same order in each 
country. This being the case, experience has shown that some countries have leapfrogged over 
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various stages in structural change while others have privatised aspects of the electricity industry but 
not chosen to make structural changes (Clark, 2001b: 1). In general, this approach helps in ensuring 
that important issues are not easily ignored in a reform process. 
2.2.1 Commercialisation and corporatisation 
Utilities in most developing countries have been performing poorly, are highly indebted and rely 
heavily on state funding. In many cases, poor performance has been a result of controlled and low 
tariffs and high levels of government intervention, usually exercised by the ministry responsible for 
energy. In some countries electricity utilities are treated like a government department and they do 
not pay taxes or dividends to the government. As an initial stage of power sector reform, many 
governments are transforming their power utilities into commercial entities with little or no 
government interventions. In this case a utility's management is granted autonomy in decision-
making and is responsible for its own actions. Utilities are now treated as any other commercial 
enterprise, which must earn a market related return on equity and pay taxes as well as dividends. As 
regards corporatisation, it involves the formal and legal move from direct government control to a 
legal corporation with separate management (Clark, 2001b:8). However it has been argued that in 
order to realise best results, corporatisation is usually combined with commercialisation, as a 
corporatised utility should be submitted to commercial discipline (Marandu et al., 1999:103). 
Often commercialisation and corporatisation in African countries have been introduced under 
management contract where operation of the utility is delegated to a qualified firm, usually an 
external firm. The qualified firm signs a contract with the government agreeing on the performance 
targets to be met over a contract period. Under this arrangement, in return for its service, the 
contractor receives a fee, which is fixed or indexed to a parameter such as turnover, sales, operating 
profit or a combination of these. A variation of management contracts is performance contracts 
between the government and the utility, where remunerations of the utility's employees are related 
to the success in meeting the targets. Chiwaya (1999) quotes the World Bank as saying that 
performance contracts are in use in France, Bolivia, El Salvador and Cote d'Ivoi re (the Ivory 
Coast). Commercialisation and corporatisation, whether under management or performance 
contract, have been considered as a means of creating a level playing field and creating conditions 
for real competition to take place (Econ, 2000:24) .. 
2.2.2 Restructuring for performance improvement and competition 
Restructuring is the cornerstone of the power sector reforms. It is so important and widely used a 
concept that others use it to refer to power sector reforms or privatisation, which is incorrect. 
Restructuring is part of the reforms and it entails rearrangement of the organisational structure of a 
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utility in order to improve performance and create competition. A country may restructure its power 
sector without necessarily introducing competition or changing ownership of the ESI industry. 
However, a worldwide trend is to transform the ESI from a state controlled to a market driven 
sector. The major concepts which are universally considered when countries restructure their power 
sectors are:- vertical unbundling, horizontal unbundling, single buyer model, wholesale competition 
model, retail competition model, free entry, open and non-discriminatory transmission system, 
power pool model, multiple electricity trading market model, a set of trading mechanisms and 
regulatory capacity. Some of these concepts are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Vertical unbundling 
Vertical unbundling often follows the expiring of the management and performance contracts, which 
were entered into during the commercialisation and corporatisition stage. The traditional vertically 
integrated utilities are then restructured by splitting generation, transmission and distribution 
functions to form separate functional units which will trade with one another on a commercial basis. 
This makes it easier to relate costs to output and to avoid hidden cross-subsidization. It also makes 
the management triangle shorter and as a consequence decisions are taken quickly and closer to the 
people who are implementing them. A major rationale for the vertical unbundling is to separate the 
potential competitive elements of the industry (generation) from the natural monopoly components 
(transmission and the wires part of the distribution). In order to avoid any shortfall in capacity, 
which may occur while the newly created entities (particularly the generation segment) are prepared 
to handle new investment, IPPs may be allowed entry into the market. This will enable the 
electricity industry to expand as rapidly as possible and at least cost. 
Horizontal unbundling 
It has been argued that vertical unbundling alone cannot bring the desirable improvement in 
performance, nor competition, as each newly created entity from vertical unbundling becomes a 
monopoly at its functional level which might result in higher power prices than that of the integrated 
monopoly, if not well regulated (Bacon, 1994). Thus there is a need for horizontal unbundling where 
generation is further separated into a number of competing companies - none big enough to exert 
market power. O'Neill et al. (2001:1) points out that competition in generation promises large 
efficiency gains and cost savings to consumers because generation comprises approximately 75% of 
all electricity costs. For a large country or system where a single national utility was responsible for 
distribution, horizontal separation to create regional electricity supply companies (Resc) ·or 
distribution entities (Discos) may also be adopted. This will bring the utility closer to the customers, 
thus improving the ability to respond to local needs (Marandu et al., 1999: 101 ). However, since 
transmission is regarded as natural monopoly, it should continue to be performed by a single 
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company in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of the systems but should be subject to price 
regulation. 
Single buyer model 
During the vertical unbundling stage, some governments may decide to partially unbundle their 
power sector by leaving transmission and generation together. This means that generation and 
transmission functions remain to be performed by a single state owned company which purchases 
bulk power from the IPPs and also sell in bulk to distribution companies or entities. This model is 
called the single buyer model and has been introduced in many South East Asian countries and other 
developed countries (Eberhard, 2000:7). One disadvantage of this model is that the ESI may be tied 
up with undesirable power purchase agreements (PPAs) for a long period of time, and thus unable to 
lower prices. Moreover, if PPAs are not flexible enough, unexpected economic changes like the 
devaluation of local currency against major currencies can put extreme pressure on the government 
finances. This occurs when the state utility is committed to purchase prices denominated in US 
dollars or UK Pound Sterling while having to on-sell the electricity in its domestic prices. For 
instance, Indonesia and Pakistan have experienced this problem (Hansen, 2001 ). 
Wholesale competition model 
This is an arrangement where the horizontally unbundled power generation entities and IPPs 
compete in selling electricity in bulk to the distribution companies and large customers. As a result 
of competition, large consumers are now allowed to buy electricity from lowest cost generators. 
This forces generators to minimise their cost and hence increase productive efficiency. Allocative 
efficiencies are also improved for new investment. This system first emerged in the UK. Other 
countries such as Chile, Argentina and USA have also followed this reform system (Hansen, 2001). 
However, a requisite for wholesale competition is the open access to the transmission network 
principle and free entry to the market. Investment in generation and transmission should be freed 
and left to the market forces. 
Retail competition model 
The wholesale competition model limits competition to large customers only. However, the 
introduction of a new participant in the market in the form of energy brokers, commonly known as 
suppliers, has enabled competition to be extended to all essential consumers. Electricity supply is 
now carried out by the new participants, and this is termed the retail competition model. Under this 
arrangement, attained at the mature stage of the reforms, supply is separated from the ownership of 
the distribution wires, thus enabling small customers to buy their electricity requirements from 
competing suppliers. The suppliers purchase electricity in the wholesale market and pay a regulated 
fee to the transmission and distribution companies for the use of their infrastructures. As is the case 
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with transmission systems, distribution networks should also be under open access for attaining 
effective retail competition. Countries such as the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Norway have 
reached this stage, which is regarded as a stage where full benefits of competition in the electricity 
industry are attained (Fischer et al., 2000). Figure 2.1 below shows structural dimensions of 
electricity industries in transition. 
Figure 2.1 The Structural Dimensions of Electricity Industries in Transition 
MODELl: 
NATURAL MONOPOLY 
• Utilities are vertically 
integrated 
• Generation, 
transmission and 
distribution are not 
subject to competition 
• No-one has choice of 
supplier 
MODELl: 
SINGLE BUYER 
• Single buyer chooses 
from various generators 
(IPPs) 
• Access to transmission 
exchange not permitted 
for sales to final 
consumers 
• Single buyer has 
monopoly over 
transmission networks 
and over sales to final 
consumers 
Source: Adapted from Clark, A .. (2001b) 
Electricity trading mechanism 
MODEL3: 
WHOLESALE COMPETITION 
• Distribution companies 
buy direct from generator 
(IPPs) 
• Distribution companies 
have monopoly over final 
customers 
• Open access to 
transmission wires 
• Generators compete to 
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• Power pool established to 
facilitate exchanges 
Large 
Customers 
(LC) 
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Customers 
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~------------------, 
MODEL4: 
RETAIL COMPETITION 
• All customers have choice 
of supplier 
• Open access to T & D wires 
• Distribution is separate from 
retail activity 
• Retail industry is 
competitive 
This is another characteristic of the power sector reforms. In order for the competitive electricity 
market, whether wholesale or retail, to work as required, it requires a set of effective trading 
mechanisms and instruments. This is in addition to the principles of open access transmission and 
distribution networks and free entry. As electricity cannot economically be stored in great 
quantities, its market is rather complicated as sellers and buyers need to interact differently from 
those dealing with other products. In a competitive electricity market, effective interaction is 
considered to be facilitated by mainly two market models, namely the power pool model and the 
multiple electricity trading market model. These models have different sets of trading mechanisms 
such as a market of bilateral and future contracts, a day-ahead spot market and real time balancing 
and settlement markets. 
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Power pool model 
Basically, this model involves electricity trading through a power pool which acts as a power 
exchange.. In this model generators bid their power into a pool and purchasers of power buy their 
power from the pool. Generators make bids on price and available capacity for a particular period, 
usually an hour or half hour a day ahead. The power pool operator then uses this information to 
build a least cost function for the next day's power dispatches. The price that the purchaser of power 
will pay is based on the bid price of the last dispatched plant, but subject to adjustments to include 
any capacity payment and costs of system operation and balancing. The system operator is 
responsible for financial settlement and system balancing and handling any constraints by adjusting 
the dispatch schedule and ancillary services. Usually a separate price schedule for increase or 
decrease in generation or consumption is used in balancing markets. Contracts for difference, which 
are bilateral contracts between generators and purchasers, can be entered into for risk hedging and 
their payments are done outside the pool. This model was widely used in the UK, Australia and 
South American countries although it has limited demand side participation which lead the UK to 
embark on the multiple market model (Fischer et al., 2000; Econ, 2000:27). 
Multiple electricity trading market model 
Whereas under the power pool model generators are forced to schedule and dispatch all of their 
power through the pool, under the multiple market model (MMM) generators are allowed to sell 
their power directly to the consumers. In this model there is a variety of platforms where trade may 
take place on a voluntary basis, and as a result there is strong demand side participation. Generators 
and purchasers may enter into long or medium-term bilateral contracts, often far in advance of actual 
delivery (Fischer et al., 2000; Econ, 2000:27). 
2.2.3 Privatisation of the unbundled ESI 
Some governments have restructured and introduced competition into their power sectors by 
limiting private involvement to new entrants in the form of IPPs. This means that all the assets 
previously owned by the vertically integrated utilities remained state owned even after restructuring. 
For example, while Norway restructured its power sector but did not privatise the assets, the UK, 
Chile and Argentina restructured and privatised at the same time (Eberhard, 2000: 9). 
However, it has been argued that there is a limit to what the government can do and that certain 
economic undertakings, particularly industrial enterprises, can be handled more efficiently by the 
private sector (Chiwaya et al., 1999:300). Governments need to reduce their direct involvement in 
economic activities and engage in creating enabling infrastructure for more private sector 
participation for economic growth. Thus, in recognition of the importance of the private sector 
14 
involvement in the ESI and in order to attain the full benefits of competition, many governments 
eventually embark on privatising programmes of publicly owned ESI assets. Privatisation can be 
introduced in phases, and governments should frrst decide what parts of the industry are to be 
privatised and how privatisation is to take place. The most common ways have been through 
inviting strategic equity partners, auctioning assets, targeted equity sales or an initial public offering. 
2.2.4 Change in the role of regulatory oversight · 
The role of regulation is expected to change as market reforms are adapted to meet the needs of a 
future competitive electricity industry. Previously, in many countries, particularly developing 
countries, government departments (in most cases under the ministries of energy) undertook the 
regulation of the power sector. As reforms are introduced, new regulatory boards, authorities or 
commissions which are transparent, capable and independent should also be introduced. The role of 
the new regulatory boards will focus mainly on transmission and distribution, which will remain 
natural monopolies. There is a need to ensure open non-discriminatory access to the transmission 
and distribution systems by the generators, customers and retail suppliers. However, for generators 
and retail suppliers, the role of overseeing proper interactions of the participants to ensure optimal 
efficiency is now the responsibility of two bodies, the competition body and the regulatory body. 
These two bodies together have an objective of addressing market failures such as abuse of market 
power and externalities. 
The regulator role will move away from the old "command and control" price settings, which were 
characterised by government and cabinet approvals, to cost of service regulation or range of conduct 
or incentive based regulatory mechanisms. Unlike command and control regulation which was 
characterised by direct operating instructions given to the utilities, the incentive regulation normally 
uses rewards and penalties to (provide inducements to) motivate the utilities to perform. 
Under the reforms there is also a need to have an optimal split in functions between competition 
authorities and electricity regulators. The competition authority functions could be to look at the 
structure of the market, control anti-competitive behaviour and to review mergers, which will lead to 
market power and ensure that such mergers will not happen. On the other hand the electricity 
regulator functions could be to control monopoly pricing in distribution and transmission systems, to 
ensure appropriate levels of consumer protection through regulatory mechanisms such as cost of 
service regulation or incentive regulation and to set and monitor standards. Other functions of the 
electricity regulator could be to address safety and environmental matters as well as to address 
public interests such as distribution and equity imbalances. However, the split of function does not 
mean that the competition authorities and electricity sector regulators work in isolation. The two 
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boards should work closely together for better co-ordination of the electricity market, thus helping 
the governments realise their objectives. 
2.3 Public Benefit Notion 
According to Clark {200 1 b), the term public benefit refers to social, environmental and 
developmental "goods and services" that bring about notable social welfare improvements. 
Specifically in the electricity sector, public benefits include electrification and access programmes, 
public interest research and development {R&D), public interest energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, integrated resource planning, customer services (reliability, quality, security of supply, 
customer support, etc) and environment protection programmes. Societies value all these public 
benefits, but due to market failures, markets do not provide them adequately. If provided, they can 
contribute significantly towards sustainable development. 
2.3.1 Power sector reforms and public benefits 
Electricity has played a critical role in countries' economic development and in raising standards of 
living of the citizens. As countries are embarking on power sector reform programmes, publicly 
owned utilities, which were keen on public benefits are now corporatized, commercialised and 
privatised and are thus required to operate commercially and maximise profits. These reforms will 
reduce government involvement in the electricity sector. Unfortunately, profit maximisation and 
public benefits are two conflicting objectives. If public benefits need to be enhanced then proper 
planning during the reforms must be put in place. Measures which might be adopted to advance 
them when electricity industries are restructured, should carefully be considered and should be put 
ahead of the reforms. In developing countries where people live in abject poverty, public benefit 
goods and services are of great importance, hence the need to advance them rigorously. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted various drivers for change as well as reform strategies which, to some 
extent, are triggered by the drivers as well as what a particular country wants to achieve from the 
reforms. However, to achieve the best results, a country needs to evaluate carefully any reform 
proposal it wishes to follow since each country has a diverse range of economic, social and political 
structures. Furthermore, the adapted reform pattern needs to be flexible enough, as a reform 
approach that has worked in one country may not necessarily produce the intended results in another 
country. In addition to adapting appropriate and flexible reform patterns, the call for change of the 
regulators' roles to meet the need of the patterns is of great importance. The effectiveness and 
performance of the regulators in the new patterns will have a critical impact on the expected benefits 
of these reforms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Uganda 
3.0 Location and Demography 
Uganda is located in the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa and lies astride the Equator. It is a landlocked 
country, bordering the Sudan to the north, Tanzania and Rwanda to the south, Kenya to the east and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. The total area of the country is about 241,000 km2 of 
which about 44,000 km2 (18%) are covered by fresh water lakes and rivers. The country has a 
p,opulation of about 22.2 million with a growth rate ~f2.8% per annum. 86% of the total population 
lives in the rural areas. With a land area of 197,097 km2, the population density is about 113 people 
per square kilometre (World Bank, 2002). 
3.1 Economy 
The economic reforms, which have been implemented by the present government of Uganda since 
1987, coupled with the political stability of the country, have contributed to economic growth rates 
averaging 7 % per annum in the last decade. This has made Uganda one of the fastest growing 
countries in Africa. However, in 2000, the real GDP grew by 3.5% compared to a growth of7.5% 
achieved in 1999. The slower pace of economic growth in 2000 was attributed to a prolonged 
drought that affected a large part of the country in 1999. However, the manufacturing sector's 
performance was robust and posted a growth rate of 8.6 % in 2000. As manufacturing is linked to 
electricity consumption, such robust growth calls for an increase in investment in the power sector. 
Uganda is thus seeing a shift from the firmly agriculturally based economy of 1986 towards 
construction, manufacturing and regional trade (World Bank, 2002). 
Uganda's monetary policy also ensured that inflation arising from the drought was kept under 
control and as a result the inflation rate has been maintained below 10 % per annum for the past four 
years from the record highs of 240% in 1988. For the year ending December 2001, the annual 
underlying inflation rate was 3.2 %. 
In order to attract foreign investments to complement domestic efforts, Uganda has put in place a 
fiscal incentive package, whose terms provide for generous capital recovery terms, particularly for 
investors whose projects entail significant investments in industrial plants and machinery and whose 
investments are medium or long-term. The incentive package also includes initial allowances, 
deductible annual allowances and other annual depreciation allowances. Coupled with the incentive 
package, most of the economic activities are fully liberalised and open to foreign investments. The 
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foreign exchange market is also wholly liberalised and there are no restrictions on capital amount 
transfers and in this case no barriers to the remittance of dividends. Uganda's shilling is fully 
convertible and has remained relatively stable over the last years. 
Generally, the country's economic strategy is to modernise its economy by relying on markets. To 
this effect the government's major role will remain to provide the necessary legal policies and 
physical infrastructure to enable private investment to flourish. 
3.2 Energy Sector 
As is the case in most countries in the world, the energy sector is one of the key sectors in the 
Ugandan economy. Uganda's energy sector is managed by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development and is divided into four sub-sectors: - petroleum, electricity, fuel wood, and new and 
renewable sources. The sector is characterised by a heavy dependence on biomass energy resources, 
which provide about 94 % of the total national energy needs. Electricity contributes only about 1 % 
of the total energy consumed, whereas the petroleum sub-sector provides about 5% of the country's 
energy consumption requirements. The combined contribution of the new and renewable sources of 
energy (such as wind, biogas, solar, geothermal, liquid fuels and peat) to the total energy consumed 
in Uganda is estimated at a mere 1 %. 
The Ugandan government has deregulated the energy sub-sectors dealing with electricity and liquid 
fuels. The government sees its further role in the energy sector as that of elaborating on and 
implementing energy policies and energy development strategies, as well as in creating the 
conditions necessary for an improved energy supply. The government's overall policy objectives in 
the energy sector are the following: -
• To improve the quality and quantity of energy supply through appropriate sector reforms and 
the establishment of an enabling legislation; 
• To promote the efficient utilisation of energy resources and the execution of rural 
electrification programme; 
• To promote private sector participation in the development of both conventional and 
renewable energy resources in order to expand access to energy services; 
• To maximise opportunities for export of power to the neighbouring countries once the internal 
demand is adequately met (GoU, 1999). 
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3.3 The Power Sector 
3.3.1 Background 
The power supply in Uganda is based primarily on hydro, and to a lesser extent, on thermal 
resources. Uganda, which is one of the sources of the Nile River, has significant hydropower 
potential on this river, estimated to be in excess of2,000 MW (GoU, 1999: 8). At present, out of this 
total potential, only 300 MW capacity has been developed. However, the completion of the 
proposed Bujagali IPP hydropower project in 2006 will add another 250 MW. Uganda also has 
great potential for mini-hydros. Twenty-two mini-hydro sites with the capacity range of 0.5 - 5 MW 
have already been identified (GoU, 1999). Potential sites for large hydropower projects and their 
estimated maximum installed capacity are summarised in Table 3.1. Studies carried out by Uganda's 
Department of Geological Surveys and Mines show that Uganda has geothermal resources in the 
Western Rift Valley estimated at about 450 MW. Uganda also has great potential for solar energy 
as, by virtue of its location on the Equator, Uganda receives relatively high isolation levels 
averaging about 5 kWh/m2/day (GoU, 1999). 
Table 3.1 Hydroelectric Potential along the Nile River in Uganda 
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On Nile between Lake Victoria and Lake Kyoga 
Owen falls Extension 200 500-700 
Bujagali 250 1,200 - 1 ,500 
Busowoko 230 1,000- 1,200 
Kalan gala 225 700-900 
On Nile between Lake Victoria and Lake Kyoga 
Karuma (Kamdini) 300-350 1,200- 1,400 
Ay_a_g_o North 360-400 2,000 - 2,400 
Ayago South 230-250 700-1,200 
Murchison Falls (Kabalega) 450-550 2,600 - 3,500 
TOTAL 2245-2455 9,900 - 12,800 
Source: Ruffini, 2000d:29 
Although Uganda's power sector heavily depends on hydro (98 %), the fact that the source of the 
river Nile, Lake Victoria, is situated in Uganda, means that it does not suffer from drought-induced 
electricity shortages, like its neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania. However, despite such a good 
resource and the existence of the first hydro power plant, built as early as 1954, only 6% of the 
population, in fact, has access to electricity, of which 5 % are found in urban areas and only 1 % in 
rural areas. The level of electric energy usage in Uganda is extremely low, with an average per 
capita consumption of only 44 kWh/year. In the rural areas per capita consumption is only 
10 Kwh/year. The per capita power consumption is the second lowest in the world, the lowest being 
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Sierra Leone (African Energy, 2000). However, the remaining 94% of the population, which as yet 
has no access to electricity, represents a potential power market, hence the need to increase 
investments in power generation, transmission and distribution. Private investments are needed to 
develop the potential hydro resources in terms of mini-hydros and large-scale projects. 
3.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
The Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), a publicly owned utility that was formed in 1948 through the 
Uganda Electricity Ordinance, originally had a monopoly to generate, transmit and distribute 
electric power throughout the country. The UEB monopoly in the power sector ceased on 
31 51 October 1999 when the new Electricity Act became law, following the approval of a power 
sector privatisation policy in June 1999. In addition to removing the UEB monopoly, the new 
Electricity Act also established the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA). The objectives of 
formulating and implementing the new electricity policy were to address the key problems in the 
power sector, namely very poor financial and commercial performance by the UEB and the need to 
finance a relatively large investment programme (GoU, 1999: 3). 
As a result of the new Electricity Act and the government's objectives and goals for the power 
sector, as stated in the revised 1999 strategy plan for this sector, the UEB was unbundled into three 
separate companies. The three companies formed with effect from 30th March 2001, were the 
Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGC), the Uganda Electricity Transmission 
Company Limited (UETC) and the Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDC). In 
line with the three limited liability companies, the UEB remains a statutory body that takes care of 
stranded assets and other unallocated responsibilities. Details of Uganda's power sector 
restructuring and reform are discussed in Section 3.3.8. 
Although the UEB, prior to the new Electricity Act of 1999, had been the only body allowed to 
generate, transmit, distribute and retail electricity in the country, the old Electricity Act of 1948 had 
granted the Minister responsible for energy, the power to authorise other private operators without 
necessarily seeking endorsement by the UEB. There were some institutions, which were generating 
electricity in small quantities for their own use. For example, Kilembe Mines Company operates a 
hydroelectric station with a total installed capacity of 5 MW. Another mining company, Kasese 
Cobalt Company Limited, runs a much bigger plant with an installed capacity of 10 MW. A mission 
hospital, Kisiizi, operates a generation plant of 0.06 MW capacity, consisting of a single 75 kVa 
hydroelectric generator. Another hospital, Kogando, also owned and operated a 0.06 MW capacity 
plant for its own use. Under the new Act, these companies would be allowed to continue generating 
for their own use and if they should have a surplus, they could inject it into the national grid by 
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selling it to the UETC or supplying to their surrounding areas. Both Kilembe Mines Company and 
Kasese Cobalt Company Limited were selling power to the UEB in the past, and now they are 
selling to its successor, the UEGC. There is also a small hydro power station at Maziba near Kabele 
town in southwestern Uganda. This plant is connected to the grid and is a standby power station for 
Kabele town. Figure 3.1 shows the proposed institutional arrangement of the power sector after the 
reforms have been implemented 
Figure 3.1 Proposed Institutional Arrangement of the Power Sector 
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3.3.3 Supply 
Generation 
Hydro generation accounts for 98% of Uganda's total generation capability. The major existing 
generating facilities in Uganda, the Nalubaale Dam (formerly Owen Falls) with an installed'capacity 
of 180 MW and Kiira Dam (formerly Owen Falls Extension) with an installed capacity of 120 MW, 
were previously owned and operated by the UEB. These facilities and other UEB-owned generating 
facilities now fall under the newly formed UEGC - the Uganda Electricity Generating Company 
Limited. The total combined generation capacity attained at Owen Falls has now reached 300 MW. 
With three units at Kiira Dam currently operational, work on unit 4 is projected to start soon as 
funds have been secured from the project's financiers, the World Bank. The UEB had also operated 
the Maziba Gorge hydroelectric scheme, a three-unit 1 MW (2X250 kW + 1X500 kW) station. The 
UEB had also been maintaining five diesel generation plants with a total installed capacity of 
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2.13 MW to supply electricity to isolated upcountry areas. Table 3.2 shows installed capacity of 
Uganda's electricity generating stations, which now fall under the new Generation Company. 
Table 3.2 Installed Generation Capacity 
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Owen Falls 18 1954 180 
Owen Falls 
Hydro Extension 3 2000 120 
Maziba Gorge 2X250kV 1993 
1x500KV 1993 1.0 
Total Hydro Capacity 301 
Arua 3 1989 0.85 
Diesel Moroto 2 1989 0.425 
Moyo 1 1989 0.21 
Maziba 1 1990 0.32 
Adjuman 1 1990 0.115 
Nebbi 1 1991 0.21 
Total Diesel Capacity 2.13 
Total Installed Capacity 303.1 
Source: Compiled from UEB Annual Reports 
One ofthe strategic objectives of the then UEB in managing the existing generating facilities was to 
maximise the output and achieve 90 % availability of all units. Given this objective and the fact that 
Uganda's generating capability does not suffer from drought-induced shortages, the plants' 
performances for the period under review, 1990-2001 were generally good, as appears from Table 
3.3 below. 
Table 3.3 Units Generated and Sent Out (GWh) 
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1990 736.5 735.7 1.4 737.9 68.6 
1991 781.5 780.8 1.1 782.6 65.6 
1992 993.3 992.6 1.0 994.3 75.2 
1993 976.5 975.9 1.4 977.9 71.0 
1994 1,016.8 1,016.5 1.4 1,018.2 72.0 
1995 1,056.3 1,056.0 1.5 1,057.8 69.6 
1996 1,129.0 1,128.7 1.1 1,130.1 74.1 
1997 1,217.3 1,216.7 1.2 1,218.5 77.9 
1998 1,232.4 1,231.9 1.2 1,233.6 78.3 
1999 1,340.5 1,339.5 1.2 1,341.7 85.1 
2000 1,537.9 
- - 1,537.9 67.6 
2001 1,556.2 
- -
1,556.2 71.4 
Source: Compiled from UEB Annual Report, 1999 and OFPS & UEDCL Corporate 
Planning 
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Transmission and Distribution System 
Uganda's transmission and distribution system consists of 132 kV, 66 kV, 33 kV and 11 kV lines. 
The electricity grid extends across the southern part of the country where it covers Masaka, 
Kampala and Jinja, to the west of Owen Falls Dam, to Tororo in the east, where it connects to the 
Kenya system and north up to Lira. The interconnection between Uganda and Kenya is via a double 
circuit 132 kV line. There is also another 132 kV line, which supplies power to Kagera region of 
Tanzania. However, this region is not connected to Tanzania's national grid, and hence the Ugandan 
and Tanzanian systems are not actually interconnected. 
Some of the transmission and distribution lines in Uganda date back to the 1940s and 1950s. 
However, much of the new transmission work on the Ugandan transmission system, particularly at 
132 kV and 33 kV, was associated with generating station development and the need to upgrade the 
lines into double circuits for reliability purposes. Table 3.4 shows the development of major 
transmission and distribution lines in Uganda fromyear 1991 to year 2001. 
Table 3.4 Transmission and Distributions Lines in Uganda (km) 
~~~~
1991 909.2 73.6 2,615.2 
1992 909.2 73.6 2,664.2 
1993 994.2 73.6 2,696.8 
1994 1089.2 73.6 2,715.6 
1995 1,225.2 73.6 3,008.6 
1996 1,225.2 73.6 3,075.0 
1997 1,225.2 73.6 3,120.6 
1998 1,313.2 73.6 3,304.0 
1999 1,318.1 73.6 3,335.0 
2000 1,318.1 3,335.0 
2001 1,318.1 3,335.0 
Source: UEDCL Corporate Planning 
System Losses 
Uganda is one of the countries in Africa that experiences very high system losses, both technical and 
non-technical. The former are due to overloading of some of the feeders well over their design 
capacity, thus resulting in low supply levels to customers. Another contributing factor is the fact that 
secondary lines are very long, often resulting in continuously connecting customers on the same line 
without regard to voltage levels at the end of the lines. Aged transmission lines also contribute to the 
high levels of technical losses. 
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As regards non-technical losses, the main contributing factor is the large number of illegal 
customers who have connected themselves to the grid system. Previously, due to the shortage of 
meters, UEB was giving some customers an unmetered supply (Mugyenzi, 1999). Illegal 
connections also flourished, because the UEB took such a long time to connect new customers who 
had applied for the service, that they were thus tempted to resort to illegal means. However, the new 
management of the UEB, which was appointed in April1999, took several measures to reduce both 
technical and non-technical losses, and to some extent they have succeeded, as is demonstrated by 
the trend shown in Table 3.5 below. Some of these measures included recruiting more metering 
staff, improving the meters or issuing replacements, improving the billing systems by using shorter 
periods of billing, for instance, and physical checking of wiring systems in homes to curb illegal 
connections (an exercise called "operation see me"). 
Table 3.5 System Losses 
~~-~~ 
1990 217.5 38.2 
1991 128.5 19.7 
1992 224.5 31.7 
1993 236.8 33.2 
1994 276.8 36.2 
1995 340.4 39.5 
1996 300.4 30.8 
1997 346.7 33.1 
1998 367.1 34.2 
1999 463.5 39.7 
2000 442.2 34.4 
2001 516.6 36.1 
Source: UEB Annual Reports and UEDCL Corporate Planning 
3.3.4 Demand 
Uganda's peak demand has grown from one year to the next. In recent years, there has been 
relatively faster growth due to a generally high economic growth in the country. For example, in 
1998 the peak demand was 179.8 MW, and it grew to 260MW in 1999. The electricity demand in 
Uganda, in fact, comes from two sources, export peak demand and domestic peak demand, which 
will be discussed more fully hereunder. 
Export Peak Demand 
A significant market exists for electricity exports to Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda and to the region 
at large. Currently, Kenya sources about 4% of its own electricity needs from Uganda, which 
exports up to about 30 MW of continuous power. Uganda started to export power to Kenya from 
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1954 when the Power Supply Agreement, which is due to expire on the 1st January 2008, was 
signed. Droughts, which have frequently affected Kenya and negatively impacted on its rapidly 
growing electricity demand, have made it necessary for Kenya to ask Uganda for more supplies. 
However, Uganda has failed to supply more than 30 MW, due to their own supply constraints, as 
their domestic electricity demand, too, has increased. Uganda also exports about 5 MW of 
continuous power (about 20 GWh annually) to Tanzania's Bukoba region, which borders Uganda. 
There is a possibility for more demand from Tanzania to supply to its proposed mines sites in north-
western Tanzania. Apart from supplying these two countries, Uganda also exports about 1.0 MW of 
continuous power to Rwanda. The total power exported by Uganda amounts to about 300 GWh, for 
which it earns about US$ 20 million annually. 
Domestic Peak Demand 
Although Uganda exports power, internally it has been experiencing load shedding almost every day 
for a long time now. Nevertheless, the problem of load shedding was eased with the commissioning 
of the new Owen Falls Extension Power Station (now known as Kiira Dam) in May 2000, and since 
then load shedding has been reduced to once a week. With the commissioning of unit ill of the 
Kiira Dam (Owen Falls Extension) in July 2002, the country now has an installed generating 
capacity of 300 MW. Table 3.6 shows Uganda's electricity consumption by tariff whereas Table 3.7 
shows the system's peak demand. 
Table 3.6 Electricity Consumption by tariff 
Source: UEB Annual Reports and UEDCL Corporate Planning 
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Table 3~7 System Peak Demand 
1990 351.7 166.5 518.2 122.8 103,920 
1991 526.6 126.6 652.1 136.2 95,569 
1992 484.8 283.4 768.6 151.0 110,809 
1993 476.4 261.8 0.9 739.1 157.2 116,885 
1994 487.5 237.1 15.1 739.7 161.4 107,595 
1995 521.5 175.8 18.3 715.6 173.6 101,409 
1996 676.7 131.2' 19.0 0.9 827.8 174.0 123,047 
1997 700.5 148.3 19.6 1.5 869.9 178.6 142,327 
1998 705.9 136.3 21.3 1.3 864.8 239.0* 159,205 
1999 702.2 152.8 21.1 0.04 876.1 260.0* 164,225 
2000 843.0 229.5 21.5 0.1 1,094.3 280.0* 180,234 
2001 912.8 1,057.9 200,217 
Source: UEB Annual Reports and UEDCL Corporate Planning 
*System Maximum Demand in 1998, 1999 and 2000 was established using load studies assuming 
the Maximum Demand at different substations occurs at the same time, whereas the Maximum 
Demand in previous years are readings from Owen Falls Power Station (UEB, 2001). 
3.3.5 Tariffs 
The electricity tariff system in Uganda has been divided into six main categories with three 
components, namely an energy charge, a fixed charge per month and a demand charge for some of 
the categories. The block system is used for the residential tariff to encourage consumers to reduce 
their consumption. However, although domestic consumers are the major contributors - about 70 % 
in 1998- to Uganda's peak demand, a "time of use" tariff is not used. Perhaps this is due to the 
difficulties in metering customers according to time of use, especially when considering the high 
technology required for such metering systems. 
The latest tariff adjustment in Uganda was made in June 2001. The preceding tariff adjustment had 
occurred in July 1993, thus no adjustments had been made for almost eight years. Consequently, the 
latest tariff increases more than doubled the charges in each tariff category. However, according to 
the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA, 2001), the new tariff is, in fact, lower than the 1993 
tariff, adjusted for inflation and foreign exchange changes. Under the 1999 Electricity Act, tariff 
adjustments will now be effected by the ERA. The ERA stated that its general principle in tariff 
adjustments is that the tariff should reflect the true cost of supplying different consumer classes. In 
this way it would allow the sector to cover its costs without government subsidies. Tariffs therefore 
would be adjusted on a quarterly basis in order to reflect fluctuations in demand and exchange rates, 
as well as annual inflation rates. However, the adjustments of transmission revenue requirement will 
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be effected on an annual basis (ERA, 2001). Table 3.8 compares the old tariffs (1993) to the new 
ones (2001). 
Table 3.8 Electricity Retail Tariff- 2001 
1 (first 30 
kWh 10 20 50 1,000 1,000 
1 (30 to 200 
kWh) 10 70 189.8 1,000 1,000 
1 (over200 10 100 189.8 1,000 1,000 
kWh) 
2 10 115 189.8 4,000 1,000 
4.1 20 75 171.6 10,000 10,000 10,000 5,000 
4.2 22 55 99.6 
3.1 30 70 104.4 15,000 15,000 10,000 3,300 8,000 3,000 
3.2 32 50 68.3 
5 50 125 176.3 4,000 4,000 
Source: Electricity Regulation Authority 
3.3.6 Rural Electrification 
Over 90% of Uganda's 22 million people live in rural areas. At present only about 1.0% of the 
rural population has access to electricity. Most of the population with access to electricity in the 
rural areas does so through such sources as car batteries, diesel generators and photovoltaic systems 
(PVs). The cost of electricity from these sources is many times that of grid power, i.e. in the order of 
US cents 250/k:Wh for the former, compared to US cents 7/k:Wh for the latter. It is estimated that 
there are over 200,000 households which are using such sources (Ruffini, 2000a). This shows that 
there is a potential demand for electricity by Uganda's rural people. As is the case with many 
utilities in Africa, however, the then UEB concentrated its activities mainly in urban areas and did 
very little to meet this rural demand. 
Since 1995, the government of Uganda has put considerable effort into increasing rural 
electrification through projects such as the solar PV project, i.e. the Photovoltaic Pilot Projects for 
Rural Electrification (PPPPRE), which was initiated in 1995. Recently, with the aid of the World 
Bank, the government of Uganda has committed itself to increasing rural electrification from 1 % to 
over 10% by 2012. This will be realised through the Energy for Rural Transformation Programme. 
The government has just secured US$ 375 million from the World Bank and a consortium of other 
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donors for this project. Some of this money will be given out as soft loans and subsidies to private 
investors willing to extend power to rural areas. (Bbumba et al., 2002). 
Government's initiatives have also been reflected in the new Electricity Act. The Act encourages 
private sector-led rural electrification projects. The Act also stated that tariffs would be set so as to 
ensure fmancial viability for each decentralised system. This will ensure that the provision of 
electricity services in rural areas happens on a commercial basis. For less attractive areas 'smart 
subsidies' in the form of grants will be used to attract developers. Thus in order for the government 
ofUganda to be able to provide these subsidies, the government is, as part of its reform, establishing 
the Rural Electrification Fund to replace the subsidy for small consumers. It is because of this 
seriousness shown by Uganda's government, that the World Bank has selected Uganda as the first 
beneficiary of the African Rural and Renewable Energy initiatives for the continent (Ruffmi, 
2000a). This programme, the first of its kind in Africa, was launched on 11 tit July 2002. 
3.3. 7 Financial Performance of the then UEB 
Before the unbundling of the UEB, the utility was making huge losses, except in 1999. That year the 
UEB had a significant favourable reversal of fmancial performance, making a profit of over UShs 4 
billion (UEB, 2001). This was achieved through the many changes that the UEB, under new 
management, introduced that year, such as a new billing system, a new management information 
system and a large number of retrenchments of employees. Before these retrenchments, the sales 
and customer per employee ratios had been very low. For instance in 1997 the sales per employee 
ratio was 291, while the number of customers per employee was 48. These ratios in 1998, after the 
changes had been implemented, increased to 426 MWh/employee and 79 customers/employee, and 
further to the even higher ratio of 783 MWh/employee and 148 customers/employee in 2001. The 
international norm for the ratio of customers per employee is 161 (SAD-ELEC, 2001). The UEB's 
greatest weaknesses were billing and revenue collection. According to the government's New 
Strategy Plan and Implementation Plan document, in 1997 the UEB received revenue for only 58% 
of the power generated and in 1998 this was even less - around 50 %. Accounts receivable in 1998 
exceeded nine months' billing. As a result of poor revenue collection, the UEB was thus unable to 
contribute significantly to the financing of needed investments, leaving the burden of doing so to the 
government. Also the UEB had very low, and in some cases even negative, financial performance 
indicators, as shown in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9 Some Financial Performance Indicators of UEB 
Table 3.9 Continued 
Source: Compiled from UEB Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001 
3.3.8 Sector Reforms 
Uganda has made substantial progress in the process of reforming and restructuring its Electricity 
Supply Industry (ESI). The reforms of the power sector moreover fall within overall reform 
initiatives by the government of Uganda to liberalise the economy. In June 1999 the government 
formulated a comprehensive New Strategy Plan, built on the earlier 1997 Strategy Plan, for 
transforming its power sector into a financially viable entity. In addition, the new Electricity Act 
was enacted by Parliament and became law in November 1999. All these efforts were mainly due to 
the fact that the power sector had experienced a very poor financial and commercial performance, 
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leading to the failure of the UEB to raise furids to fmance new investments. More specifically, the 
driving forces for this process of restructuring and reform can be articulated as follows: 
• First, overcoming the fundamental problems of the UEB, which were:-
Very poor supply reliability, characterised by extensive and increasing load shedding 
and reduction in voltage; 
Inadequate investment in all parts of the sector during the 1990s and inability to 
finance future required investments, particularly in distribution; 
Very poor commercial performance, characterised by collections being received for 
less than 50% of the electricity generated; 
High technical and non-technical losses, exceeding 30 %; 
High accounts receivables, which in early 1999 were equivalent to about nine 
months' billings, with around 50 % being due for more than a year; 
Low productivity, despite the recent retrenchment of around 30% of UEB's 
employees; and 
Poor rate of connection of new customers (GoU, 1999). 
• Second, to stop supporting the UEB from the government's budget, hence releasing those 
funds to finance social sectors such as education and health; 
• Third, attracting private capital into the power sector; and 
• Finally, the international experience and the benefits which such reforms have so far 
delivered. 
Through the reforms, the government of Uganda wants to achieve the following objectives:-
• To make the power sector financially viable and able to perform without subsidies from the 
Government Budget; 
• To increase the sector's general efficiency; 
• To increase the sector's commercial performance; 
• To meet the growing demands for electricity and increasing area coverage; 
• To improve the reliability and quality of the electricity supply; 
• To attract private capital and entrepreneurs; and 
• To take advantage of export opportunities. (GoU, 1999) 
As previously noted, the implementation of the new strategy plan has led to the breaking/unbundling 
ofthe loss-making UEB into three separate limited liability companies: the Uganda Electricity 
Generation Company, the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company and the Uganda Electricity 
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Distribution Company. The UEB remained as a statutory company to take care of the stranded assets 
and other unallocated responsibilities, but the other assets of the UEB were transferred to these three 
successor companies. The assets of all three companies would remain publicly owned, but would be 
concessioned out to private companies on a long-term basis. 
In concessioning out the existing facilities in generation, transmission and distribution, competitive 
bidding procedures would be used. New generating capacity would be provided competitively by 
independent power projects through a process, to be organised by the Transmission Company and 
overseen by the Electricity Regulatory Authority {ERA). In this case the IPPs' entries will also be 
through competitive bidding procedures. As regards transmission, the Transmission Company will 
be a regulated monopoly, but will not be allowed to operate generation and distribution businesses. 
The Transmission Company will be required to add new transmission capacity as needed, but export 
lines may be developed, financed, constructed, operated and owned by private investors who will be 
given entry on a competitive basis as well. The Transmission Company will also be the System 
Operator (SO) and will be responsible for: -
• Co-ordination of the power supply system to msure balance between generation and 
consumption of electricity; 
• Dispatch of generation facilities; 
• Co-ordination of transmission outages; 
• Monitoring import and export of electricity; 
• Preparation of forecasts of capacity requirements; 
• Making rules for dispatch of generation; and 
• Publication of standardised tariffs (Electricity Act, 1999). 
In additional to the above responsibilities, a "ring-fenced" business entity within the Transmission 
Company, with separate accounts and its own personnel, has been/will be formed to undertake 
wholesale market operations. According to African Energy {2001) the unit will be responsible for:-
• Holding power purchases agreements (PPAs) and managing contracts between generators and 
the Distribution Company; 
• Evaluation and planning for least cost system expansion; 
• Evaluation of site proposals and recommendations; 
• Evaluation of proposals for new generation; 
• Development of demand forecast and publication of actual results; 
• Conducting least cost dispatch; 
• Formulation of wholesale tariffs; 
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• Providing financial settlement services for the wholesale market; and 
• Arranging for system-wide fees to cover generation and transmission capacity. 
3.3.9 Regulatory Framework 
As part of the overall reform process of Uganda's power sector, the Electricity Regulatory Authority 
(ERA) was established as a corporate body as required by Article 5 of the 1999 Electricity Act. The 
main objective of the power sector reform in Uganda is to tap into the benefits of private sector 
participation and to create competition. The ERA will play a central role in ensuring that the benefits 
that are expected from the reforms are realised, as well as ensuring the sustainability of the reforms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Botswana 
4.0 Location and Demography 
Botswana, a landlocked country, is located in Southern Africa. It borders South Africa to the south 
and east, Namibia to the west, Zimbabwe to the northeast and Zambia to the north. It has a total area 
of 600,370 sq. km, of which 585,370 sq. km. is land and 15,000 sq. km. is water. 80% of its land 
area is covered by the Kalahari Desert. Botswana's population is relatively small with about 1.6 
million people (World Bank, 2002). Unlike other African countries where the majority of the 
population lives in rural areas, close to 50% of Botswana's population lives in urban areas with 
Gaborone, its capital, containing about 42% of the total urban population. It is followed by 
Francistown with 21% and the mining town ofSelebi-Phikwe with 13% (SAD-ELEC, 1996:120). 
4.1 Economy 
Since its independence, year after year, Botswana's economic growth rate has been one of the 
highest in the world and its economy is one of the strongest on the continent, after transformation 
from being the poorest country in Africa when it attained independence. In 2000, Botswana's per 
capita GDP was US$ 3,300 making it a middle-income country. Although a major attribute to 
Botswana's economic success is diamond mining, its fiscal discipline and sound management, 
coupled with a well functioning democratic political system, have also played a major role towards 
its success. Diamond mining accounts for more than 33% of Botswana's GDP and for about 75% of 
its export earnings. The tourism sector has also been contributing significantly to the GDP and also 
the government and service sectors. The manufacturing, agriculture and construction sectors each 
contributed an average of 5% to the GDP over the last ten years. The contribution from agriculture 
is small (3.6%) due to the fact that a large part of Botswana's land area is unsuitable for farming. 
The country also experiences frequent droughts (World Bank, 2002). 
4.2 Energy Sector 
The energy sector in Botswana is managed by the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs. 
The national energy balance in 2000 showed that wood contributed about 38.6% of the total final 
energy consumption. Liquid fuels follow this, mainly in the form of petrol and diesel, of which their 
total share was 36.5%. Petrol alone accounted for 19% while diesel accounted for 16.5% of the 
country's final energy consumption. These fuels are mainly used in the transport sector. The other 
petroleum products used and their shares were as follows:- Paraffin (about 1 %) - mainly used for 
lighting by rural households and as a cooking fuel in some urban and rural households; LPG (1 %) -
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used in both rural and urban households; Jet A fuel (0.4%)- mainly used in aeroplanes; lubricants 
(0.4%); Fuel Oil (0.2%); and AVGas (0.2%). 
Coal, which is the only main source of electricity in Botswana, accounted for about 12.6% of the 
country's total final energy consumption whereas electricity's share to the final energy consumption 
was 9.1%. 
4.3 The Power Sector 
4.3.1 Background 
Botswana's power sector has been steadily growing over the last ten years. However, Botswana is a 
net importer of electricity, with about 55% of the country's total electricity requirements during 
2000/2001 being generated beyond its borders. Most of the imports come from South Africa. Other 
imports come from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. Although Botswana imports most of its 
power, it has abundant coal reserves that are currently used to generate the remaining 45% of the 
country's total electricity requirements, which is used as a base load. The reserves are so huge that 
they can be used to generate enough electricity to meet all of the country's demand as well as for 
export. Coal resources are estimated to be in the region of 212 billion tonnes of which 3.34 billion 
tonnes are measured. According to SAD-ELEC (1996), during 1993 - 96, Botswana carried out 
studies on a possible 2,400MW export power station. However, nothing has been done so far to 
implement it. 
4.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
The Botswana Power Corporation, BPC, a parastatal utility that was formed in 1970 by an Act of 
Parliament, has the responsibility to provide electric power throughout the country. It is responsible 
to the Ministry of Minerals, Energy, and Water Affairs, through the Energy Affairs Division within 
the ministry. The division was established in 1984 to co-ordinate energy related activities including 
the management of power development, coal development and energy planning. 
BPC is a vertically integrated utility and is responsible for generation, transmission and distribution 
of electrical power for the nation. In addition, the Department of Electrical and Mechanical Services 
(DEMS), under the Ministry of Works, operates isolated diesel generators to supply government 
institutions such as schools, clinics and offices, which are in remote areas. In addition, individual 
industries generate electricity for their own use subject to a licence being granted by the ministry. 
Another important institution in Botswana's power sector is the National Rural Photovoltaic 
Electrification Program (NRPEP), which is responsible for providing Solar Power. 
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Figure 4.1 Botswana's Power Sector Institutional Arrangements 
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BPC's vision of supplying cost effective electricity caused it to close its Selebi-Phikwe Power 
Station due to the high per unit cost of generation. The power station was effectively shut down on 
31st March 1996. The plant's per unit cost of generation was well above the imported energy from 
neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa. High costs of coal transportation and the age of 
the station, including the technology that was being used, were among the factors that contributed to 
the expensiveness of the generation. As a result of the closure of the Selebi-Phikwe power plant, 
BPC is currently running only one coal power plant, Morupule, which has an installed capacity of 
132MW (4X33MW). Previously the plant could provide up to about 80% of the country's power 
requirements, but as electricity demand increases the percentage has been decreasing and it can now 
provide only about 45% of the country's electricity requirements. Despite its decreasing capability 
in meeting the country's electricity demand, the plant's overall performance over the past ten years 
has been good, with a load factor of about 89% except for the 1995/96 and 1996/97 period when 
unit number two was unexpectedly damaged due to overheating (BPC 1997:11). 
A study to add two units each with a capacity of 120MW at Morupule Power Station was carried out 
in 1994 by Blackenridge International of Canada. The expansion would effectively triple the current 
generation of the station from 132MW to 372MW. Although the study recommended the expansion 
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to be carried out, BPC deliberately held it back simply because its funding would require borrowing 
money which would result in increasing the tariffs by 15-20% for the next 15 years. Instead, BPC 
decided to continue with importation of cheap power from Eskom. However, according to the BPC 
2001 annual report, the government has approved that feasibility study to be re-examined to evaluate 
the proposed generation expansion at Morupule. The study is earmarked to be completed by 2003. If 
the decision will be implemented, actual construction could also start immediately after in order for 
the plant to be commissioned between 2004 and 2007. 
Imports 
BPC depends more on imports than on its own generation for both economic and strategic reasons. 
Although BPC imports most of the electricity requirements, this is carefully done by constantly 
weighing up the benefits of importing against its own generation. In particular, there is a criterion, 
which was set in 1994 for the Corporation's "Import and Generation Policy". The criterion has 
remained unchanged ever since it was set but operational aspects of the imports have been changing 
in order to make the operations easier. As mentioned earlier, BPC imports most of its electricity 
requirements from Eskom of South Africa under a Power Purchase Agreement (PP A), which came 
into force in January 2000 and expires at the end of2007. In this agreement Eskom agrees to supply 
BPC up to 410MW (BPC 2001:17). Apart from bulk electricity imports, there are about 14 towns 
and villages which are supplied by cross border imports, mainly from ZESCO of Zambia, ZESA of 
Zimbabwe, NamPower of Namibia and Eskom. Units imported and generated internally and sent out 
are shown in Table 4.1. 
However, the evolution of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) plays an important role in 
meeting Botswana's power requirements and has, in fact, helped Botswana to have a diverse source 
of suppliers within the region. It can now import electricity not only from countries which it shares 
borders with but also from any other SAPP member country. BPC's active and strong participation 
in the SAPP electricity market has already yielded positive results. According to the BPC 2000 
Annual Report, a saving of about P7 million on imports was realised over a short period of nine 
months. It is envisaged that even more savings will be realised using the SAPP's new electricity 
trading arrangement, the Short Term Energy Market (STEM) through the Co-ordination Centre in 
Harare. 
Notwithstanding such positive results, financially and in terms of the availability of diverse import 
sources, the government is now concerned with the steady increase of the percentage of imports 
required to meet the country's fast growing electricity demand. It is expected that by 2007, imports 
will be supplying up to 70% of the country's total requirements. As noted earlier, efforts are 
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underway to expand internal generation so as to reduce this over-dependence on imports. The 
aspects of regional growth and future Power Pool tariffs which Botswana cannot influence have 
been the main source of the government's concern about its over-dependence on imports. 
Table 4.1 Units generated internally and imported 
~~~~ i!!W'!i'""~~~~rw, ~·· f-, OYi'_ 'j ~-·-"- -"" mmw-_ll.~·~~~J£.~!---~ 
s:: ~ '"' '···-i\: ~ , ~ '"'}m~r.:~~ ~--v><·~~-::.~..,"~ ~ E:eaif1f"'\i:_J~~--;1~_: i·-- :::_;"~""'"'r:-1~;~~- ~~- :r~ ·~~-.t111-"' -:: .t~-/,--~_" Jc,: 1~~ t~~~·--'t~ ""~vi'\\" - • · '~--"1? --~ .·,]lf'~ · ~, l ~"' • ~r ~5, iV i .-, ...... , 'r~";t~ . ,;; ,:· "t.., -~ -·-=-~ -'~---.J ' "-~'"' ~ ~~ ~./b,_<:._l!e>~l<-'-- ~""" ~--~"---"'-'"' 
1989/90 864.9 98.7 766.2 
1990/91 923.7 108.6 815.6 
1991192 901.0 111.7 789.3 
1992/93 1,083.5 132.2 951.3 
1993/94 1,014.8 118.8 896.0 
1994/95 1,010.5 123.5 887.0 
1995/96 1,017.0 123.8 893.2 
1996/97 725.4 141.9 583.5 
1997/98 834.5 100.7 733.8 
1998/99 1,015.5 115.0 900.5 
1999/00 1,027.0 115.0 912.0 
2000/01 1,034.6 115.0 919.6 
Source: Compiled from BPC 's Annual Reports 
Key: TSE =Total System Energy 
Transmission and Distribution System 
56.0 7 822.2 
97.4 11 913.0 
227.6 22 1,016.9 
113.7 11 1,065.0 
225.8 20 1,121.8 
299.6 25 1,186.6 
392.3 31 1,285.5 
812.4 58 1,395.9 
809.0 52 1,542.8 
744.0 45 1,644.5 
967.9 51 1,879.9 
1,123.1 55 2,042.7 
Botswana has a strong interconnected network and it is internationally interconnected to South 
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The interconnection is through 400kV, 220kV and 132kV 
lines while the well-developed national power grid consists of 222kV, 132kV and 66kV lines. A 
recent development on the transmission line was the construction and commissioning of the 
Sgodtshane- Thamaga 132kV line, the Thamaga Switching Station and the Thamaga- Jwaneng 
132kV line. This second 132kV line to Jwaneng mine was commissioned on the 4th August 2002 
and was expected to firm up supplies to Jwaneng itself as well as Molepolole and Kanye. Along 
with spending money on constructing new lines, BPC has been spending money every year on 
reinforcing the existing system. As a result, system losses, percentage wise, have been at almost 
single digit figures for the past ten years as discussed below. 
The distribution system, which consists of 33kV, 22kV and 11kV lines, has also been expanding 
over time to cope with the increasing demand from various economic activities as well as from the 
domestic sector. For instance, during 2000/2001, the distribution system grew by 13% in route 
length (km) and by some 3% in installed capacity (MV A). Just as with the transmission system, 
BPC also has given a high priority to the maintenance of its distribution system in order to minimise 
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unplanned outages (BPC, 2001:15). Total lengths of the different voltage transmission and 
distribution lines are shown in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 Transmission and Distributions Total Lines Lengths in Botswana (km) 
~~~~ 
1989/90 
1990/91 -
1991192 - 902 407 
1992/93 
-
902 470 
1993/94 
-
907 831 
1994/95 - 907 920 
1995/96 
-
1,007 1,243 
1996/97 
- 1,007 1,243 
1997/98 204 1,007 1,243 
1998/99 204 1,007 1,250 
1999/00 204 1,007 1,250. 
2000/01 204 1,007 1,385 
Source: Compiled from BPC's Annual Reports 
System Losses 
Botswana is one of the countries in the region with the lowest system losses. This has been the result 
of the BPC comprehensive maintenance programmes. In 2001 total system losses on the BPC's 
network were approximately 9.8%. This was less than the SADC average of 13.8% (BPC, 2001:9). 
A major source of the system losses is caused by customers tempering with meters and illegal 
connections of electricity which are on the increase, especially in Gaborone and Francistown (BPC, 
2001:21). Table 4.3 below shows BPC's network losses from 1990-2001. 
Table 4.3 Transmission and Distribution Losses 
Source: Compiled from BPC Annual Reports 
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4.3.4 Demand 
As is the case in most African countries, the majority of the population lives in the rural areas, but it 
is the urban areas that form the major electricity demand centres. True to this pattern, electricity 
supply in Botswana is also confined mostly to urban areas. Recently, however, the BPC, with 
support from the government, has embarked on a comprehensive rural electrification programme. 
As a result of the rural electrification programme, the corporation's customer base increased by 12.8 
% in2001. 
The above efforts to expand electricity access to the rural population resulted in an increase in the 
share of domestic electricity consumption from 10% five years ago to the current 13% of the total 
consumption. The mining sector still consumes the largest share, although it has decreased from 
62% to 52% in the past five years. The commercial sector category also consumes a large share and 
over the past ten years has been consuming on average about 25% of the total sales. Demand from 
domestic consumer category has been increasing more than other categories as a result of the BPC's 
efforts to expand access to electricity and rural electrification. 
In Botswana, the main electricity load centres are located in the southeastern and eastern part of the 
country. This is so because the major mining centres are located in these areas and consequently 
they are also the most populated. The main load centres are thus at Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe with 
its smelter complex, Gaborone, Orapa, Lobatse and Jwaneng. Table 4.4 shows electricity 
consumption by tariff category. 
Table 4.4 Electricity Consumption by Tariff 
'.tl~ 
1989/90 65.2 147.1 505.1 54.8 772.2 19,653 144.9 
1990/91 78.1 167.0 540.1 63.2 848.4 22,994 159.6 
1991192 94.6 183.6 595.5 66.3 940.0 25,591 179.5 
1992/93 109.1 215.8 593.4 72.7 991.0 31,937 193.9 
1993/94 122.0 240.9 583.6 71.1 1,017.6 37,471 188.9 
1994/95 146.6 278.6 612.4 74.5 1,112.1 44,164 194.7 
1995/96 160.5 339.3 618.9 78.7 1,197.4 49,465 204.9 
1996/97 173.8 380.2 668.1 85.1 1,307.2 54,440 222.6 
1997/98 190.2 382.4 715.2 90.5 1,378.3 60,023 238.5 
1998/99 222.6 418.8 753.1 106.5 1,501.0 67,397 256.5 
1999/00 280.4 491.8 759.7 138.8 1,670.7 76,380 285.0 
2000/01 3336 462.3 899.4 147.3 1,842.6 86,165 316.0 
Source: Compiled from BPC Annual Reports 
Key: 1 = Domestic; 2 =Commercial; 3 =Mining; 4 = Government 
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4.3.5 Tariff 
The BPC has six tariff categories: home; small business (electricity not exceeding 400 volts and 
loads not exceeding 35 kW); medium business (electricity not exceeding 400 volts and loads 
exceeding 35 kW), large business (electricity at or above 11000 volts); government; and water 
pumping. The tariffs themselves are broken down into three parts: fixed charge per month 
(administration), energy charge per kWh (production costs) and demand charge per kWh 
(investment costs). 
The tariffs are generally set to reflect the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of supply. The BPC's 
policy on continuing importation of cheap power against expansion of its own generation facilities 
has made it possible to restrict tariff increases over. a long period. With the aim of co-operating with .. 
the government in trying to curb inflation, BPC has a policy of limiting tariff increases to less than 
50% of Botswana's inflation rate. However, this is done carefully to ensure a balance against the 
principle of instituting sound financial policy practices. Over the past eight years average tariff has 
only increased by 10% in nominal terms - which implies a reduction in real terms after inflation is 
. taken into account. 
4.3.6 Access to Electricity and Rural Electrification 
This is an area where the BPC has put in much effort in order to increase its customer base as well 
as to fulfil one of the goals set in Botswana's Energy Master Plan. The goal specifies among other 
things, " Make access to electricity and use of electricity affordable. Provide a large number of 
households with access to electricity." In order to fulfil this goal, in October 1995 the government, 
through the BPC, introduced soft repayment terms for the cost of electricity connections. According 
to the BPC 1999 Annual Report, the introduction of the soft repayments scheme has increased the 
demand for electricity to the extent that the BPC in-house and external electrical construction teams 
have been working to full capacity in order to cope. In 1997 there were five private electrical 
contractors carrying out construction work to provide power to consumers on behalf of the BPC. 
This number was increased to seven in 2000. The arrangement of the soft repayment terms was that 
when it started in 1990, new customers were supposed to contribute 40% of the total connection 
costs and the balance was paid in equal instalments every month for a period of ten years. During its 
short period of operation, 1990- 1995, it proved successful hence the government decided to revise 
the terms to make them even more attractive. The revised mode of operation requires an individual 
to pay 10% down payment the remaining 90% being recoverable from the individual over the same 
period as before i.e. ten years. In April 2000, the payment terms were further relaxed to 5% as down 
payment, with 95 % recoverable in 15 years. 
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Rural Electrification 
Rural electrification in Botswana is funded by both the government and the BPC. The seriousness of 
the government and the efforts of the BPC in rural electrification have attracted foreign agencies, in 
particular SIDA and DANIDA, to assist in funding the rural electrification programme. In 1998, 
with the Swedish International Agency (SIDA) providing financial and technical assistance, 15 
villages were electrified. In the same year another 29 villages were also supplied with electricity 
from BPC and government funding on a fifty-fifty basis. As mentioned earlier, in 1998/99 70 more 
villages were expected to be electrified and 14 were earmarked for connection to the national grid. 
To take the efforts a step further, the BPC has been trying to make use of other technologies in order 
to supply affordable service to the low-income rural population. To this effect, in 1998, the BPC 
started and completed a pilot single wire earth return system (SWER). Consumer uptake on this 
network has been gradually increasing. The BPC had the intention of adopting the technology to 
other locations once it proved successful. 
The BPC had also investigated the possibilities of establishing solar villages in the country. The 
utility started a pilot project to electrify Khakhea using photovoltaic solar home systems (SHS). The 
project was estimated to cost P500, 000, and was expected to be completed in March 1999 (BPC, 
1998:16). This project is something that is rarely seen in Africa. However, little progress has so far 
been made in its implementation, although at the moment BPC is putting in place a new strategy 
aimed at integrating grid electrification with provision of electricity using PV. So far three villages, 
namely Motlhabaneng, Kudumatse and Lerolwana have been selected for the implementation of the · 
PV dissemination project (BPC, 2001:21). In the western part of the country, the BPC is planning to 
use photovo1taics, as grid extension would be quite expensive. Botswana's national grid is 
concentrated in the eastern part of the country thus leaving the western part without service. 
Furthermore, in order to minimise supply costs, the BPC has electrified a number of villages near 
the borders through cross border supply from Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa. The 
concept of rural collective schemes is another attempt by the BPC to reduce total costs of supply. 
In 1997, before the BPC started using PV, the government had initiated the use of PV for village 
electrification. Under this programme the government provided loans to customers to purchase solar 
PV installations through the Rural Industries Innovation Centre in Kanye. Just as it was with 
electricity connection costs, the customers were supposed to pay 15% of the total cost of the solar 
installation and the balance was to be paid through monthly instalments over five years. In 1997-
1998 some 234 solar installations were made. In 1998 the government was evaluating the 
programme to determine its success. 
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The BPC's efforts in rural electrification programmes and the programmes of generally widening 
access to electrification have been successful. The BPC has set targets of the number of new 
consumers to connect every year and it has been meeting these targets. In fact, it has been exceeding 
these targets and as a result the number of consumers has more than tripled over the period 1990-
1999. This has enabled Botswana to achieve a 29% rate of access to electricity, surpassing the 
SADC average of 17 percent. 
4.3. 7 BPC Financial Performance 
As highlighted by indicators in Table 4.5 below, the BPC's financial performance has been 
generally good over the past ten years. Over this periocl, the utility has been realising net profits on 
an increasing trend, except for the 1996/97 and 1998/99 fiscal years. The decrease in 1996/97 was 
due to an increase in expenditure on imported energy that resulted from a decrease in internal 
generation caused by a faulty unit at Morupule power station. That of 1998/99 was mainly due to an 
increase in depreciation and salaries. One may expect that this overall steady increase of BPC 
profitability is happening with a corresponding tariff increase but as mentioned earlier, actually 
there have been no significant tariff increases for the past six years. An important factor behind 
BPC's good financial performance is the fact that it is making maximum use of the available cheap 
electricity in the region. The unit cost of imported electricity has been decreasing over the past two 
years (BPC 2001:9). Its fmance charges have also diminished as its debt: equity ratio has improved. 
Other financial indicators such as the return on total assets and debt equity ratio have also been 
generally good. For the past ten years, except for 1993/94, the utility has been exceeding the World 
Bank set target of 5% for the average return on fixed assets (BPC, 1999:11 ). Although most of the 
financial performance indicators have been generally good for the past ten yeas, BPC staffing 
performance indicators have showed little improvement. For instance, even though the customer per 
employee ratio has .actually increased from 12 to 46, almost four times, the current ratio is still very 
low compared to international standards which stand at 160 customers per employee (SAD-ELEC, 
2001:7). In fact, BPC is supposed to have a high customer per employee ratio because of the fact 
that it imports most of its electricity in bulk and again it contracts out a significant portion of 
construction of service line works. Despite that, the BPC, along with Eskom of South Africa and 
Namibia's NamPower, is rated as one of the most financially viable power utilities in the Southern 
African Development Community (Ruffini, 1999: 11 ). 
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Table 4.5 Some Financial Performance Indicators of the BPC 
Number Number Total Sales Customers Total Total 
Per Revenue Asset Year of 'of Sales per- Value Customers Employees (GWh) Employ~e Employee MWh/Empl. (P'OOO) (P'OOO) . 
1989/90 19,653 1,614 772.2 478 12 114,058 585,238 
1990/91 22,994 1,649 848.4 514 14 140,809 587,113 
1991192 25,591 1,698 . 940.0 554 15 162,809 724,513 
1992/93 31,937 1,770 991.0 560 18 185,603 868,734 
1993/94 37,471 1,712 1,017.6 594 22 205,290 1,006,072 
1994/95 44,164 1,700 1,112.1 654 26 234,265 1,142,382 
1995/96 49,465 1,680 1,197.4 713 29 242,435 1,254,929 
1996/97 54,440 1,693 1,307.2 772 32 262,352 1,426,470 
1997/98 60,023 1,677 1,378.3 822 36 278,936 1,389,378 
1998/99 67,397 1,672 1,501.0 898 40 311,152 1,571,265 
1999/00 76,380 1,740 1,670.7 960 44 361,938 1,884,995 
2000/01 86,165 1,856 1,842.6 993 46 408,453 2,187,021 
Table 4.5 Continued 
Net ·Average Returns Debt/ Interest Historical 
Year Profit/Loss Selling Prite- _ -on - Equity Cover Excb~nge Before Tax of ElectriCity Assets Rat•o _ Ratio 
-· Rate _· 
·(P7000). (l'hebe/kWh) • -o/o .; PIUS$ . , 
1989/99 7,048 14.8 5.3 1.0 1.0 
1990/91 14,876 16.3 6.6 0.9 1.8 
1991192 23,974 17.3 7.3 0.5 2.2 
1992/93 34,049 18.8 6.7 0.4 2.6 
1993/94 37,048 20.2 3.7 0.3 3.7 
1994/95 60,205 21.1 5.3 0.3 4.7 2.77 
1995/96 76,134 20.2 6.0 0.2 4.7 3.32 
1996/97 72,392 20.1 5.1 0.2 3.6 3.65 
1997/98 95,678 20.2 6.4 0.2 8.2 4.23 
1998/99 89,501 20.7 6.0 0.2 5.9 4.62 
1999/00 127,645 21.7 7.7 0.1 8.0 5.10 
2000/01 165,335 22.2 7.7 0.1 17.0 5.46 
Source: Compiled from BPC Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001 
4.3.8 Sector Reforms 
The process of electricity industry restructuring, privatisation and regulatory reform, worldwide, has 
.been the current trend with the aim, amongst others, of improving the overall performance of the 
industry as well as creating conditions for its sustainable development. As discussed above the BPC, 
the sole electricity utility in Botswana's power sector, has been performing quite well to the extent 
of being able to restrict tariff increases for the past six years. Despite these good results, there is 
always room for improvement. In recognition of this fact, the government of Botswana approved a 
White Paper on Privatisation Policy, in March 2000, which earmarked the energy sector as one of 
43 
the sectors where liberalisation should be considered. Through the privatisation of the power sector, 
the government wants to make the BPC more efficient so as to supply electricity at least cost to the 
economy, in line with the National Development Plan 8. As part of the implementation of this 
privatisation policy the government has set up an autonomous public entity, Public Enterprises 
Evaluation and Privatisation Agency (PEEPA), which will evaluate the performance of the 
parastatals, BPC being one of them, and advise on the commercialisation and privatisation 
processes. 
Following the approval of this White Paper on Privatisation Policy by the parliament, some 
initiatives in regard to the power sector reform have already been undertaken. Recently, the 
government of Botswana has floated an advertisement inviting tenders from various consultants for 
a preliminary investigation on Electricity Supply Industry restructuring. Recommendations of this 
study will enable the government to make an informed decision on the industry's future. In 
particular the government wants the consultant of the study, among other matters, to review laws 
and regulation of the electricity supply industry; review and evaluate models of electricity supply 
industry restructuring in selected countries; and assess if any of these models suit Botswana and 
report on the impact of a restructuring of employment and tariffs. The consultant is also required to 
make recommendations regarding the ESI restructuring, based on the results of investigations, and 
to advise on how to proceed with the restructuring, if restructuring is the way to go. 
4.3.9 Regulatory Framework 
In 1970, an Act that established the Botswana Power Corporation and defined its constitutional 
rights and internal organisation was passed. The legislation gives the BPC all powers necessary or 
convenient for the performance of its functions and duties, provided it conducts its affairs on sound 
commercial principles. The BPC was also given a mandate to set out its own electricity tariffs. 
There is no independent regulatory board but consumers have the right of appeal to the Minister of 
Minerals, Energy and Water Mfairs. 
In its capacity as regulator, the Ministry, through the Electricity Supply Act of 1973, issues licences 
to applicants who want to operate in the ESI. However, the Minister is obliged to consult with the 
BPC before issuing licences to any applicants and must take into consideration BPC's future plans 
as well as give precedence to the BPC's interests. However, the government is now committed to 
distancing itself from regulating the sector and it wants to assign this task to an autonomous body. 
As part of the tasks to be performed by the consultant who will advise the government on 
restructuring options, the consultant is also required to recommend whether Botswana should 
establish a dedicated ESI regulator or a multi sector regulator. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Kenya 
5.0 Location and Demography 
Kenya is located astride the Equator on the East Coast of Africa. It borders Uganda in the west, the 
Indian Ocean in the east, Tanzania in the south and Somalia, Ethiopia and the Sudan in the north. It 
covers an area of 583,000 sq. km (225,000 sq. miles). The population statistics in Kenya in 1999 
reveal that there were 30.1 million persons living in the country, with 67% of the population living in 
the rural areas (World Bank, 2002). 
5.1 Economy 
Kenya's economy depends largely on agriculture, which accounts for about a quarter of the GDP 
(24.5 % in 1999), and approximately two thirds of exports. Agriculture is complemented by 
manufacturing (13.2% in 1999), commerce and tourism (12.5% in 1999). These last three 
collectively accmmt for an additional one-quarter of the GDP. Since 1998 Kenya's economy has been 
slowing down, which has been attributed to various factors including crumbling infrastructure, high 
interest rates, loss of investor confidence and prolonged droughts that have adversely affected 
agriculture and the power supply. The growth of the real GDP decelerated from 1.8% in 1998 to 
1.4% in 1999, and decreased further to -0.3 % in 2000. With the exception of the transport, storage 
and communications sectors, all other sectors recordered a negative growth rate in 2000. The 
country's inflation rate has remained at a single digit, averaging 6% in 2000/2001, and was projected 
to reduce to 3 % in 2002 as a result of expected improvements in food production (KenGen, 2001 a). 
In an attempt to reverse the economic decline situation, the Kenyan government has implemented 
yarious measures directed at removing structural bottlenecks, improving governance and creating an 
enabling environment for investment and economic growth. Some of these measures include reforms 
geared at restoring economic growth particularly privatisation of commercial public sector 
institutions. With regard to the general economy, this began in the 2000/01 financial year, but in the 
power sector the reforms actually started as early as 1997. 
5.2 Energy Sector 
The Kenyan energy sector is managed by the Ministry of Energy, which has always played a very 
important role in Kenya's economy. As is the case in other developing countries, particularly in 
Africa, biomass is also the major energy source of Kenya. Kenya's primary energy sources, in 
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descending order, are as follows: fuelwood dominates (55%), followed by petroleum (21 %), 
charcoal (13 %), hydro and geothermal (10 %) and lastly coal (1 %) (Ruffini, 2000b:18). 
Since the mid-1990s the Kenyan energy sector has been undergoing restructuring and reforms, 
particularly in the electricity and petroleum sub-sectors. The Government of Kenya decided to carry 
out these reforms due to acute power shortages caused by the lack of investment between 1990 and 
1996 and the persistent droughts. In its Electric Power Act of 1997, Kenya made a commitment to 
liberalise and privatise its power sector. As a result, Kenya was one of the first countries in Africa to 
embark on a power sector restructuring and reform programme, although its actual implementation 
was slow. The liberalisation of Kenya's energy sector has led to the introduction of private players in 
both the electricity and petroleum sub-sectors. These private players in the form of Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) are now contributing significantly to electricity generation. Restructuring and 
reforms in the power sector are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.8 hereunder. 
5.3 The Power Sector 
5.3.1 Background 
Kenya's power sector is relatively well developed, with an interconnected system linking all major 
towns and cities. The power supply comes from three major sources, i.e. hydro, thermal and 
geothermal. Most of the hydro developments, five major power stations, are situated along the lower 
part of the Tana River with water being cascaded from one station to the next. Although Nairobi City 
is the country's major demand centre, the national grid has been well developed and covers almost the 
entire country, thus connecting the generation centres to all major load centres. 
The existing installed hydropower capacity of 677.2 MW forms about 45 % (so far developed) of the 
total country's potential hydropower resource, which is estimated at 1,500 MW. An additional 
installed capacity of 60 MW is set to become available in July 2005 with completion of the Sondu 
Miriu River Project. About half of the potential is attributed to small rivers. In this regard, to date, 55 
river sites have been identified as commercial possibilities for micro hydro plants with a maximum 
mean capacity ranging from 50 KW to 700 KW (Lore, 2000). However, in contrast to the situation in 
Uganda, most of this potential is rainfall dependent and as a result the country has been experiencing 
acute electricity shortages. Kenya also has huge geothermal potential, which can be used to generate 
electricity at relatively low cost. According to the Kenya Electricity Generation Company (KenGen), 
576 MW of additional geothermal energy is planned by the year 2017, which will represent about 
25 % of Kenya's power requirements, projected at 2,349 MW. Furthermore, by virtue of its 
geographical location astride the Equator, Kenya has excellent solar energy sources, with mean solar 
radiation estimated at 5.5 kWh/m2/day, which is available for as much as 280 days per annum, 
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depending on location (Lore, 2000). A good number of solar home systems have already been 
installed to tap this resource. 
5.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
Before January 1997, there were basically two state-owned companies dealing with electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution in Kenya. These companies were the Kenya Power 
Company (KPC) and the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited (KPLC). The KPC was 
established and registered as a company in 1954 and was responsible for developing geothermal and 
other generating facilities, and the sale of electricity in bulk to the KPLC. The KPC was also 
commissioned to construct the Nairobi-Tororo-Uganda transmission line. Although it was registered 
as a company, it was, in fact, managed by the KPLC under a management contract. The KPLC was 
responsible for transmitting and distributing electricity throughout the country. 
In January 1997, the functions of the KPC and the KPLC were clearly separated; this included the 
separation of the KPC management from the KPLC. This occurred as a result of the power sector 
reforms, which were being implemented by the government at that time. The Electricity Regulatory 
Board (ERB) was also established and IPPs were introduced as part of the overall reform process. 
More specifically, the KPC which was re-launched on the 2nd October 1998 under a new name and 
corporate identity, namely the Kenya Electricity Generation Company Limited (KenGen), took charge 
of all publicly owned power generating plants. KenGen sells bulk electricity to the new Kenya Power 
and Lighting Company Limited (KPLC), which owns all the transmission and distribution assets and 
is responsible for the transmission and distribution of electricity; The KPLC also buys bulk power 
from IPPs and imports power from Uganda. The four main IPPs are lberafrica Power (K) Ltd, 
Westmont Power (K) Ltd, Orpower4 Inc and Tsavo Power Co. Ltd. All these players in Kenya's 
electricity industry are regulated by the ERB, which also has the responsibility of setting, reviewing 
and adjusting the tariffs. The Ministry of Energy is now only responsible for formulating the policy 
for the energy sector and administering the Rural Electrification Schemes. There are also a few 
private individuals and institutions that generate electricity for their own use and sell the surplus to the 
KPLC. Figure 5.1 below shows the institutional arrangements in Kenya's power sector, which 
basically consists of a single buyer model using Power Purchase Agreements (PP As). 
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Figure 5.1 Institutional Arrangement of Kenya's Power Sector 
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5.3.3 Supply 
The electricity supply in Kenya consists of power that is generated within the country itself, and 
power that is imported from Uganda. Each of these will be discussed more fully hereunder. 
Generation 
Kenya has a diverse electricity generation industry in terms of the players involved as well as the 
technology used. Kenya's total existing installed electricity generation capacity stands at 
1,072.1 MW, with an effective capacity of 889.1 MW. KenGen alone owns and operates 87 % of the 
total existing installed capacity. The four IPPs together own and operate 175.5 MW capacity as 
follows:- Iberafrica Power (K) Ltd. (56 MW), Westmont Power (K) Ltd. (43.5 MW), Orpower4 Inc 
(12 MW) and Tsavo Power Co Ltd. (74 MW). Table 5.1 shows the existing installed generating 
capacity in Kenya. In 2001, which was a drought year, the peak demand in the country was fairly low, 
724 MW. In the preceding ten years the highest peak demand had been 734 MW, attained in 1998/99. 
Apart from generation from KenGen and the four IPPs, three emergency power producers (EPPs) 
were contracted in the drought year (2000), to supply 105 MW of continuous power to ease the 
impact of power rationing. These EPPs were Aggreko ( 45 MW), Cummins (30 MW) and Deutz 
(30 MW), and their contracts expired during the May- June 2001 period. The government, with 
assistance from the World Bank, met the financial obligations of the contracts. In 2001 other power 
suppliers included Mimias Sugar Company that supplied 2 MW, and various private auto generators 
who supplied a total of20 MW (KenGen, 2001a & KPLC, 2001). 
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Table 5.1 Existing Installed Generating Capacity in Kenya 
Hydro 
Thermal 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Compiled from KPLC Annual Reports 
Key: 1 Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
2 Owned and Operated by Government of Kenya 
1981 
1982 
1985 
45.0 
3 Emergency Power Producers (EPPs) whose contracts ended in June 2001. 
The rest (not marked) Owned and Operated by KenGen 
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145.0 
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As regards the technology used in generation and as shown by the table above, 677.2 MW (about 
63 %) of the existing installed capacity is hydropower. As mentioned earlier, most of the hydropower 
plants are situated on the lower Tana River and all are owned by KenGen. Thermal energy sources 
with a capacity of 408.5 MW account for about 38% of the existing generating capacity, with 
geothermal capacity (57 MW) accounting for only about 4.8 %. The majority of the thermal stations 
are strategically located at the coast, near Mombassa, both for easy supply of fuels and also to service 
the Mombassa load, which is the second biggest load centre after Nairobi. To boost the existing 
generation capacity, KenGen is currently constructing two plants, a 64 MW geothermal plant, Olkaria 
II, and a 60 MW hydropower plant, Sondu Miriu. These plants are expected to be completed by the 
end of 2002 and mid-2004 respectively. Another 48 MW Olkaria III plant (IPP project) is also 
expected to be commissioned in July 2003 (KenGen, 2001a: 13). 
Imports 
Kenya also imports about 30 MW of continuous power from Uganda. It started doing so in 1954 
through a PPA, which will expire in 2008. However, all of Kenya's capacity, both imports and 
internal generation, is insufficient to meet its total demand, mainly due to the erratic nature of rainfall. 
As a result of this, Kenya has shifted its dependency on hydropower to the development of geothermal 
resources and thermal generation, and to an international interconnection and electricity trade. In this 
regard, as part of the KPLC's strategy to diversify its sources of bulk power, it has signed a new 
power purchase agreement for additional capacity with the recently established Uganda Electricity 
Transmission Company (UETC). Under the new agreement Kenya will import up to 80 MW of 
power from Uganda when the 200 MW Bujagali hydropower project .on the River Nile· is 
commissioned in February 2006. The new contract, which will replace the earlier one, will enable 
Kenya to purchase 50 MW of firm capacity and an excess of up to 80 MW for a period of 14 years 
(KPLC, 2002a). Table 5.2 shows the total amount of electricity generated in Kenya itself and the 
amount imported from Uganda. 
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Table 5.2 Units Generated and Imported 
·Total Total Totat Total 
Year Hydro Geo- Thermal Generation her mal (GWh) (GWh) (CWh) 'GWh) 
1989/90 298 
1990/91 2,760 298 110 3,168 
1991192 2,775 272 97 3,144 
1992/93 2,974 272 81 3,327 
1993/94 3,048 261 160 3,469 
1994/95 3,104 290 284 3,678 
1995/96 3,163 390 417 3,970 
1996/97 3,354 393 405 4,152 
1997/98 3,259 366 744 4,369 
1998/99 3,274 390 832 4,496 
1999/00 2,435 383 1,488 4,306 
2000/01 1,325 429 2,129 3,683 
Source: Compiled from KPLC Annual Reports 
TSE* = Total System Energy 
Transmission and Distribution System 
ImportS Total System 
System'. Load 
Units %of Energy-, If actor 
(GWh) TSE* (GWh):. (%). 
3,085 68.2 
134 4.1 3,302 67.8 
240 7.1 3,384 68.6 
273 7.6 3,600 69.3 
264 7.1 3,733 72.6 
187 4.8 3,865 72.2 
149 3.6 4,119 72.3 
144 3.4 4,296 72.1 
146 3.2 4,516 71.5 
140 3.0 4,637 72.2 
155 3.5 4,461 71.9 
198 4.9 4,081 64.4 
National grid extension was a major priority of the government during the 1980s and as a result the 
country is well covered. A 220 kV double circuit line connects the country's seven forks hydro 
complexes located at Kiembere and Nairobi. Other upcountry load centres are connected via 220 kV 
or 132 kV transmission lines. The system has been interconnected with Uganda's system through a 
132 kV-transmission line from Tororo (Uganda) to Nairobi. This line was built in 1954 to transmit the 
power generated at the Owen Falls Dam near Tororo in Uganda. Studies are now being carried out for 
a Kenya-Tanzania interconnection. A 250 km 220 kV transmission line will be built from Arusha 
(Tanzania) to Nairobi. Its completion will interconnect all the East African countries that form the 
East African Co-operation, namely Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. At the moment Kenya is pushing 
the Tanzania-Zambia interconnection so that it can access the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). 
However, Kenya is not yet a SAPP member although it has already applied for membership (KPLC, 
2001: 17). Table 5.3 hereunder shows the development of the transmission and distribution systems in 
Kenya from 1991 to 2001. 
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Table 5.3 Transmission and Distribution- Total Line Lengths in Kenya (km) (As at 301h June) 
~~-~~-~:l~--\ 77.'41)~,~- -- ;~~,:l~~:,\;;;~-,r-- ~;tll:<\vt --..- ~'tpT,\(--·r- ---~~ -- , ___ i!G\~7 . ~] 
L- --~ ~ - ~ it ~ -- -...,_ L .. ..._. - - - - ~l - ...- ... ""' - _ __..J:; -~ -~ J -- • • -. • -
1991 877 1,980 451 126 3,342 7,870 
1992 877 1,980 451 126 3,451 8,309 
1993 877 1,980 451 126 3,583 8,613 
1994 877 1,980 573 126 3,686 8,838 
1995 877 1,980 573 126 3,876 9,250 
1996 877 1,980 573 126 3,969 9,372 
1997 877 1,997 574 126 4,094 9,616 
1998 877 1,997 574 126 4;203 9,671 
1999 877 1,997 574 126 4,516 10,029 
2000 877 1,997 576 126 4,639 10,397 
2001 885 2,032 580 126 4,795 10,593 
Source: Compiled from KPLCAnnual Reports 
With regard to transmission developments, construction of a 140 km 220 kV line from Kiembere to 
Nairobi is currently underway and its completion will improve the transmission of power from the 
hydro stations on the Tana River to the capital city. Another 220 kV double circuit line from Olkaria 
to Nairobi and associated sub-stations is also under construction and was scheduled to be completed 
in mid-2002. This line, which covers a distance of 110 km, will enable the transmission of power 
from Olkaria ll and Olkaria lll power plants to the national grid. As part of the Sondu Miriu 
hydropower project, a 50 km 132 kV transmission line is being constructed and is expected to be 
completed in 2004 (KPLC, 2001: 9-13). 
System Losses 
Previously Kenya had relatively low system losses, both technical and non-technical, but during the 
1989/90-2000/01 period system losses have increased steadily, except during the 2000/01 fmancial 
year, when they decreased slightly, as shown in Table 5.4 below. This decrease can be attributed to 
various practical measures taken by the KPLC to reduce both technical and non-technical losses. For 
instance, to reduce technical losses, the KPLC implemented a number of system reinforcement 
projects and did maintenance work on the transmission and distribution systems, as well as installing 
loss reduction equipment on distribution lines. To reduce non-technical losses, the company carried 
out a countrywide meter inspection exercise in conjunction with a successful customer awareness 
programme. These measures are expected to be intensified in the coming years. The company set 
itself a target to reduce the system losses from the current levels to 17.5 % within the next three years 
(KPLC, 2001: 1 0). However, even if the KPLC attains its target, the percentage of 17.5 % is still very 
high by international standards. 
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Table 5.4 System Losses 
~l ~.~ 
- - l_ta r.- 'L_,L 
1989/90 484 14.8 
1990/91 511 15.2 
1991/92 566 15.8 
1992/93 559 15.2 
1993/94 598 15.6 
1994/95 660 16.2 
1995/96 660 16.2 
1996/97 695 16.4 
1997/98 831 18.6 
1999/99 884 19.2 
1999/00 957 21.5 
2000/01 869 21.3 
Source: Compiled from KPLC Annual Reports 
5.4.4 Demand 
In recent years, the demand for electricity in Kenya has. exceeded the supply. In 2001 the total 
installed electricity generation capacity stood at 1,173.1 MW, whereas the effective capacity was only 
988.1 MW. This effective capacity could not meet Kenya's electricity demands in 2000. In an attempt 
to avoid load shedding the government contracted three emergency generators to augment generation. 
These generated a total of 587.4 GWh. Despite these efforts, Kenya again experienced a heavy load 
shedding programme. Since September 1999, Kenya has been experiencing inadequate power in its 
system due to a lack of rain and delays in the implementation of planned power projects. This has 
resulted in losses to the economy that are conservatively estimated at approximately US$ 68 million 
per month (Daily Nation On the Web, 2000). All the major demand categories suffered heavily during 
this period, with small and large industries registering huge losses of output. 
Kenya's peak demand has grown year after year, regardless of the suppressed demand. For instance, 
over the period from 1989/90 to 2000/01 the highest peak demand was 734 MW during the 1998/99 
financial year. Due to power shortages, the system's peak demand dropped to 708 MW in 1999/00 
before increasing to 724 MW in 2000/01. The installation of back-up electricity generating units, such 
as small generators, solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, wind and other renewable energy sources has 
increased as a result of the unreliability of the power from the national grid and the failure to meet 
consumer demand. Moreover in rural areas four times as many households have solar home systems 
than are connected to the national grid, which is the reason why Kenya has one of Africa's most 
thriving photovoltaic (PV) electricity sub-sectors (Lore, 2000). 
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With regard to consumption per consumer category, the large commercial and large industrial 
category has always been the major consumers, followed by the domestic, small commercial and 
small industrial category. In 2001, for instance, the large commercial and large industry category 
consumed 1,361 GW, which is about 44% of the total electricity sold in Kenya (i.~. 3,091 GWh), 
while domestic, small commercial and small industry consumption was 34 %, (1 ,064 GWh) of the 
total. The demand from the latter category has been increasing steadily during the period under 
review, averaging over 6% before it decreased to -2% in both 2000 and 2001 due to load shedding. 
This initial rapid growth occurred because of the expansion of the informal sector, improvements in 
the standard of living and the increase in human settlement, particularly in urban areas. Nairobi, the 
major load centre, continued to record most of these increases, followed by Mornbasa. In 2001, 
Nairobi alone consumed about 52 %, while the Coast region, which includes Mombasa consumed 
about20% of the total electricity sold. In 2001 Nairobi's maximum demand was 401 MW, while that 
of the country was 724 MW. Table 5.5 shows electricity consumption for different consumer 
categories. 
Table 5.5 Sales of Electricity in GWh to different categories of customers 
Source: Compiled from KPLC Annual Reports 
Key: 
Tariff A - Domestic, small commercial and small industries 
B- Commercial (medium) and industrial (medium) 
C - Commercial (large) and industrial (large) 
D-Off-peak 
E - Street lighting 
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5.4.5 Tariff 
Electricity tariffs in Kenya need to be set at a level that is sufficient to keep its diverse power industry 
running smoothly. The tariff should make the KPLC financially viable so that it can pay for the bulk 
electricity it buys from the publicly owned KenGen and the IPPs. According to Gatheru et al., (1998), 
up until 1994 Kenya's electricity tariff was very low. After a comprehensive study, a new tariff was 
introduced that almost doubled the average price of electricity. The new tariff was set to recover the 
cost of both the generation and the distribution companies. It had three components: - a) the basic 
tariff based on 75% oflong-run marginal costing (LMRC), b) a fuel oil surcharge formula to recover 
the cost of fuel oil, and c) an exchange rate fluctuations factor on foreign loans. However, in 1999 the 
tariff was re-adjusted upwards as a result of the increase in fuel oil prices and the devaluation of the 
Kenyan shilling against major currencies. 
The 1999 tariff, although slightly revised in May 2000, is still in use but it is presently under review 
by a consortium of consultants, the National Economic Research Association (NERA) and a power 
industry consultant, GIBB (East Africa). The consultants were commissioned by the ERB to do the 
review and have already issued a draft report in 2001, which indicated that it was necessary to 
increase the .tariff. The consultants recommended that the new tariff proposal be made effective by 
July 2002 when the KPLC's new financial year (2002/2003) begins. This was recommended in order 
to ensure that the KPLC remained fmancially viable. According to the East African Standard (2002), 
with the existing tariff, the KPLC is completely unable to recover costs and last year- in 2001 -the 
company reported the biggest operating loss in Kenya's business history, namely Kshs 5 billion. 
Furthermore, the KPLC owes KenGen in excess of Kshs 12 billion in unpaid electricity supplies. 
Retail tariff adjustments are now done by the ERB. In future the ERB will from time to time review 
the tariff to ensure that it is sufficient to allow the power industry to recover all its costs. 
With regard to bulk electricity tariffs, which the KPLC pays to its various suppliers, it has been urged 
that the tariffs are extremely high. For instance, under the existing tariff between KenGen and the 
KPLC, which was approved by ERB and effected in August 1999, KenGen sells a unit of electricity to 
the KPLC at Kshs 2.36 (about 3.0 US cents) which is too high (KenGen, 2000a). According to the 
KPLC (200 1: 9), bulk power purchases cost the company up to 92 % of its annual total revenue. It 
further states that as part of the short-term measures to address the high cost of bulk power purchases, 
the company was negotiating a review of the bulk electricity tariffs with its suppliers (KenGen, 
lberafrica, Westmont and UETC for the imports) in order to rationalise the bulk tariffs with the retail 
tariff yield. To facilitate the review, a consultant, PB Power of United Kingdom, was appointed by the 
government to update a tariff study. This was already undertaken in 1998, and the consultant was 
supposed to produce a final report by January 2002. He was required to recommend appropriate bulk 
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power tariff levels between the KPLC and KenGen. It was expected that this recommended tariff 
would be implemented in April 2002. As to the import tariff, the KPLC has already succeeded in 
negotiating a tariff adjustment with the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company, which will result 
in an estimated annual saving ofKshs 200 million (KPLC, 2001: 13). 
5.4.6 Rural Electrification 
Since the early 1960s, Kenya has maintained the Rural Electrification Fund, which is administered by 
a committee under the Ministry of Energy. Apart from the levy on the electricity sold by the KPLC, 
donor agencies and the government have been contributing significantly to the Fund. The 
contributions from the donor agencies have been in the form of grants, very soft loans and interest 
differentials; while those from the government have come directly from the treasury or as remission 
from duties and taxes on imported materials. The Fund has made it possible to electrify almost all the 
district headquarters and a number of other rural schemes. 
The power sector reform process has also recognised the task that lies ahead for rural electrification. 
Under the revised Electric Power Act of 1997, there is a provision of a levy - up to a maximum of 
5% - on the KPLC's total revenue, for rural electrification projects. This is expected to generate 
funds to continue carrying out the Rural Electrification programmes as per the comprehensive rural 
electrification master plan which was prepared by the Ministry of Energy with the assistance of the 
Africa Development Bank. The KPLC is the implementing agency of the rural electrification plan and 
will be engineering and constructing various rural schemes itself or through subcontracting. However, 
according to Gatheru et al., (1998), there is no proper institutional framework with regard to the 
following functions: -
• To administer the Rural Electrification Fund; 
• To set procedures and formulate policies for planning, financing and executing the rural 
electrification programme; 
• To set priorities based on maximising economic benefit: cost ratio and to bring about the 
greatest social benefit to the communities 
• To allocate funds on an equal basis to all provinces, on the basis of size, population, economic, 
environmental and social factors. 
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5.4. 7 Financial Performance of the Utilities 
As noted earlier, there are basically two major utilities which operate in the Kenyan power sector. 
These utilities, KenGen (the electricity generation utility) and the KPLC (the transmission and 
distribution utility), are supposed to operate in accordance with commercial principles and are 
required to pay taxes as well as dividends to their respective share holders. After the separation of 
assets was completed in 2000, each utility now has its own assets. However, for the past two years 
their fmancial performance has so far been in direct opposition to each other, in the sense that one 
realised profits, while the other recorded net losses. While KenGen realised profits before taxation of 
KShs. 2,475 million and KShs 3,763 million for 2000/2001 and 1999/2000 respectively, the KPLC 
recorded net losses before taxation of KShs 4,106 million and 4,158 million for the same financial 
years. Other financial and performance indicators for the loss-making KPLC also deteriorated during 
the past two years, as shown in Table 5.6. Although the KPLC's total revenue seems to be substantial, 
there is an amount which cannot be counted as revenue, as it only collects it as fuel cost recoveries, 
which are passed on directly to consumers. For instance, as per the Income Statement as at June 30th 
2001, out of the KShs 28.2 billion collected in 2001, about KShs 12.1 billion were fuel cost 
recoveries. On the other hand, as shown in Table 5. 7, KenGen had very healthy financial and 
performance indicators. At the same time it should be noted that KenGen's sales per employee ratio is 
exceptionally high due to the fact that it sells electricity in bulk in contrast to the KPLC. This ratio, 
however, dropped drastically in 2000/2001 due to a decrease in the units generated, which was caused 
by drought (KenGen, 2001a & KPLC, 2001). 
According to the KPLC (2001:7) three major factors contributed to its lack of profitability, namely:-
ftrstly, high power purchase bulk tariffs with electricity suppliers, which take up 92 % of the total 
company's annual revenue. Secondly, high technical losses, which, for example, in 2001 caused the 
company not to realise a total of KShs 1 ,689 million. It should be noted that the KPLC buys 
electricity in bulk and in that way it pays also for the transmission and distribution losses. And last but 
not least is the decline in units sold due to power rationing between May 2000 and January 2001, 
which was caused by KenGen's failure to supply sufficient electricity to the KPLC. Apart from the 
non-availability of power from the generation segment, a situation which ended in January 2001 after 
the country received sufficient rainfall, the decline in units sold was caused by a lower than projected 
demand for electricity, experienced since January 2001 as a result of a general economic slow-down. 
Although the KPLC did not mention openly (in the 2001 Annual Report) the fact that some of its 
customers - and especially the government - were delaying paying their bills, it is likely that these 
delays also contributed to the KPLC's poor performance. According to East African Standard (2002), 
by January 2002 the government's pending bills with the KPLC were in excess of KShs 2.5 billion, 
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which the government had promised to settle, but little has, in fact, been paid. This is a significant 
amount of money that could to some extent reverse the company's poor financial performance. 
The poor performance of the KPLC has far-reaching implications for the Kenyan power sector as a 
whole. Since the KPLC operates as a middleman between the fmal consumers and the bulk power 
suppliers, its performance automatically, in one way or another affects the consumers or the bulk 
power suppliers. As appears from KenGen's balance sheet as at June 30th 2001, a total ofKShs 11.4 
billion was owing to them from the KPLC in the form of electricity units sold to them and in the form 
of a Development Surcharge due. This represents an increase from the amount of KShs 9.3 billion 
owing as at June 30th 2000. While such a big amount of money was owed by the KPLC, KenGen was 
struggling to raise money to finance its existing power construction projects estimated at KShs 3 
billion (East African Standard, 2002). According to the KPLC (2001:13) the construction work of 
Sondu Miriu 60 MW hydropower project has been adversely affected due to the government of 
Japan's delays in realising funding. KenGen has to come up with its share first, before the external 
financier, the government of Japan, releases his share of the funds. As a consequence of delays in 
payments, there were also problems with the Olkaria II 64 MW geothermal power project and, in fact, 
its contractor threatened to abandon the project. If these projects will not be completed and 
commissioned as planned, Kenya will again experience a major power supply shortage by 2004 (East 
African Standard, 2002). To reiterate, the ultimate cause of all these problems experienced by 
KenGen and of the fact that Kenya is on the brink of experiencing another electricity shortage, can be 
attributed to the poor performance of the transmission and distribution company, the KPLC. 
However, in recognising the need for KPLC to perform well in order to salvage the situation, it has 
put in place some short-term and medium-term measures. These measures included: enhancement of 
the power capacity, review of the power purchase bulk tariffs, reduction of the technical losses, 
business and organisation restructuring and improvement of the financial management of the 
company (KPLC, 2001: 13-14). These measures were developed with the assistance of the 
government and the consultant. As regards enhancement of the power capacity, it is envisaged that, 
subsequent to the recently commissioned 75 MW Kipevu II project and an additional 210 MW 
capacity expected to be commissioned between 2002 and 2005, the recent problem of power shortages 
will be overcome. 
In relation to the review of the bulk power purchase tariffs some steps have already been taken, as 
discussed earlier under the tariff subheading. Successful implementation of the measure to reduce 
technical losses, as was also discussed earlier, is projected to yield an additional revenue of KShs 200 
million per annum during the first year, which will increase to KShs 600 million per annum in the 
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third year. As for business and organisation restructuring, the company intended to, inter alia, reduce 
its workforce by 2,000 employees by June 2002. However, according to Oyuke et a/. (2002), the 
government and the World Bank, which is sponsoring the business and organisational restructuring 
exercise, are currently fighting over who should actually finance the project thus standing at a high 
risk of stalling. Improvement of the financial management entails implementing measures to improve 
its working capital, such as reduction of electricity debt and debtors (K.PLC, 2001: 13-14). 
Table 5.6 Some KPLC Financial Indicators 
Table 5.6 continued 
82,637 1.12 
1990/91 157,673 1.41 
1991/92 162,191 1.68 
1992/93 (261,178 1.75 
1993/94 763,136 3.10 
1994/95 1,499,803 4.29 51.43 
1995/96 1,512,042 4.57 4.27 57.12 
1996/97 2,160,099 4.96 4.59 58.73 
1997/98 2,005,343 5.17 4.71 60.38 
1998/99 1,721,924 5.17 4.64 70.33 
1999/00 7.00 8.03 -0.13 0.38 4.65 76.18 
2000/01 9.12 10.27 -0.16 2.08 8.33 78.60 
Source: Compiled from KPLC Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001. 
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Table 5.7 KenGen Financial Indicators 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 1 4,062 3,925,887 
1996/97 1 4,236 2,136,719 
1997/98 1 4,129 3,509,645 
1998/99 1 4,139 7,407,949 21,079,460 
1999/00 1 1,620 3,982 2,458 15,574,463 49,335,946 
2000/01 1 1,587 2,757 1,737 13,488,013 55,076,574 
Table 5.7 continued 
Source: Compiled from KenGen Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001 
5.4.8 Sector Reforms 
Power sector reforms in Kenya began in the early 1990s. Kenya is among the first African countries 
to embark on a power sector restructuring and reform programme. Previously, there were two publicly 
owned companies, which dealt with electricity generation, transmission and distribution, namely the 
KPC and the KPLC. As mentioned earlier, the KPC was managed by the latter under a management 
contract, and it was responsible for developing and running generating facilities. The KPLC was 
responsible for the transmission and distribution of electric power throughout the country, although it 
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also owned generating facilities under the Tana and Athi River Development Authority (TARDA), the 
Tana River Development Company (TRDC) and the Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA). 
The two entities mentioned above, which for practical purposes was a single entity as a result of one 
being managed by the other, performed relatively well since their inception up to the early 1990s. 
From this time, Kenya's power sector started to experience some difficulties, mainly due to an 
inadequate power supply. This was attributed to three major causes: - a) an over-dependence on 
hydropower generation, which was adversely affected by the lack of rainfall as well as the poor 
distribution of rainfall in the main catchment area; b) the high breakdown rates of both thermal and 
hydro plants, largely resulting from a lack of investment between 1990 and 1996 (Gatheru et al., 
1998); and c) more significantly is· the fact that none of the 250 MW of generation capacity planned 
between 1993 and 1997 was actually built (Ruffini, 2000b:32). Lack of investment and the failure to 
implement planned power generation projects were firstly due to an embargo imposed by donor 
agencies on the government, and secondly due to the failure of the KPC and the KPLC to finance the 
projects themselves. This resulted in massive load shedding, which began in 1996 and continues to 
date, and which has had a severe impact on Kenya's economy. 
Drivers for the reforms 
The main driving forces behind Kenya's power sector reforms are: -
• the generation shortages which were caused by the three factors mentioned above; 
• the government objectives of improving the efficiency of the power sector operation; and 
• attracting private investment (international financing) to remedy the situation by investing in 
power generation. 
As a result of these, a new Bill, the Electric Power Act of 1997 was passed by the Kenyan Parliament, 
becoming law on the 9th of January 1998. Among other things the Act provides for the following:-
• Separation of the policy and regulatory functions exercised by the Ministry of Energy and 
consequently the establishment of an autonomous Electricity Regulatory Board; 
• Separation of the management and other functions of the KPC and the KPLC; and 
• Seeking to liberalise the sector by enabling the private sector to participate m power 
generation and to sell electricity to the grid. 
Implementation of the reforms as provided for in the new Bill saw the power sector officially split 
into two utilities. Thus, the KPC and the KPLC were separated into two companies. As mentioned 
earlier, the KPC, which was wholly owned by the government, became a separate company with a 
separate board, management and staff and was charged with the generation of electricity in 
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competition with IPPs. It sells electricity in bulk to the KPCL. All the generation assets previously 
owned by the KPC itself and the KPLC were put under the control of the KPC which later, on 
October 2nd 1998, changed its name to the Kenya Electricity Generating Company Ltd- KenGen. On 
the other hand, the KPLC, a monopoly, remained responsible for the transmission and distribution of 
electricity in all the areas of the country. It thus buys power in bulk from KenGen and IPPs under bulk 
power purchase agreements. The KPLC also started to issue shares to the public, although the 
government owns the majority of these shares in order to retain control. The process of the separation 
of the assets between the KPLC and KenGen took almost three years and was finally completed in 
June 2000 (Daily Nation On the Web, 2000). 
While the process of asset separation took so long, the IPPs were allowed to operate even before the 
new Electricity Power Act of 1997 had been passed, in an attempt by the Kenyan government to ease 
the power shortage. Early in 1996, the KPLC signed power purchase agreements (PPAs) With two 
IPPs, Iberafrica of Spain and Westmont of Malaysia, to install 88 MW capacity together. These 
projects were commissioned in August 1997 (Gatheru et al., 1998). Thus, with regard to private 
generation, the new Act aimed to attract more investors and raise investors' confidence. As a result of 
having in place such an Act, two more IPPs were introduced, and there are presently a number of 
other private power generation projects under construction, some of which will be commissioned in 
the near future, such as the Kipevu II 75 MW diesel plant. 
The reforms also saw the establishment of the Electricity Regulatory Board in June 1998 to regulate 
the generation, supply, transmission and distribution of electricity. The establishment of the 
Regulatory Board removed the government's direct involvement in the sector. The government's only 
task with regard to the energy sector now is policy formulation for the sector and administering the 
Rural Electrification Scheme. 
The reform process is not complete yet. To ensure that the sector attains the optimum levels of 
efficiency, some other processes need to take place. These include the privatisation of various 
publicly owned assets and further vertically unbundling the KPLC to separate the functions of 
transmission and distribution. Distribution may also be horizontally unbundled to allow different 
distribution companies to service different load centres or zones. To create fair competition on the 
generation side, the giant and publicly owned KenGen may be divided into several small generating 
companies and sold to private individuals, although strategically the government may retain 
ownership of up to 45 %. However, the government of Kenya is still committed to continue reforming 
the power sector. It has been stated in various government policy documents, such as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that the government is committed to continuing with reforms in the 
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energy sector. The government has stated its commitment to the restructuring and privatisation of the 
power sector in order to make the sector more efficient, and also said that it aims to further restructure 
the KPLC so as to improve its operations and financial management (Daily Nation On the Web, 2000 
& KPLC, 2002c ). 
To fulfil its commitments the government, it is currently carrying out a power market design and pre-
privatisation study through a consultant in order to determine an appropriate competitive electricity 
market structure for the country. In addition, the consultant will recommend effective ways of private 
sector participation in generation, transmission and distribution. The consultant is supposed to 
complete the study in 2002 (KenGen, 2001). In October 2000, prior to these initiatives the 
government appointed a team known as the Restructuring Task Force and a management consultant 
(Price Waterhouse Coopers) to review the organisational, management and financial structure of the 
KPLC. The consultant was expected to make recommendations on how the KPLC could be 
restructured to make it more efficient and how to reduce the operational costs of the company. Some 
steps, such as reducing the number of the KPLC functional divisions from 15 to 7 and reducing the 
operational areas from 6 to 4 business regions, have already been taken since then. On the other hand, 
according to the KPLC (2001: 9) the government is currently preparing a National Energy Policy to 
make the fiscal, regulatory and legal regime of the sector more investor friendly so as to attract more 
private investors. 
5.4.9 Regulatory Framework 
Kenya's Power Act of 1997 provided for the separation of the policy and regulatory functions 
exercised by the Ministry of Energy by establishing an autonomous regulatory board. Consequently, 
the Electricity Regulatory Board (ERB) was established in June 1998. Prior to this, the Ministry of 
Energy was responsible for the functions of both regulation and policy formulation in the electricity 
sector. The establishment of the ERB was part of the overall reform process of the power sector and it 
was established to manage the sector and to ensure efficient functioning. 
However, according to a study conducted by Nyoike et al. (2002: 1 ), which examined the autonomy 
of the ERB, it was established that it is not as autonomous as it ought to be. This is because of the fact 
that the Electric Power Act of 1997 and the State Corporation Act (SCA) of 1986 defme the ERB as a 
state corporation. The study further revealed that the SCA provides for the dissolution of a state 
corporation, the dismissal of a board member and even the entire board by the executive and that the 
board was recently replaced in its totality, which confirms the power of the executive over the ERB. 
As regards the granting, suspension and revocation of licences, the study found that the ERB' s role is 
merely advisory, and that the final authority rests with the Energy Minister who is not bound to accept 
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the ERB's recommendations. The study recommended, among other things, that instead of ERB 
members being appointed by the Energy Minister, they should be appointed by the Cabinet, which 
would reduce their vulnerability and simultaneously increase their autonomy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Namibia 
6.0 Location and Demography 
Namibia is located in Southern Africa. It borders the South Atlantic Ocean to the west, Angola to the 
north, and Botswana to the east and South Africa to the south. Namibia has a total area of 825,418 sq. 
km. In 2000 it had a small population, by international standards, of only 1.8 million people, scattered 
over the entire land area. 31% of this population is considered urban while 69% of the population live 
in the rural areas 0N orld Bank, 2002). 
6.1 Economy 
The Namibian economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals. Export of 
non-fuel minerals accounts for a significant portion of its exports. It is the fourth largest exporter of 
non-fuel minerals in Africa and the world's fifth producer of uranium (Photius, 2000). Apart from 
uranium, other minerals exported by Namibia are diamonds, lead, zinc, tin, silver, marble gemstone, 
copper and tungsten. Namibia is rich in alluvial diamond deposits. The export of minerals makes the 
mining industry a key sector in Namibia's economy. In 2000, its contribution to the total exports was 
50.7% (Bank ofNamibia, 2001). 
Unlike other African countries, agriculture contributes little to the total GDP of Namibia, an average 
of 10% in the period 1996-2000. However, a large number of the population depends on subsistence 
fanning despite the fact that it is often severely affected by frequent droughts. This results in the 
majority of the population living in abject poverty due to its over-dependence on subsistence farming 
and the fact that the country's income distribution is highly skewed (Photius, 2000). Even though 
agriculture's contribution to the GDP is minor, the country's manufacturing industry focuses on food 
processing and beverages. In the period 1996-2000, the manufacturing sector contributed an average 
of 14.2% to the total GDP. Namibia furthermore has one of the richest potential fisheries in the world. 
Its contribution to the total GDP has been significant, about 4.5% on average over the period 1996 -
2000 (Bank of Namibia, 2001). 
Namibia's economic policies aim at sustaining an economic growth variety in the productive base and 
the attraction of foreign investors by offering an attractive incentive package. Among the incentives to 
foreign investors are that there are no restrictions on them bringing funds into the country or taking 
out investment capital, interest or dividends. However, dividends are subjected to a 10% withholding 
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tax while there is no withholding tax on interest. Foreign investors are highly attracted to the economy 
in order to contribute to Namibia's economic growth which was 4.5% in 2000. This year the GDP, at 
current prices, was N$23,786 million. The real per capita GDP ofN$8,096 (about US$1,153) and the 
per capita national income ofN$9,075 (about US$1,293) in 2000 defines Namibia as a middle-income 
country (Bank of Namibia, 2001). The government is now reducing its direct involvement in the 
economy by privatising most of its publicly owned enterprises. Its future role will be to provide an 
enabling environment for strong private sector involvement so as to stimulate faster economic growth. 
6.2 Energy Sector 
Namibia's energy sector is one of the key sectors of the country's economy. As in many African 
countries, Namibia's energy sector is also a key link between poverty and environment. This is due to 
the fact that wood is the single largest fuel source for the rural households. As mentioned earlier, 72% 
of Namibia's population lives in the rural areas, thus exerting huge pressure on the forests and the 
environment. It is estimated that about 93% of rural households depend on wood for their cooking, 
lighting, ironing and water heating (Utonih, et al., 2001:2). Some poor households are meeting these 
energy needs by using low quality energy types such as crop waste and dung. 
Petroleum products, i.e. petrol and diesel, dominate the energy sector in terms of commercial energy 
consumed. In the year 2000, they accounted for 63% of the total commercial energy consumed. All 
the petroleum products consumed in Namibia are imported with 60 - 70% coming from South Africa. 
Electricity is the second largest commercial energy consumed, accounting for about 17% of the total 
in 1996. Coal consumption accounts for only about 5% of the total commercial energy consumed with 
most of it being imported from South Africa as well. 
Lying on the same south-west coast with Angola, which has quite a lot of economically exploitable oil 
reserves, Namibia has yet to experience a commercial oil discovery although extensive explorations 
have been done and were recently intensified. However, Namibia has ample reserves of natural gas 
which can be commercially exploited. Policy formulation to guide exploration and exploitation 
activities of these resources (oil and gas) as well as policy development of the overall energy sector, is 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
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6.3 The Power Sector 
6.3.1 Background 
Before its independence from South Africa in 1990, the power sector in Namibia was developed 
mainly to supply the urban centres. Since independence, considerable progress has been made in 
supplying grid electricity to the rural areas and also in widening access to those living in urban areas 
that previously had not been connected. However, despite all the progress most of the electricity 
supplied in Namibia is imported from South Africa thus leaving the abundant domestic electricity 
potential sources undeveloped. 
One of the potential electricity sources is natural gas discovered at Kudu in the late 1960s early 1970s 
when the initial offshore exploration phase took place. Mbendi quotes Namibia's state oil company, 
Namcor, as saying that the country has sufficient gas deposits to meet its electricity demand for the 
next century and that proven reserves stand at 1.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) which justifies the plans for 
exploitation. There have been plans to exploit the gas for liquefied natural gas (LNG) production for 
exports, electricity generation in Namibia and piping - over a distance of 700 km to the Western Cape 
in South Africa. This would make Namibia self-sufficient in power generation for a considerable 
period in the future. 
Apart from natural gas, the country also has a significant hydropower potential mainly on the Kunene 
River. The potential includes 12 different schemes ranging from 50 to 500MW (MME, 1998:10). 
Some of this potential has already been developed while studies are going on to determine the 
feasibility of the others. There are also other rivers with some potential although at the moment the 
feasibility is not known. The only known site is the 15MW potential on the Okavango River. 
Namibia is also considered to have plenty of untapped solar power and wind potential due to its 
location. There is plenty of wind in the coastal areas and currently Namibia is planning to put up a 
wind turbine farm. 
6.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
Namibia has a relatively diverse power sector, different from many African countries where publicly 
owned monopoly utilities are responsible for generation, transmission and distribution. The power 
sector in Namibia is different because of the fact that the Namibia Power Corporation Pty Limited, 
henceforth NamPower, the state owned utility, is responsible for generation and transmission only. It 
sells electricity in bulk to the distribution entities _!lnd to large customers such as mining companies 
and commercial farms. NamPower was established on 9th December 1964 as the South-West Africa 
Water and Electricity Corporation (SWA WEK) and became operational in 1973. Later it was 
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registered as a private company under the Company Act of 1973. It had a monopoly in electric power 
generation and transmission. 
Municipal electricity departments largely undertake distribution of electricity in Namibia. There are 
46 municipalities and local authorities supplying electricity to end-users in the urban and peri-urban 
areas. In the rural areas, distribution is the responsibility of the Ministry of Regional and Local 
Government and Housing (MRLGH) although NarnPower supplies commercial farmers. Other 
government departments are also involved in the supply of electricity but mainly for government 
buildings and own use. The Department of Works used to run diesel generators in areas not previously 
electrified and was supplying electricity to the government offices. It was also responsible for paying 
all the government energy bills. Recently, individual government departments have had to take 
budgetary responsibility for many of the Department of Works functions. 
Although the MRLGH is the one responsible for rural distribution, electricity supply to some other 
areas in Namibia have been contracted out to private companies. In the northern part of the country, 
Northern Electricity (Pty), a private company, distributes electricity. The company started as a 
revenue collecting agency for MRLGH and also handles supply in rural areas in the regions of 
Oshana, Ohangwena, Omusati and some districts in the Oshikoto region. However, the assets are still 
publicly owned by the MRLGH. The company is responsible for operation, maintenance, new 
connections, revenue collection and payment of NarnPower charges but with MRLGH monitoring. 
NarnPower together with the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) are responsible for rural 
electrification. In this case, NarnPower is responsible for the main rural transmission and distribution 
system and direct supply to commercial farmers and users in places where there are no municipalities. 
In July 1999, the country's electricity distribution industry was bolstered by NamPower establishing a 
subsidiary company, Premier Electrical, to engage in electricity distribution. The new company is 
responsible for distributing electricity to smaller consumers in small towns and municipalities, towns 
and villages by using both grid and off-grid technologies particularly solar power. In municipal areas, 
the company has entered into joint ventures with the municipalities to provide reliable and affordable 
power to the local residents. 
Overseeing the activities of all the above institutions in the power sector is the responsibility of the 
Electricity Control Board (ECB) which was established in July 2000. It controls and regulates the 
industry in all aspects of generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. 
Diagrammatically, institutional arrangements in Namibia's power sector are shown in Figure 6.1 
below. 
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Figure 6.1 Namibia's Power Sector Institutional Arrangements 
Generation 
(NamPower) 
-co 
Exports u w 
J 
......... 
~r ~ Angola -o t.. Cj 
0 
Imports .. Transmission Botswana 1 co -
-South Africa r (NamPower) ~ 0 t.. ] +-~'~ S.Africa > s:: 0 u 
r >-
= 
.t 
Q u ... 
.... 46MLA Premier MRLGH Northern t.. 
= ,.CI Electrical Electrical +-... u ... 
.... 
..!! 
"' 
... 
\,. w Q 
'------' 
., .. ~r ,,. ., [ Customers I 
6.3.3 Supply 
As is the case in most of the countries which border South Africa, Namibia's electricity supply is 
made up of internal generation and imports, with most of the imports coming from South Africa. 
Generation 
Currently all the generation facilities are owned and operated by NamPower. In fact, previously 
NamPower had a monopoly over generation but now generation has been opened up to competition. 
Most of the generation facilities, which make up about two thirds of the total country's installed 
capacity are on the Kunene River at the Ruacana Falls in northern Namibia. The Ruacana hydropower 
plant, which is a run-of-river power plant, has an installed capacity of 249MW. As a run-of-river 
hydropower plant, its ftnn capacity has been highly fluctuating depending on the amount of rain 
received in a particular year. Utonih and Dlamin (200 1: 15) quote the World Bank as saying that 
Ruacana's capacity is reduced to half its rated capacity, 130MW, for much of the typical hydrological 
year and to as low as 65MW during the driest quarters. 
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NamPower's other installed electricity generating facilities are: - Van Eck coal plant at Windhoek 
with a capacity of 120MW and the Walvis Bay diesel plant with an installed capacity of 24MW. 
However, these thermal plants have been kept on standby mode due to their high per unit cost of 
generation compared to the substantially low unit price from power trading within the rules of SAPP 
(NarnPower, 2000:11). Table 6.1 shows existing installed electricity generating capacity in Namibia. 
Table 6.1 Existing Installed Electricity Generating Capacity 
HYDRO Ruacana 1980 240 
VanEck 1972 120 
Thermal Walvis Bay 1979 24 
r=~--~~~----r-------------~-------r------~~----------i Katima Mulilo 3 
Total Existin_g_ Installed Ca_pacit;y 387 
Source: Compiled from NamPower Annual Report, 2001 
As mentioned earlier, internal generation in Namibia is mainly from the Ruacana hydropower plant 
and according to the NamPower 2000 Annual Report, in 2000 generation reached an all time record of 
1,407GWh. This was attributed to above average water flows in the Kunene River coupled with 
increased efficiency at the Ruacana plant. However in 2001, generation decreased by 13A% to 
1,211GWh mainly due to less water flow in the Kunene River compared to the flow in 2000. Despite 
the decrease in hydro generation, the thermal plants continued to be on a s~dby mode and the 
difference was sourced from importing more units from South Africa. Generation at the Ruacana plant 
will continue to be constrained until the Gove Dam in Angola, which was built on the Kunene River 
to regulate water flow, is repaired. The dam was damaged during the civil war in Angola before it was 
even commissioned. Perhaps now that there is peace in Angola the dam is going to be repaired and 
will become operational as originally envisaged. 
Imports 
Units imported during a particular year depend on the performance of the Ruacana hydropower plant, 
which, as mentioned, is influenced by the amount of rainfall received. In 2000 internal generation 
increased and the electricity imported decreased by 11.5%. Namibia's overall dependence on imports 
then declined to 34.8%, the lowest over the period 1990 - 2001 (NamPower, 2000:14). In 2001 
internal generation decreased and the units imported increased to 1,066GWh, which was about 47% 
of the total units supplied. Table 6.2 shows Namibia's internal generation and imports from Eskom in 
South Africa. Namibia also imports electricity through a 66kV interconnecting power line from 
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Zambia. This serves the Eastern Caprivi region which includes the town of Katima Mulilo. Apart 
from South Africa and Zambia, Namibia also buys electricity from SAPP which sells power on the 
Short Term Energy Market (STEM) or on Bi-lateral Agreements. 
Table 6.2 Units generated internally and imported 
Internal IMPORTS Total Imports(%) System 
Year Generation System tn Total Maximum 
ESKOM ZESCO Energy System Demand 
(GWb) (GWh) (GWh} (GWh) Energy (MW) 
1990 1,149 641 - 1,790 35.8 225 
1991 1,368 551 - 1,919 28.7 240 
1992 
- 1,949 246 
1993 
-
1,747 279 
1994 879 874 - 1,753 49.9 251 
1995 1,257 758 - 2,015 37.6 277 
1996 873 1,078 
-
1,951 55.3 294 
1997 630 1,319 - 1,949 67.7 321 
1998 1,004 1,192 15 2,211 54.6 326 
1999 1,198 869 18 2,085 42.5 298 
2000 1,407 766 19 2,192 35.8 317 
2001 1,211 1,045 21 2,277 46.8 332 
Source: Compiled from NamPower Annual Reports 
Planned Generation Development 
Currently NamPower is concerned with the over-dependence on imports. Tassel (1999:8), quotes the 
NamPower Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Leake Hangala, as saying that "it is of concern to be 
dependent on a neighbour, no matter how friendly that neighbour might be". According to the journal 
he made the statement when he was commenting on the ability ofEskom to supply power to Namibia. 
To this effect NamPower has now initiated aggressive efforts to reduce the over-dependence by 
having on hand plans for the construction of power plants to increase internal generation. A wind 
power station with a capacity of up to 10MW will be constructed at Liideritz near Grosse Butch. 
According to NamPower (200 1 ), its construction will start immediately after securing a licence from 
the Electricity Control Board. 
NamPower's efforts to increase generation and, if possible, to become self sufficient, rests on two 
possible developmenst, the Epupa hydro plant on the Kunene River and the development of the Kudu 
gas field. According to NarnPower, a combined cycle power plant with a capacity of 750MW was 
planned. Given the current electricity demand in Namibia, completion of this plant will not only give 
Namibia enough internal capacity but also a significant export capacity. However, recent wells drilled 
by Shell have been dry and Shell has withdrawn from the venture. Furthermore, feasibility studies for 
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a 20 - 30MW hydropower facility at Divindu which will supply the Kavango and Capri regions are 
scheduled for next year. 
Transmission and Distribution System 
Namibia's national grid is concentrated at the centre of the country running from the southern to the 
northern end of the country. The grid system is made up of 400, 300, 220 and 132kV transmission 
lines. A newly built 900km 400kV transmission line strengthens Namibia's connection to the South 
African grid. It runs from Aries near Kenhardt in South Africa via Keetmanshoop to the Auas 
substation just outside Windhoek in Namibia. Of the 900 km, 735 km are on the Namibia side and the 
remainder are in South Africa. The completion of the line has given Namibia sufficient capacity to 
meet its power demand for a long period in the future through imports from South Africa and from the 
SAPP. 
The country has a total of 521 km of 330kV -transmission line which connects the Ruacana power 
station to the country's main distribution station at Ornburn near Omaruru. It was built in 1977 and 
since then there has been no other transmission line built at this voltage level. 
Before construction of the 400kV interconnector, power imports from South Africa were via a double 
circuit 220kV line. This line was first built as a single circuit in 1980 with a length of 740 kilometres. 
Later, in the late 1980s, this line was upgraded to a double circuit after the building of another 740 
km, thus making the total line length 1480 kilometres. Another 125 kilometres of 220kVtransmission 
line was built in 1995 which connected the town of Oranjemund in the extreme southwest to the town 
of Ariamsulu in the extreme southeast. 
Development of the 132kV line, which was undertaken between 1990 and 2001, included the 
construction and commissioning of a 156 km line in 1991 to supply power to the Elizabeth Bay 
diamond mine. In 2000 another 220 km were commissioned to transmit power from the Ruacana 
hydro power station to Omatando - Okatope. This line was expected to improve the quality and 
reliability of power supplies and to cater for the expected load demand increase in northern Namibia. 
Over the past eleven years, 1990 - 2001, NamPower has been concentrating on widening access to 
electricity to the Namibian people and as a result the total lengths of the medium and low tension 
lines, 66kV and below, have increased considerably. For instance, in 2001 NamPower constructed a 
total of 567 km of 66kV and below lines, as can be seen in Table 6.3 below. The table also shows 
development of the major transmission lines. 
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Table 6.3 Transmission and Distribution Total Line Lengths in Namibia (km) 
~~---qr______,~~~r-~~r7.:~ 
L__::rGEu ,_ . !·W- _[ ~~~Y ~ j - 1.£~DtM' _J " i_ c.m_::~· (~~r?~ 1tu tJ 
1990 - 521 1,480 790 5,090 10.00 
1991 - 521 1,480 946 5,453 10.50 
1992 
-
521 1,480 946 6,507 
1993 
-
521 1,480 946 7,576 
1994 
-
521 1,480 946 8,519 11.41 
1995 
-
521 1,645 946 9,580 11.46 
1996 
- 521 1,645 946 10,546 11.28 
1997 - 521 1,645 946 11,293 12.78 
1998 
-
521 1,645 946 11,516 13.89 
1999 289 521 1,645 946 11,924 10.65 
2000 735 521 1,664 1,166 12,656 9.76 
2001 735 521 1,664 1,166 13,223 9.97 
Source: Compiled from NamPower Annual Reports 
System Losses 
Unlike other African countries where there is a sole utility generating, transmitting and distributing 
electricity, figures for system losses given by NamPower do not represent the system losses for the 
whole country. As distribution of electricity in Namibia is undertaken by many other entities, getting 
the national figure for system losses entails combining all system losses figures from all the entities in 
the electricity supply industry. Consequently the figures in Table 6.3 above are only for NamPower 
transmission losses. NamPower has been able to maintain these losses at below 10% for the past two 
years. 
6.3.4 Demand 
Electricity demand in Namibia consists of domestic demand and export demand. 
Domestic demand 
In the early 1990s, the mining sector was the major electricity consumer in Namibia. During this 
period, electricity consumed by the mining sector was more than that consumed by the municipalities 
to distribute to their proclaimed areas. For example, in 1990 mines consumed 736GWh, about 47% of 
the total while the municipalities in total, purchased 619GWh, about 40% of the total consumption. 
However, from 1992 demand from the mining sector has been decreasing and in 2001 mines 
accounted for only 29% of the local electricity consumption. In 2001, electricity consumed by the 
mining sector decreased to 592GWh from the 1991 high of 757GWh while at the same time demand 
from municipalities increased to 1,161GWh from 659GWh in 1991. The mining sector electricity 
consumption declined because of the dormancy of copper mining and processing activities at Tsumeb 
which historically was one of Namibia's largest consumers of electricity (NamPower, 1999: 14) 
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While electricity consumption by the mining sector was declining, consumption by other consumer 
categories was increasing particularly, as mentioned, from the municipalities as well as from the rural 
areas. Increase in demand in these categories was because of commitments to increase access to 
electricity both in the urban and rural areas. In 2001, rural areas demand increased by 12% although 
the rural areas electricity consumption accounts for only about 11% of the total consumption. 
Exports Peak Demand 
Ironically, while Namibia imports most of its electricity from South Africa, it also exports electricity 
to South Africa and other countries, like Angola and Botswana. NarnPower supplies electricity to 
Katima Mulilo from Zambia through a 66kV transmission line. NarnPower also supplies electricity to 
the Mohombo area in Botswana through a 33kV power line from Omaere, Gobabis in Namibia. 
Furthermore, NamPower supplies southern Angola from Omatando. The contribution of these cross 
border supplies to Namibia's 332MW peak demand in 2001 is not significant. Out of the total energy 
of2005GWh supplied by NarnPower in 2001, exports accounted for only about 3%. In 1992, exports 
to ESKOM were 204GWh, about 12% of the total system demand, the highest recorded over the 
period 1990 - 2001. Since then exports to South Africa declined to a record low of only 1GWh in 
1997. This was due to the fact that the country experienced devastating droughts during the preceding 
years which severely affected the performance of the Ruacana hydro power station. Table 6.4 shows 
electricity consumption by different consumer categories and exports to neighbouring counties. 
Table 6.4 Electricity Consumption by Consumer Categories (GWb) 
1990 619 736 91 166 1,612 
1991 659 757 102 201 1,719 
1992 720 688 102 204 1,714 
1993 750 641 111 49 1,551 
1994 803 606 116 28 1,553 
1995 868 631 139 146 1,784 
1996 913 656 132 30 1,731 
1997 963 596 140 1 1,700 
1998 1,028 668 185 1 1 21 1,904 
1999 1,060 562 185 1 3 52 1,863 
2000 1,114 560 204 1 4 95 1,978 
2001 1,116 592 228 2 5 62 2,005 
Source: Compiled from NamPower Annual Reports 
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6.3.5 Tariff 
NamPower, over time, has been maintaining price stability in its sales of electricity - something 
which NamPower expects to retain during the electricity reforms. Such price stability will foster 
increased demand among industrial, mining and other bulk electricity users to the benefit of 
Namibia's economy. In this respect, NamPower is determined to maintain the price of electricity at 
affordable levels. However, NamPower efforts and determination should be supported by the 
distribution entities, as the final consumer price depends highly on their performances. 
According to NamPower's 2001 annual report, the unit cost of electricity sold to customers over the 
years has been declining in real terms although it does not reflect the cost of supply. In an attempt to 
make the prices reflect the cost of supply, tariff adjustments were effected on 1st July 2000. Since then 
there have been no other adjustments. Last year NamPower proposed to the Electricity Control Board 
an implementation of a phased move towards fully cost-reflective tariff in each of the areas of 
generation, transmission and distribution (NamPower, 2001:15). 
The consequences, of Namibia's fragmented electricity distribution industry, which has a number of 
players, is the fact that end-user electricity prices vary considerably throughout the country and 
between urban and rural areas. The pricing structures and levels of the distribution ip.dustry do not 
reflect the cost of supply, hence they are not conducive to efficient resource allocation (White Paper 
on Energy Policy, 1998:22). In this policy document (White Paper on Energy Policy), the government· 
states "electricity tariff structures and prices will be based on sound economical principles generally 
and as a whole reflecting the long-run marginal cost of electricity supply". Implementation of this 
policy statement was expected to start in 1998 by conducting a tariff study, which would recommend 
ways in which electricity pricing reforms would be undertaken. 
6.3.6 Access to Electricity and Rural Electrification 
Access to Electricity 
As mentioned earlier, electricity distribution in Namibia is done by many institutions. Consequently 
widening electricity access by connecting new customers is the responsibility of each of these 
distribution institutions. As regards NamPower fulfilling this task, in its 2001 annual report, 
NamPower clearly re-stated its serious commitment to increase electricity access to Namibians 
throughout the country. Previously NamPower was supplying electricity to only large consumers like 
mining customers and commercial farms but now, to reflect its commitments, it has established a 
wholly owned subsidiary company to engage in electricity distribution. The newly formed subsidiary 
company has already entered into joint ventures with some municipalities and local authorities in 
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order to foster connections to new customers as well as to provide reliable services in those areas. 
The NamPower distribution arm is also engaged in electricity distribution in rural areas. 
On the other hand, municipalities and local authorities and the MRLGH, which are responsible for 
connecting customers in their proclaimed areas, have also stepped up efforts to widen electricity 
access although they are not as strategically positioned as NamPower's distribution company. Their 
technical and financial capabilities in a way limit them from achieving high connection rates 
compared to Premier Electric. However, their efforts are evident from the fact that they have, over 
time, increased the quantity of electricity they purchase from NamPower to distribute to their 
customers. In 2000 total electricity purchased by municipalities increased by 5.1 %, suggesting that the 
increase of demand came from new customers who have been connected. Furthermore, in an effort to 
improve electricity supply services including widening access, a privately owned company, Northern 
Electrical, was contracted in 1996 to operate and manage electricity supply in the densely populated 
northern regions ofNamibia (Utonih et al., 2001:4). 
The government is also very keen to widen access to electricity in urban areas and it has given this 
due attention in the White Paper on Energy Policy, 1998. To this effect the government's policy 
statement given in the White Paper on Energy Policy is that: "Government will ensure that licenses 
for distribution of electricity in urban areas under the Electricity Act include provisions, such as 
electrification targets and a fair structure, that facilitate increased access to electricity among low-
income consumers". This seems to be a very well focused policy statement, given the fact that in 
Namibia only 75% of the urban population has access to electricity (White Paper on Energy Policy: 
22). If implemented as planned, Namibia will electrify the remaining 25% and reach 100% access in 
urban areas within a short period of time. 
The policy statement is also concerned with the ability of poor households to use electricity in urban 
areas. In most of the urban areas in African countries access to electricity by poor households is one 
problem and using the electricity after getting it is another problem altogether. Poor households use 
electricity mainly for lighting which is not the aim of all the electrification efforts. Electricity should 
be used for more than lighting. Other uses like cooking and ironing should also be encouraged and 
facilitated as they decrease the demand for charcoal and wood, thus saving the forests and preserving 
the environment. That being the case, making electricity affordable is of paramount importance. 
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Rural Electrification 
Rural electrification is part ofNamPower's commitment to increase electricity access to the majority 
of Namibians. In this regard the government is also very committed, as it is closely co-operating with 
NamPower, in terms of financing and policy formulation, for the rural electrification programmes. In 
the White Paper on Energy Policy, the government states the necessity for rural electrification as a 
way of uplifting social conditions and creating incentives for economic growth in the rural areas and 
as a means of redressing past imbalances. In an effort to enhance rural electrification, it is included 
among the items under the performance agreement between the government and NamPower. 
Accordingly, NamPower has been meeting the requirements of the performance agreement 
(NamPower, 1997:20). The performance contract requires NamPower to invest N$ 10 million each 
year in rural electrification. Perhaps investing in rural electrification had to be put into the 
performance contract due to the fact that rural electrification investments are not financially viable, 
not only in Namibia and in this case for NamPower, but everywhere else and for any other utility. 
Surprisingly, the government and NamPower have two different targets for rural electrification. In the 
White Paper on Energy Policy issued in May 1998, the government states its intention to have at least 
25% of rural households connected to the national grid by 2010. On the other hand, NamPower states 
its commitment as giving access to electricity to at least 80% of Namibians within the next 10 years. 
This was indicated both in the 1996 and 1999 NamPower annual reports. While the government's 
target is for rural households, that of NamPower is for all Namibians. The targets differ considerably 
even by computing the access to all by assuming 100% access in urban areas (with 28% of Namibia's 
population) and 25% access in rural areas (with 78% of the population) set by the government. In 
other words, if NamPower will attain 100% access in urban areas within the next 10 years, then to 
attain its 80% target it should attain 42% access to electricity in rural areas which differs from the 
govemritent' s 25% target. 
NamPower's rural electrification programme targets both communal areas and commercial farmers in 
the rural areas. The programmes started in the mostly densely populated central northern regions of 
the country covering the Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto regions in 1991 and 1993. The 
programmes continued and in 1992 and 1993 the western Kavango Region was electrified, followed . 
by the eastern Kavan go region in 1993 and 1994 (Utonih et al., 2001 :4). Since then a number of other 
rural areas have been connected to the grid for the first time thus making the current percentage of 
rural households with access to electricity rise to 15% (Utonih et al., 2001:4). However, it should be 
noted that most of the programmes mentioned here were run by the government but with NamPower 
acting as an implementation agent. 
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Funding of rural electrification: 
The fmancing of the rural electrification programmes is mainly done by the government, NarnPower 
and the Norwegian government through NORAD. In addition to the N$10 million, which NarnPower 
is required to spend every year for niral electrification; NarnPower introduced to Namibia a grant 
funding component of some N$200 million for rural electrification programmes when it secured 
international funding for the 400kV Power Project. It was expected that the funds would be allocated 
to priorities identified by NarnPower and the Ministry on completion of the Namibian Rural 
Electrification Distribution Master Plan in 1999 (NarnPower, 1999:19). However, the Rural 
Distribution Master Plan was completed in August 2000 instead of the planned 1999. Its objective is 
to provide guidelines and establish priorities for upgrading the extensions of the existing electrical 
distribution networks in Namibia which will enable NarnPower, in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy, to establish the networks to meet the demands of development in an orderly and 
cost-effective manner within the 20 year span of the plan (Utonih et al., 2001:6). 
Table 6.5 Rural Electrification Funding Received Since 1991 
Source: Utonih and Dlamini, 2001:6 
Off-grid Electrification: 
In recognition of the role of renewable technologies, particularly solar systems, in supplementing grid 
electrification, the Namibian government instituted a revolving credit fund for solar horne systems 
(SHS) under a project called "Horne Power" in 1996. The fund would help cover the high cost of 
SHS, especially in areas with dispersed population. This project is managed by the National 
Development Corporation and it provides loans at low interest rates (5%) to purchase SHS. The loans 
are payable over a maximum period of five years. To qualify for a loan a customer is required to pay a 
down payment of20%. The customer also should be earning a minimum annual income ofN$15,000. 
The project has been implemented in phases and until mid-February 2001, 456 systems had been 
installed in Namibia (Utonih et al., 2001 :5). Premier Electric is also involved in Solar Power Project. 
In July 2002 the company commissioned the first pre-paid solar system in Namibia. 
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6.3.7 Financial Performance ofNamPower 
This section was supposed to discuss the financial performance of all the main players in Namibia's 
power sector but d~e to the existence of a large number of entities in the distribution part, it was 
difficult to obtain their annual reports. The discussion is therefore limited to NamPower's financial 
performance, as it is the largest player by far. Moreover, many of the distribution entities are not 
financially viable (NamPower, 1999:9). 
In July1996, SW A WEK transformed into NamPower. SW A WEK was a business concern which was 
always managed in strict observance of business principles without any government interference and 
as result it was financially very successful. Thus NamPower inherited a stable and sound business 
}Vhich it has enhanced even more as it has been prqducing favourable financial results year after year., 
It is one of the largest and most financially sound corporations in Namibia and it fully complies with 
the principles of generally acceptable accounting principles (GAAP) (NamPower 1998: 18) 
NamPower's financial performance is characterised by increased profit and high returns on its assets. 
In 1999 it realised a profit after tax amounting to N$193.2 million which was the highest over the 
period 1991 - 2001. This was mainly attributed to the high internal generation at the Ruacana hydro 
power station which followed an above-average water flow on the Kunune River (NamPower 
1999:8). Returns on assets have also been very competitive, and so have other financial indicators. 
Table 6.6 contains key indicators ofNamPower's financial performance over the period 1991-2001. 
The financial performance of NamPower during a particular year depends highly on the performance 
of its Ruacana hydropower plant which is influenced by the amount of rainfall received at the Kunene 
River catchment area in Angola. This is to say that low internal generation leads to more units being 
imported from Eskom and thus increased total expenditure. NamPower's sound financial performance 
has made it a creditworthy entity. It has always serviced its long-term debts without fail, something 
which most of the other electricity utilities in Africa are unable to do. 
NarnPower pays both tax and dividends to the government on an annual basis and it has been a major 
and dependable contributor to the government's revenue (NamPower, 1998:16). It started to pay taxes 
I 
in 1994 and dividends in 199l.However, in 1993 and 1994 it didn't pay dividends due to the severe 
drought which Namibia experienced which impacted negatively on NamPower's financial 
performance. It has also been substantially financing rural electrification. 
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Table 6.6 Some Financial Performance Indicators ofNamPower. 
Table 6.6 Continued 
Source: NamPower Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001 
6.3.8 Sector Reforms 
The current worldwide power sector reforms which are being undertaken have caused most countries 
to closely examine their power sectors and make important decisions on their future. In this respect, 
most of the African governments are making efforts to increase the. sector's overall efficiency .. 
Likewise, the government of Namibia has stated itsintention to reform the power sector. In fact, some 
initiatives to reform the power sector have already been undertaken. The. reforms are intended to 
liberalise the electricity supply industry and to allow for more effective private sector participation. 
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Drivers for the power sector reforms in Namibia 
As stated earlier, the current structure of Namibia's power sector is made up of NamPower, which 
virtually has a monopoly in generation and transmission, and a highly fragmented electricity 
distribution industry. This bei~g the case the sector may be operating at an efficiency level possibly 
below what is needed to support economic and social developments in Namibia (White Paper on 
Energy Policy: 21). Rearranging the distribution industry so that it can deliver reliable, quality and 
affordable electricity is one of the main drivers for power sector reforms in Namibia. According to 
NamPower (2000: 1) other drivers for ESI reforms are:-
• Maximising financial and economic returns to the state through fiscal revenue and debt reduction; 
• Widened resource availability and technological change through competitive imports; 
• Opportunities for black economic empowerment; 
· • International environmental concerns; and 
• Improved customer service and choice. 
On the other hand, the government listed the ESI problems as follows: -
• High import dependency and few sources of supply; 
• A large number of supply authorities with widely differing competence and practices; 
• Various technical, financial and institutional problems relating to rural electricity supply; 
• Electricity prices that in many instances are not cost-reflective; and 
• An unclear institutional structure (White Paper on Energy Policy: 20). 
Objectives of the reforms 
The government has the following objectives: 
• Increase sector efficiency; 
• Improving access to electricity in a sustainable manner, particularly in rural areas; 
• Increase security of supply, while taking into account the risk of stranded investments; 
• Promotion and development of the sector as a key vehicle for investment and growth; 
• Introducing sector competition; 
• Ensuring environmental and socio-economical sustainability; 
• Alleviation of resource constraints in the electricity sector; and 
• Development of an efficient and appropriate governance framework and structure. 
In the White Paper on Energy Policy, the government highlighted different routes it would take to 
achieve the above objectives and set out its implementation targets. However, prior to the issuing of 
this policy paper the government had contracted a group of regional and local consultants led by 
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SAD-ELEC (Pty) Limited of South Africa to carry out a study of different models for restructuring 
the power sector. The study was launched in November 1997 and was expected to recommend how 
the fragmented distribution industry would be restructured in order to form an efficient industry, as 
well as how competition in the electricity generation industry and supply by private sector 
participation could be introduced. 
In order to ensure that an in-depth investigation would be carried out, the study was undertaken in 
three phases. The phase one was completed in March 1998. It investigated in detail the current 
performance of the ESI and relevant international experience. Phase two evaluated possible 
restructuring options with particular focus on rationalisation of the electricity distribution. This phase 
was completed in July 1998. According to SAD-ELEC et al (1999:2), these two phases (one and two) 
accomplished the documentation of the performance of the Namibia's power sector and reviewed the 
key issues at stake, from a Namibian perspective. The other functions completed during the two 
phases were identification of the options for change, with reference to international experience and 
local conditions and a detailed analysis of a limited set of options for the distribution part of the ESI. 
After the completion of these first two phases, phase three of the study was undertaken and a draft 
report submitted in November 1999. The main objectives of this phase were:- first, to make 
recommendations for the most appropriate market structure for Namibia's power sector and its 
implications for the generation and transmission component of the industry; second, to finalise 
recommendations for the restructuring of the distribution industry by focusing on the different parts of 
the country and the necessary process to facilitate change; third, to develop proposals and 
recommendations with regard to resolution of key policy issues identified in phases one and two; and 
lastly to establish proposals for implementation of the recommendations. 
On completion of phase three, it was recommended that Namibia embark on a single buyer model 
with the following key elements: 
• Electricity should be traded through the single buyer by all generators and distributors selling and 
buying power from the single buyer; 
• IPPs can export power using NamPower's transmission system; 
• Large users with a notified maximum demand greater than SMW at a single point have the right 
to choose the single buyer or local distributor; 
• The single buyer may waive the right to supply in favour ofiPP/imports; and 
• Small-scale generators, which are embedded in the local distribution network, need not sell to the 
single buyer (SAD-ELEC et al., 1999:8). 
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The study further recommended that on implementation, NamPower's transmission business should 
perform the commercialisation functions associated with the task of the single buyer, act as a system 
operator and own and operate transmission infrastructure. To ensure greater transparency and to 
enable regulation to focus on the aspects of business that should be regulated, NamPower should 
restructure by separating generation and transmission functions and each should have its own 
accounting function. However, it was clearly pointed out that the proposed single buyer model for 
Namibia could be taken as a transitional stage towards a greater degree of wholesale competition. 
Figure 6.2 below shows Namibia's proposed Single-Buyer Model. 
Figure 6.2 Namibia Single-Buyer Model 
Source: SAD-ELEC eta/., 1999:6 
Kunene IPP 
Single Buyer 
(NamPower G & T) 
As regards the distribution industry structure, it was recommended that regional electricity distributors 
(REDs) be established in the North and Erongo regions. For the Central/South region it was 
recommended that a combination of municipal distributors plus the NamPower distribution Company, 
Premier Electric, operate rural supplies and some urban areas but with an open-ended future option of 
combining the assets and the operations to form a RED. A summary of the key features of the 
proposed distribution structures is given in the following table: 
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Table 6.7 Key Features of the Proposed Distribution Structure 
North Erongo Centre/South 
A combination of 
A move towards an asset- A phased approach municipal distributors Structure based RED towards a joint venture plus Premier Electric RED operating rural supplies 
and some urban areas. 
Ownership Predominantly Stakeholders ownership Municipal and NamPower 
stakeholder ownership ownership 
Private Part ownership of Possible involvement in Possible part ownership of the final stage of Participation distribution 
establishing the JV RED Premier Electric 
Owned by a company 
Electrification which will be formed In the final stage assets Owned by Premier (AssetCo) or asset- Electric or asset-holding 
assets holding subsidiary of are owned by the JV RED subsidiary ofNamPower 
NamPower 
Electricity Stakeholders Council plus Existing municipal controls plus Governance Board of Directors for RED Corporate Governance for Premier Electric 
Regulation All distributors will be subject to Electricity Board licences and price controls 
Source: SAD-ELEC eta/., 1999:12 
To reflect its commitments, the government started to implement the reforms as recommended in the 
study by starting with the introduction of a new Electricity Act in July 2000. This Act aimed at 
levelling the playfield for competition in the sector, broadening the supply base and increasing 
investments. It also provides for the establishment of an Electricity Control Board to regulate the 
sector and ensure fair competition and high efficiency levels. It was envisaged that after the 
establishing ofthe Electricity Control Board the first round of licensing would take place during 2001. 
In line with the government's objectives of creating competition in the sector and with the aim of 
implementing the study's recommendations, NamPower transformed itself from a monopolistic 
vertically integrated utility to a commercial energy-related enterprise. In this respect, as stated earlier, 
in 1999 NamPower formed a subsidiary company, Premier Electric, to serve as its distribution vehicle 
which will later compete with other distribution companies still to be formed or licensed. 
NamPower's transformation entailed revising its internal structure. It implemented this through a 
project called "NamPower Mongula" meaning NamPower Tomorrow (NamPower, 2001: 1 0). Unlike 
distribution, for which a subsidiary company was formed, NamPower ring-fenced its other business 
units which are generation, transmission and single buyer - in order to maximise accountability and 
performance. All of this was done so that they can hold their own and against private competition. 
NamPower also separated those activities which fall under the auspices of the Electricity Act and the 
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ECB (regulated activities) from non-core activities (non-regulated) so that it can enter into new 
commercial opportunities. 
6.3.9 Regulatory Framework 
The new Electricity Act of July 2000 was enacted to replace the old South African Electricity Act 
which previously governed the sector. The new Act provides for the establishment of an electricity 
regulatory board and as a result, the Electricity Control Board (ECB) was established in the same year 
(2000). The ECB is responsible for regulating the electricity industry, setting electricity prices, issuing 
licences to all players, including IPP's, as well as offering customer protection. Prior to the 
establishment of the ECB, the ministry responsible for energy, the Ministry for Mines and Energy, 
performed both regulatory and electricity sector policy formulation functions, as is the case in most 
African countries. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Swaziland 
7.0 Location and Demography 
The independent Kingdom of Swaziland, a landlocked country, lies between South Africa and 
Mozambique. It shares a border with South Africa of 430 km out of a total of 535 km (80 %), and 
shares the remaining 105 km with Mozambique. Except for Gambia, it is the smallest country on 
-the African continent with an area of 17,363 sq. km. It has a population of about one million people 
with a growth rate estimated at about 2.5% per annum (World Bank, 2002). 
7.1 Economy 
Swaziland's economy is heavily dependent on South Africa for its sustenance. South Africa, which 
is the region's dominant economy, is Swaziland's paramount trading partner as Swaziland sells 
about three quarters (75 %) of its exports to, and buys more than 80% of its imports from, South 
Africa. The top three export items are mixed manufacturing, sugar and wood pulp. The soft drink 
concentrate from the large Coca-Cola plant is its largest single manufactured export product. Its 
major imports include electricity, petroleum products and coal. With a per capita income of 
US$ 1,500 per annum, Swaziland is ranked among the lower middle-income developing countries 
(World Bank, 2002). 
Since the 1980s, however, the performance of its economy has slowed down. During the year 2000 
the economic growth continued this downward trend to an estimated 2.6% from 3.7% in 1999 
(World Bank, 2002). This was mainly attributed to reduced agricultural production due to floods, 
leading to a slowing down of agro-processing. The economy is dominated by export-based 
agricultural and agro-based manufacturing products and is thus highly vulnerable to climatic and 
other external factors. While the economy is currently ·characterised by a gradual decline, the 
population has been growing at a faster rate, 3.4% in 2000 as against 2.9% in 1999, and this has led 
to a decline in the standard of living of the average population. 
To reverse this downward trend in economic growth, the Swaziland Central Bank, in its 2000 annual 
report, issued a number of recommendations to the government. Among the recommendations are 
that the Swaziland government should make an effort to support existing investors by improving the 
business environment and that it should continue with its efforts to attract foreign direct investments 
(FDQ. The Central Bank also urged the government to enhance the FDI attraction by upgrading 
investment incentives so that they compare well with those offered by neighbouring countries. 
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7.2 Energy Sector 
Swaziland's energy sector is managed by the Ministry ofNatural Resources and Energy (MNRE). A 
parliamentary portfolio ensures its proper functioning. Under the Ministry there is an Energy 
Section, which is responsible for ensuring the sustainable supply and use of energy resources to the 
optimum benefit of the country. It is also responsible for collecting energy-related data, such as data 
on energy demand and supply patterns, energy reserves and technologies and on environment-
related matters . 
. The country is a net importer of energy, and depends on energy imports from South Africa. It 
imports all of its petroleum products and about 70% of its electricity requirements from South 
Africa. More than 60 % of the final energy consumption is based on biomass; which encompasses 
bagasse, woodfuel (firewood and wood waste from sawmills and plantations) and a small amount of 
agricultural waste and animal waste. In this case biomass is regarded as the backbone of the energy 
supply system in Swaziland. Bagasse, a waste product of the sugar industries, is used to generate 
electricity and is the largest contributor, estimated at 33 %, to the energy supply. It is followed by 
wood fuel and wood waste, which [together] contribute about 26%. The wood is consumed in 
households, while the wood waste from the timber industry is used by industries for generating 
electricity and heating. Coal, which is imported from South Africa, contributes about 13 % to the 
primary energy supply. Swaziland further has a substantial amount of anthracite and semi-
anthracite, which cannot, however, be used in most of the burning appliances and equipment used in 
Swaziland. These appliances and equipment are imported from South Africa and are designed to use 
bituminous coal (MNRE et al., 2002). 
7.3 The Power Sector 
7 .3.1 Background 
Given the small size of Swaziland both in terms of area and population, its power sector is also 
relatively small. As mentioned above, the country imports more than 70 % of its electricity 
requirements from South Africa. However, it does have other potential sources of electricity, such as 
hydro, bagasse and large reserves of low-volatile and low-sulphur anthracite coal of medium to high 
quality. This coal is relatively smokeless and thus would be environmentally less harmful, and it is a 
good source of electricity. Currently, this anthracite coal is mined for export purposes only. The 
MNRE et al (2000) report quotes the Geological Survey and Mines Department (GSMD) report 
which states that as of 1998 the probable and potential coal reserves in Swaziland were estimated at 
1,017 million tonnes. 
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Swaziland is the second largest sugarcane producer in Africa and therefore the sugar industry 
produces substantial amounts ofbagasse annually. In 1995, this amounted to some 818,532 tonnes, 
some of which were used for industrial process heat and electricity generation (MNRE et al., 
2000: 9). Further, according to the MNRE et al (2000), there is a substantial amount of excess 
bagasse, which could be used for electricity generation. Besides the existence of large reserves of 
coal and excess bagasse, Swaziland also has good potential for hydropower. A number of studies 
which were conducted concerning hydrological resources, produced preliminary information 
indicating that Swaziland has a gross theoretical potential of 440 MW, although there is a need to 
perform a re-analysis of the national potential with new and. more up-to-date criteria for site 
selection (MNRE et al., 2000: 10). 
7 .3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
The Electricity Act of 1963 established the Swaziland Electricity Board, henceforth known as the 
SEB, to make provision for the exercise and performance of the functions related to the generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity, the inspection and testing of electrical plants and 
the safe use of electricity in Swaziland. Although the Act makes the SEB a monopoly in the power 
sector, Section 17(2) of the same Act gives the SEB the power to grant licences authorising any 
person to generate electricity for his own use or to generate or supply electricity for another person's 
use. In this case therefore, the power sector is divided into two segments, i.e. the commercial supply 
through the national grid and self-generation. The SEB, which is publicly owned, is responsible for 
the commercial supply of electricity. It delivers about 70% of the country's electricity for final 
consumption. The remaining 30 % is generated by a number of industries for their own use. Figure 
7.1 below depicts institutional arrangements of the power sector. 
Figure 7.1 Institutional Arrangements of Swaziland's Power Sector 
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7.3.3 Supply 
The electricity supplied in Swaziland thus comes partly from internal generation but mainly from 
imports from Eskom South Africa. Imports constitute about 80 % of the electricity required for 
commercial supply, whereas internal generation supplies only 20 %. 
Generation 
Most of the electricity generated by the SEB for commercial supply is generated at four hydro 
power stations. About 81 % of the total SEB installed generating capacity is made up of hydro, 
while the remaining 18 % is diesel. The amount of electricity generated by hydro plants has varied 
considerably over the past ten years due to poor and unreliable rains. For instance, in 1992 with the 
same installed capacity the SEB generated only 81.5GWh due to dry weather conditions. In 1999 the 
SEB generated fewer units too, a mere 189.6 GWh, also due to dry weather conditions, but one year 
later in 2000, Swaziland received more than adequate rains, which resulted in increased river flows 
to the SEB's generating system, and as a result the SEB generated 192.3 GWh. Table 7.1 shows the 
SEB's installed generating capacity in 2000. 
Table 7.1 SEB's Existing Installed Generating Capacity 
~-~- -- - - --~ - -- --- - -- - .. - r ,.._- - --- ~- -----• 
~ /J:r u_"j_i .. _ , t",: ' 
>··J:! 10" ~t ~ i') ::_.f\n)} ,(~'lJ..:~· ~J .... ::1-~r1.~ 
1'' :c!': 
~. ~l .. f
1 ~-':_jf::::~,~~.;L~-~_:=_:~ 1 ... 
-· 
- .. . 
Ezulwin 2 21 
Edwaleni Hydro 4 10 Hydro 1 5 
Maguduza 1 5.5 
Mbabane 2 0.5 
Total Hydro Capacity 42.0 
Diesel Edwaleni Diesel 2 9.5 1 0.5 
Total Diesel 10.0 
Total Installed Capacity 52.0 
Source: Compiled from SEB 's Annual Reports 
Imports 
As mentioned earlier, 80 % of the electricity requirements for the commercial supply comes from 
South Africa's Eskom. These imports are based on bulk power supply agreements. In 1985 the bulk 
power purchase agreement was based on a monthly rental for the lines in respect of capital 
expenditure incurred, a basic rental charge, a capacity charge and an energy charge per kWh. 
However, this agreement was recently replaced by a new agreement, with retrospective effect from 
1st January 2000. Instead of the different charges, now a Megaflex, "time-of-use" tariff is used. It is 
a three- part time-of-use tariff, which discriminates based on time of day, day of week and month 
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of year. In this case the tariff has a lower rate during the low demand season, October - March, and 
a higher rate during April to September. It also has low rates for weekends and holidays. According 
to the MNRE et al 2000 report, for the SEB to obtain maximum benefits with this tariff, it needs to 
manage its energy consumption and maximum demand according to Eskom's specified time 
schedule. 14% of the time allocated is charged at a peak rate, whilst 36% and 50% are charged at 
standard and off-peak rates respectively. 
Understanding the importance of diversifying its electricity sources, the SEB had plans to start 
trading with other utilities under the SAPP especially after completion. of the 400 kV-transmission 
line. Now the SEB purchases power from the SAPP at an hourly pool price or at contracted prices 
with any other pool generating members. However, the SEB always ensures that it maximises its 
internal generation especially from the hydro system in order to minimise its imports from Eskom. 
This enables it to reduce its bills with Eskom as hydro generation is cheaper than what it would pay 
to Eskom. For example, the average cost per unit of internal generation in 2000 was Lilangeni cents 
7.5/kWh while the cost of the electricity imported from Eskom was Lilangeni cents 12.2/kWh. 
According to the SEB 1998 Annual Report, it uses the Import Maximum Demand System facility at 
. the National Control Centre to control the imports over internal generation. Since it implemented 
this facility in 1996, it has been able to make substantial savings on Eskom's electricity bills. Table 
7.2 shows electricity generated internally and electricity imported from Eskom and other sources. 
Table 7.2 Units generated by SEB and units imported 
1991 163.3 1.7 165.0 387.0 717.0 100.0 
1992 166.3 0.2 166.5 427.7 760.7 103.0 
1993 81.5 2.7 84.2 555.8 724.2 112.0 
1994 125.0 1.1 126.1 546.9 799.1 115.0 
1995 109.0 8.4 117.4 597.0 831.8 117.5 
1996 118.5 2.0 120.5 583.1 824.1 125.1 
1997 191.0 0.8 191.8 598.0 981.6 139.0 
1998 192.9 1.5 194.4 605.6 994.4 144.8 
1999 189.6 1.4 191.0 639.7 830.7 146.4 
2000 192.3 2.4 194.7 652.4 874.1 153.8 
Source: Compiledfrom SEB's Annual Reports 
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Transmission and Distribution System 
The transmission and distribution system of Swaziland consists of 400 kV, 137 kV, 66 kV, 33 kV 
and 11 kV lines. The bulk supply (imports) from Eskom comes through three 132 kV lines and the 
newly constructed 400 kV line, which originates from Camden in South Africa and runs across 
Swaziland and Komatipoort to MOZAL (an aluminium smelter) in Maputo, Mozambique. This 
400 kV line is owned and operated by the Mozambique Transmission Company (Motraco), a joint 
venture between the EDM of Mozambique, ESKOM and the SEB on a 33.3% equity partnership. 
The completion of this line significantly increased the reliability and quality of the power supply and 
has provided the SEB with adequate capacity (250 MW) for the next 20 to 30 years. The power from 
the 400 kV -trans~ission line is injected into the SEB national grid at Edwaleni ll 400/132 kV 
substation. Table 7.3 shows the growth of the major transmission and distribution total line-lengths 
in Swaziland from 1995 to 2000. 
Table 7.3 Transmission and Distribution Total Line-Lengths in Swaziland (km) 
l_,, !_ ~~- __ C!l!!:.~X :J~C.Jl.LV~\1~~ _j 
1995 206 912 90.5 2,669.3 
1996 206 912 90.5 2,840.6 
1997 206 912 90.5 2,980.8 
1998 206 912 104.7 3,082.2 
1999 206 912 112.8 3,232.6 
2000 206 912 112.8 3,410.2 
Source: Compiled from SEB 's Annual Reports 
System Losses 
The percentage of system losses in Swaziland has been declining over the years. This is a result of 
the SEB's continued intensified programme of identifying the areas where losses occur and reducing 
both technical and commercial losses. For the past five years system losses were 16.3 %, 15.6 %, 
13.0 %, 15.7% and 14% for 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. In 1998 the SEB's 
target was to reduce the loss level to 13% by 2001, 12% by 2002 and 11 %by 2003 and thereafter. 
However, in 1999 losses increased dramatically as a result of the fact that, although a reduction 
target had been set, no clear programme had been put in place to manage these losses. Moreover, 
with the fast growth of the rural electricity network, technical losses tend to increase, largely 
because of the long line distances. 
7 .3.4 Demand 
As Table 7.4 illustrates, industry utilises more than 50% of the total electricity consumed in 
Swaziland. For instance in 2000 it consumed 395.3 GWh, being about 54% of the total 
consumption. The industrial category is followed by domestic consumers. Although the irrigation 
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category is also significant, its yearly consumption varied considerably over the years, depending on 
the amount of rainfall the country received. During dry years the consumption increased 
dramatically, while during wet years it decreased. As regards the system's peak demand, it has 
grown steadily for the past ten years: in 2000 it was ·153 .8 MW. In 1998, for the very first time, the 
system's peak demand surpassed the system's peak capacity thus creating an overshot of about 
5 MW. However, due to the installation of the power factor correction equipment, load shedding 
was avoided. 
Table 7.4 Electricity Consumption by Tariff Category (GWh) 
Source: Compi/edfrom SEB's annual reports 
7 .3.5 Tariff 
The electricity tariff of any country is the single most important factor that could make its power 
sector either viable or not. This being the case, Swaziland has been increasing its electricity tariff 
every year in January with the aim of ensuring the fmancial viability of the SEB. Tariff revision is 
done in January because it is also the time when Eskom revises its tariffs for SEB. To this effect the 
last tariff adjustments were effected in January 2002 with an average increase of 6%. However, 
according to the SEB's annual reports, these increases have always been lower than the rate of 
inflation and as a result meant a reduction in power costs in real terms. 
SEB tariffs are divided into six main categories, namely: the domestic tariff, general-purpose tariff, 
small commercial and industrial tariff, large commercial and industrial tariff, off-peak water heating 
tariff and irrigation tariff. For all these categories, the three tariff components are the following: -
firstly, a fixed (facility) charge per month, which is the same for all. Secondly, energy charges 
which differ according to the tariff category, being highest for general purposes and lowest for 
irrigation. The third and last component is demand charge, which only applies to large commercial, 
industrial and irrigation tariff categories. 
The block tariff or time-of-use tariff, especially for domestic consumers, is not used in Swaziland. 
Its use might encourage consumers to limit their consumption particularly during peak hours. 
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According to the MNRE et al (2000) report, electricity in Swaziland is not priced at economic rates 
which means that consumers do not receive the right signals to consume electricity rationally. There 
is thus a need to review and adjust electricity tariffs in order to ensure that producers receive high 
returns. In response to this the SEB in 2000 aimed to change the tariff structures to include 
provisions for both time-of-use and interruptible tariffs. This would allow consumers a wide range 
of choices on how to use electricity to the best and most economic advantage and at the same time 
would enable it to fully recover its costs. Besides this, consumers would also be encouraged to 
reduce their consumption during peak periods, thus reducing national peaks and conforming to the 
bulk electricity tariff requirements. However, the time-of-use tariff has not yet been implemented. 
This is because the differences that would result from load shifting were regarded as being too small 
to justify any load shifting by customers. This option is, however, still being pursued. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the SEB buys most (70 %) of its electricity in bulk from Eskom of 
South Africa. The balance (30 %) is hydro generated, which is one of the cheapest sources of 
electricity. In this regard, one would expect Swaziland to have reasonably low prices of electricity. 
This is not the case, however, as Eskom charges Swaziland more for the same units of electricity 
than it charges its own distributors in South Africa. In addition the SEB has a smaller customer base 
and thus is lacking the same economies of scale that Eskom enjoys {MNRE, 2000). According to 
SAD-ELEC (2001), the SEB tariff in US dollar terms for domestic customers who use up to 
200 kWh in a month was the highest in the region in 2001. 
7.3.6 Access to Electricity and Rural Electrification 
In Swaziland an estimated 30 % of the population has access to electricity. Moreover, this supply is 
concentrated in the urban areas, leaving the majority of the population living in the rural areas 
unserved. According to Utonih et al., (2001: 25) out of about 26,725 of the SEB's domestic 
customers in 1998, only 3,000 were rural households. The estimated total number of rural 
households was about 108,000 meaning that less than 3% had access to electricity. In an effort to 
increase electrification rates, the SEB established a new Marketing Department. In addition a rural 
electrification programme is also being implemented at present, jointly funded by the government of 
Swaziland and the SEB. As a result of these efforts, an annual average growth of +8 % is being 
realised especially in the domestic sector. However, due to slow economic growth globally, major 
business concerns closed down in Swaziland, and the SEB lost significant load. The asbestos mine, 
which was the SEB's major revenue earner, closed down in 2001 along with other major business 
concerns, which negatively impacted on the utility's ability to finance rural electrification 
programmes. 
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Rural electrification programmes are mainly financed by the government, the SEB and grants. In 
1999 - 2000 the government and the SEB financed rural electrification programmes at a funding 
ratio of 60:40 respectively. A two-phase grant finance was received from the Republic of China with 
R21.7 million received during the first phase in 2001. The second phase of the project has a grant 
finance of R50 million. Apart from these efforts, a proposal to obtain World Bank finance for rural 
electrification is being proposed. The Swaziland government has already signed an agreement with 
the World Bank, but this project will only be implemented once the World Bank mission has 
approved the funding on the basis of its ongoing feasibility studies. 
Currently the country has no rural electrification fund. On a year-to-year basis, the government and 
the SEB meet to agree on a specific budget for rural electrification projects, which does, however, 
depend on the availability of funds. 
7.3.7 Financial Performance of the SEB 
The overall financial performance of the SEB has been generally good during the 1994 - 2000 
period. For the whole period the SEB realised profits (surplus). As shown by Table 7.5 below, in 
1995 and 1997 profits increased to more than double that of the preceding years. However, it should 
be noted that the SEB was exempted from paying taxes. Although it is performing relatively well, its 
future survival is at a high risk, since 2 % of its customers account for 60 % of its sales revenue. For 
instance and as mentioned earlier, the closing down of the asbestos mine along with other major 
business concerns in 2001, which were the SEB's major revenue earners, will greatly affect the 
utility's financial performance. 
Table 7.5 SED's Financial Indicators 
~umber .• ··· 
. . :N.pn~i:.· I::~To~L. . >':. • Sales :Per .' · . .'customer :;:., . Totat.> ;.·,tala} ~t t > '::.: 
' Year or·· · of .. · $ales Eltlpl&!~ • . per .·• ·<RevenUe· .· .. ·· .... ·.Value~ ... 
.. ··· Cnstomeri Employees '<rlWbf· .. · . (MWb!EnipL) .· Ernplo:vee : (Etooo)· .. ···.· cE'OOOl'·• 
1991 493.6 71,923 148,597 
1992 523.8 83,071 159,440 
1993 552.2 103,079 168,371 
1994 545.8 123,500 181,807 
1995 25,696 620 603.2 972.9 41 147,118 210,525 
1996 26,708 622 585.0 940.5 43 160,876 250,507 
1997 678 671.7 990.7 191,878 278,376 
1998 719 694.7 966.2 207,877 300,447 
1999 33,718 728 718.6 987.1 46 266,724 398,525 
2000 36,367 713 732.0 1,026.6 51 240,699 513,382 
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Table 7.5 continued 
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1991 14.6 
1992 15.7 
1993 18.0 
1994 7,279 22.3 
1995 16,770 24_4 0.12 0.96 2.76 3.63 
1996 15,985 27.3 0.17 0.61 4.35 4.27 
1997 35,379 28.6 0.16 OAt 5.30 4.60 
1998 30,225 30.0 0.12 0.35 5.76 5.48 
1999 37,267 31.6 0.11 0.21 7.13 6.11 
2000 32,129 32.9 0.08 0.21 7.10 6.91 
Source: Compiled from SEB 's Annual Reports 
Exchange rate figures obtained from CIA World Factbook 2001 
7.3.8 Sector Reforms 
Most of the countries in Africa as well as in the rest of the world are now carrying out power sector 
restructuring and reforms. Not only are they expected to bring about an increase in the capacity and 
provision of reliable and low cost power, but they will also help their governments to avoid 
incurring further debts in financing the power sector. In understanding the importance of these 
reforms, the Swaziland government has also expressed its intention to reform its power sector. In 
1998 the government commissioned a consultant, SAD-ELEC, to carry out a study on the future 
options of the development ofits power sector. The consultant recommended, and subsequently the 
Swaziland government approved, the corporatisation of the SEB with a public/private ownership 
option. The other two options, which were considered but not adopted, were the commercialisation 
of the SEB whilst it still remained publicly owned, the unbundling of the SEB and electricity market 
liberalisation. 
The corporatisation of the SEB was adopted due to the fact that the SEB will be converted into a 
commercial entity which will operate under normal company laws, regulations and taxation. It will 
be required to be efficient, as it will be subjected to competition. In order to cope with the changes 
in the business environment, the SEB has decided to undertake internal restructuring whereby its 
core activities, i.e. generation, transmission and distribution, will be ring-fenced such that costs and 
revenues are allocated separately and individual accounts are issued for each business (SEB, 1998). 
This will make the SEB capable of competing with new participants in the industry. Although the 
government has already approved the corporatisation of the SEB, this will be effected after the 
necessary amendments to the old Electricity Act of 1963 have been effected. The amendments will 
also allow the setting up of a regulator to oversee the power sector. In fact, the government has 
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already completed three draft legislations, which are due to be tabled in parliament this year. These 
legislations are: -
a) The Regulatory Act, which will bring about the introduction of an energy regulator - its 
role, functions and responsibilities; 
b) The Electricity Act, which will initially be based on a single buyer model- the buyer being 
the SEB; and 
c) The Corporatisation Act, which will make it possible for private sector participation, i.e. to 
allow for the conversion of parastatals to companies. 
7.3.9 Regulatory Framework 
Currently, in Swaziland, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy performs the tasks of policy 
formulation and regulation of the power sector. As part of the overall reform process of the power 
sector these tasks will be separated, and an autonomous regulatory authority/board will be 
established to oversee the sector. The Ministry will be left with only the task of policy formulation 
for the sector. The regulatory authority/board that will be formed will play a central role in ensuring 
that the benefits that are expected from the reforms are realised, as well as ensuring the 
sustainability of the reforms. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Tanzania 
8.0 Location and Demography 
Tanzania is located in East Africa on the Indian Ocean coast, between Longitudes 29° - 40° East and 
Latitudes 1° - 11° South. It is bordered by eight countries, namely Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The 
country covers a relatively large area of 942,500 sq.km and has an estimated population of 33.7 
million people (World Bank, 2002). This population is concentrated on the periphery of the country, 
' ' 
leaving the central part, which is rather dry, relatively sparsely populated. It is estimated that 72 % 
of the population lives in the rural areas and the remaining 28 % lives in the urban areas (World 
Bank, 2002). However, for the last few years there has been a high rate of rural- urban migration due 
to deteriorating conditions in the rural areas, which is expected to increase the percentage of those 
living in urban areas. 
8.1 Economy 
As is the case m most Sub-Sahara African countries, Tanzania's economy relies heavily on 
agriculture, with the main cash crops being coffee, tea, cotton, wheat, cashew nuts, rice, sisal, maize 
and tobacco. It is estimated that agriculture employs about 90 % of the entire labour force and 
contributes approximately 50% of the GDP. In 2000 its contribution to the GDP was 45.1 %. The 
agricultural sector is characterised by small-scale farming, which depends on weather conditions. 
Consequently the sector is adversely affected by frequent droughts. For instance in 1998 traditional 
exports, namely coffee, tea, cashew nuts, cotton, tobacco and cloves, decreased by about 27 % from 
US$ 107.6 million recorded in 1997 to US$ 78.9 million in 1998. Unfavourable weather conditions 
· during that particular period accounts for the large financial decrease (BoT, 2001: 1 0). 
In terms of GDP contributions, the agricultural sector is followed by the commerce and hotels 
sector, which contributed about 16.4% to the GDP in 2000. Its real growth rate has been steadily 
increasing from a low of0.7% in 1992 to a record high of6.5% in 2000. This has been attributed to 
the increase in tourism following a decision by the government to liberalize this sub-sector and to 
privatise most of the tourist hotels. Liberalisation and privatisation in this sector were part of the 
overall economic reforms, which have also positively impacted on the industrial sector. This sector 
(industrial) recorded its highest real growth of 8% in 1998 compared to 4% in 1992. However, in 
1999 the growth rate decreased to 3.6% before increasing slightly to 4.8% in 2000. These 
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fluctuations in the industrial sector's real growth did not affect its share of the GDP, which remained 
constant at about 8.4 %'for the period 1998-2000 (BoT, 2001:29). 
Although.the mining sector's contribution to the GDP is not significant, viz. an average of2.1% for 
the period 1998-2000, it is the fastest growing sector of the economy. During 1998 the sector 
recorded its highest growth rate of 27.4% compared with a growth of 7.7% recorded in 1992. As 
happened in the industrial sector, the growth trend of the mining sector decreased to 9.1% in 1999 
before it increased once more to 13.9% in 2000. While the general improvement in the performance 
of the mining sector can be mainly attributed to the economic reforms, the poor performance during 
1999 of the mining and industrial sectors can be attributed to electricity shortages as a result of 
droughts (BoT, 2001:29). 
During 1993 the economy recorded its lowest growth over the past ten years - only 0.4 %. However, 
the improvements in the performance of the important sectors during 2000 saw the overall economy 
grow at 5.1 %. Implementation of structural reforms, deregulating investments, privatisation, 
promoting local infrastructures, restructuring of the financial sector as well as implementing a solid 
fiscal policy, contributed to this high economic growth rate. There was also a significant drop in 
inflation. It has been declining over time, dropping from the maximum of 33% in 1994 to an all 
time low of 5.1% in 2001 (BoT, 2002). With a per capita Gross Domestic Income (GNI) of US $ 
270 in 2000, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 2002). 
Furthermore, it is also one of the "highly indebted poor countries" (HIPC). However, as a result of 
the successful implementation of sound economic policies, which were initiated in 1996, the country 
has restored donors' confidence, which in turn, through the Paris Club, has seen a large portion of 
the debt being written off. 
8.2 Energy Sector 
The main primary source of energy for most households in Tanzania is biomass in the form of wood 
and charcoal, which accounts for about 92 % of total energy consumption. Woodfuel is mainly used 
in rural areas, while in urban areas over 70 % of the households use charcoal for cooking. However, 
the number of households using charcoal is currently considered to be on the increase, as electricity 
is perceived as too expensive. The increase in charcoal use and the fact that most of the charcoal is 
produced in a primitive way with very low efficiency rates, is unfortunately resulting in extensive 
deforestation, as forests are harvested at a rate faster than their natural rate of regeneration. 
As regards commercial energy consumption, petroleum products dominate even though they 
account for only about 7 % of the total energy consumption. Tanzania is a net importer of petroleum 
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products, with most coming from oil-producing Arabic countries. They are mainly used in the 
transport sector, with households using a relatively small quantity of paraffin for cooking and 
lighting. To date, no oil reserves have been located in the country despite on-going and extensive oil 
exploration activities. However, modest gas resources have been discovered. Owing to the 
extremely high costs and risks of oil exploration, this is mainly done by foreign investors. With the 
aim of attracting more foreign investors to participate in oil exploration and in the development of 
hydrocarbons, the government has put in place attractive incentive packages such as the facility to 
negotiate special terms. Currently, foreign investors are also attracted to invest in electricity 
generation since electricity consumption amounts to only about 1 % of the total energy 
consumption. Policy formulation to attract foreign investors to the energy sector and all other energy 
issues are the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM). 
8.3 The Power Sector 
8.3.1 Background 
The power supply in Tanzania comes from hydro (64 %) and thermal (36 %) generation. However 
Tanzania is considered one of the few countries in Africa with ample hydropower potential, 
estimated at 4.7 GW of installed capacity or about 3.2 GW of firm capacity. At present, only about 
12% (0.56GW) of the total potential has actually been developed. The underdevelopment of the 
hydropower potential and the fact that a large portion of generation is thermal, burning expensive 
imported oil, is the result of the high costs associated with hydropower development, which the 
country cannot afford. Power sector liberalisation will likely further jeopardise the development of 
hydro projects, as most private investors tend to opt for small units of thermal generation which are 
easy to construct and have short construction times, and as investments costs are small compared to 
the far more costly hydro projects. In addition, investors prefer to invest in thermal generation 
because rainfall particularly in the region is variable and unpredictable (rainfall risk). 
Tanzania also has proven natural gas fields, located offshore at Songo Songo Island and at Mnazi 
Bay near Mtwara. Natural gas reserves at Songo Songo Island are estimated at 736 billion cubic feet 
(bcf), while those of Mnazi Bay are still uncertain (Acres, 2001: 6-1). A Songo Songo gas-to-
electricity project, which will cost about US$295.2 million, financed mainly by the World Bank, is 
about to be launched. The project entails the construction of a gas pipeline over a distance of 232km, 
to supply natural gas to the existing 112 MW gas turbines at Ubungo and to a cement factory, both 
in Dar es Salaam. It is expected that the project will be completed towards the end of 2003. As 
regards Mnazi Bay, negotiations with a foreign private investor are at an advanced stage; the aim of 
this project is to generate enough power to supply the southern regions, which are not connected to 
the national grid. 
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Another indigenous energy resource available in Tanzania is coal. Its reserves are estimated at about 
12,000 million tonnes, of which 304 million tonnes may be considered proven. Coal occurrence was 
first reported towards the end of the nineteenth century but since then very little development has 
taken place, mainly because the energy markets are not fully developed. Currently coal from the 
Songwe-Kiwira coalfield is used by the 6MW installed capacity plant to produce electricity for their 
own use and the surplus is being sold to the national electricity utility. The National Development 
Corporation (NDC) is also co-ordinating an even bigger coal power project. A coal plant with a 
staged capacity of 100 MW - 400 MW will be constructed at Mchuchuma coalfield under the 
Mtwara corridor project. 
8.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
The major player in the country's power sector is the Tanzanian Electric Supply Company Limited, 
(TANESCO) which is responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity 
throughout the country. It also sells bulk power to the island of Zanzibar, where distribution of 
electricity is the responsibility of the Zanzibar State Fuel and Power Corporation (ZSFPC). 
T ANESCO is a publicly owned utility; it was set up in 1964 after a merger of two private utilities, 
and was nationalised in 1968. Figure 8.1 below shows the current institutional arrangement of 
Tanzania's power sector. 
In 1992, the government decided to end the monopoly power that TANESCO had enjoyed since its 
inception, thus allowing public and private companies as well as individuals to engage in electricity 
generation. Consequently a number of companies have already started to generate power, and others 
are about to begin. In this regard, Kiwira, a coal plant, and TANW AT, a wood residues plant, own 
and operate 6.0 MW and 2.3 MW respectively. They generate electricity for their own consumption 
and sell the excess to TANESCO. Another independent power producer (IPP), namely Independent 
Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), has recently constructed a 100 MW diesel generation facility at 
Tegeta Dar es Salaam, which has been selling bulk power to the T ANESCO grid system since 
February 2002. Furthermore a number of industries and large gold mines are generating electricity 
in small quantities for their own use. The large gold mines which have put up diesel generating 
facilities for their own use are the Geita Gold Mine (40 MW), Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (15 MW) and 
Afrika Mashariki Gold Mine (12 MW). 
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Figure 8.1: Institutional Arrangement of Tanzania's Power Sector 
8.3.3 Supply 
Imports 
-Uganda 
-Zambia 
TA.NESCO 
Transmission 
(TANESCO) 
Distribution 
(TANESCO) 
Customers 
ZSFPC 
The electricity supply in Tanzania comes mainly from internal suppliers, but also from a few cross-
border suppliers. 
Generation 
Tanzania's electricity system consists of two parts, namely the national grid system (called the 
interconnected system) and several dispersed isolated systems. The grid system provides power to 
the major cities and towns from the country's major generation centres, while the isolated systems 
provide electricity to smaller towns, which are not connected to the national grid. The generation 
facilities which currently feed power to the grid system, are mainly hydroelectricity (72 %) and 
thermal (28 %). In the case of the isolated systems, electricity is provided mainly by diesel 
generators, but also by cross-border suppliers. The isolated systems supply five regional 
headquarters, several district headquarters and other areas. However, most of the diesel units in the 
isolated systems are old and very unreliable. In some cases supplies of diesel to these towns have 
also been a problem for several reasons; for instance, T ANESCO 's failure to pay the oil companies 
in time, which led them to cut supplies, and the fact that during the rainy season some of the roads 
become impassable. In both systems, generation facilities are owned by T ANESCO and a few 
private companies, as noted above. Of the country's total existing installed electricity generating 
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capacity, which stands at 902MW, TANESCO owns and operates 796MW (88%), while the 
remainder is owned together and operated by the three IPPs mentioned above. Table 8.1A below 
provides details of the hydro and thermal capacity in the national grid, while Table 8.1B shows the 
existing electricity installed generating capacity for the isolated systems. 
Table 8.1A: Installed Generating Capacity of the Existing Grid System 
. Generattou Name. tJf Sutlou · ;; Year N#i.CJf %' _-· Total ., Ueedve 
1'»'e . Cmnmissfolled V+ ~ Capaeftr 
"' ' 
· . OlRilfilx C¥Wl ·-·~··.· .e: ... ..,. . . . ,.~:._ ·<- .. Kidatu 1975/80 4 204 204 
Mtera 1989 2 80 80 
Kihansi 2000/01 3 180 180 
Hydro Pangani Falls 1995 2 68 66 
Hale 1968 2 21 17 
Nyumbaya 1964 2 8 8 Mungu 
Total Hydro Capacity 561 555 
UbungoGT 1994 2 40 37 (ABB) 
Ubungo GT (EPP) 1995 2 80 75 
Thermal Diesel Generation 
- - 82 35 
IPTL -Tegeta• 2002 10 100 100 
Kiwira Coal 4 4 Plant* 
Total Thermal Capacity 306 251 
Total Installed Capacity of the Existing Grid System 867 806 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
Key: 1 Owned and Operated by IPTL 
*Owned and Operated by Kiwira Coal Mine, the rest owned and operated by T ANESCO 
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Table 8.1B Existing Isolated Systems Installed Generating Capacity 
Mtwara 4.74 3 
K.ilwaMasoko 1.119 0.55 
Thermal Diesel ~afia 0.848 0.848 
~~--------,_--~~~~~--r-~---+------~---+--~~~~ Tunduru 0.7 0.66 
Mpanda 1.96 1.3 
Njombe 1.28 1.28 
Biharamulo 0.848 0.848 
Ngara 0.952 0.952 
!Wood Residues TANWAT 2 2 
Mini Hydro Uwemba 0.843 0.843 
Total Isolated Systems Installed C~acity 35.0 28.0 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
Key: 
• Private Generators, the rest owned and operated by T ANESCO 
With regard to units generated, in 2001 the total TANESCO grid system generated 2,668.5 GWh, an 
increase of about 11 % when compared with 2,408.4 GWh generated in 2000. The isolated systems 
generated about 80 GWh in 2001. As stated earlier, the grid system is hydro-dominated which 
makes it vulnerable to droughts. Thus, for the past ten years, hydropower generation has been 
severely affected by frequent droughts, particularly in the catchment areas of the major rivers, which 
significantly reduced water flow to the major hydroelectricity generating plants. For example, in 
1997 the cascaded Kidatu and Mtera hydropower plants on the Ruaha River generated at only about 
50% of their capacity, thus losing about 700 GWh of energy, the worst during the period 1990-
2001. This led to too much pressure being placed on thermal generating facilities, which could not 
meet the demands, and consequently T ANESCO has had to embark on a more severe load shedding 
programme. Tanzania first experienced load shedding in 1992 and since then it has recurred several 
times, as shown in Table 8.6A. The resulting loss to the economy has been estimated as millions of 
US dollars. 
In an effort to reduce the effects of load shedding and to meet growing demand, T ANESCO 
constructed Kihansi Hydropower plant, which was commissioned in December 2000. However, the 
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plant is currently losing about 15 MW of its capacity daily as a result of the efforts to save a "rare 
toad species", which is believed to live only in the Kihansi basin. One important feature of these 
toads is that their reproduction process is unique in that, unlike other toad species, they give birth 
instead of laying eggs. The effort to ensure their survival entails releasing water to keep the 
environment at the Kihansi gorge as close as possible to what it was before the construction of the 
plant. The government and TANESCO on one side, and the environmentalist and international 
community on the other side, have initiated a study aimed at establishing the minimum amount of 
bypass flows that should be met by T ANESCO. 
It should be noted, however, that any amount of bypass flows will significantly reduce the firm 
energy from this plant. A higher bypass flow at say from 4m3/sec may reduce the overall viability 
of the plant, and actually turn it from a positive investment into a liability. Thus it is up to parties 
concerned to decide whether priority will be given to the toads or to the electrical power, which is 
highly needed by Tanzanians for economic development and thus poverty eradication. However, it 
must be added that this controversy would not have happened if all the necessary measures had been 
taken during the project's feasibility study stage. One objective of carrying out an environmental 
impact study, which is currently a worldwide requirement for big projects and especially those 
fmanced by donor communities, such as this one, is to ensure that projects will cause minimum 
harm to the environment. In this case, therefore, one must ask whether such a study was really 
carried out or not, and if it was, whether it was done properly; further, if it was indeed done 
properly, did TANESCO ignore the study's recommendations and simply go ahead with 
constructing the plant without considering the survival of the "rare toad species"? 
Imports (Cross-border Supplies) 
In addition to internal electricity generation, Tanzania also imports electricity from its neighbours 
Uganda and Zambia to supply its isolated towns found near the borders with these countries. The 
existing cross-border supplies are the following: the Kagera region gets its power from Uganda via a 
132 kV transmission line from Masaka in Uganda. Others are Sumbawanga town, which gets its 
power from Mbala Sumbawanga via a 66 kV transmission line, and Tunduma towship in the Mbeya 
region, which gets its power from Kasumulo in Zambia, via a 33 kV transmission line. Table 8.2 
shows units generated in Tanzania and imports for the period 1990-2001. 
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Table 8.2 Units Generated and Imported (GWh) 
1991 1,725.6 24.8 1,750.4 74.6 1.9 1,826.9 
1992 1,650.0 86.9 1,736.9 81.2 1.9 1,819.9 
1993 1,697.4 110.5 1,807.9 67.4 0.9 2.7 1,878.9 
1994 1,499.4 224.7 1,724.1 66.5 15.1 4.3 1,810.0 
1995 1,538.7 243.9 1,782.6 58.0 18.3 2.7 1,861.6 
1996 1,747.9 192.1 1,940.0 51.6 15.9 3.1 2,010.6 
1997 1,449.2 430.9 1,880.1 56.1 25.4 3.6 1,965.2 
1998 2,077.6 25.4 2,103.0 60.3 27.8 4.2 2,195.4 
1999 2,161.7 90.2 2,251.9 73.4 21.0 4.9 2,351.1 
2000 2,145.0 263.3 2,408.4 70.8 21.5 5.8· 2,506.4 
2001 2,601.9 66.6 2,668.5 79.9 22.0 6.4 2,776.8 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
Planned Generation Development 
In 1999, TANESCO, assisted by a consultant (Acres International of Canada), completed a long 
range Power Sector Development Plan for Tanzania for a 25-year period. The plan is continuously 
updated each year by its Corporate Planning Department. The revised load forecast in both 2000 and 
2001 developed two load forecast reference scenarios, one with a "reduced" and the other with a 
"full" industrial list. These two scenarios were developed due to the uncertainties surrounding the 
timing of the planned large mining loads. It was difficult to establish whether some of the planned 
mining projects would indeed take off, and if so, whether they would be using T ANESCO' s power. 
For example, a recently established mining company has decided not to use TANESCO's power but 
has set up its own generation capacity, allegedly in a bid to avoid TANESCO's expensive power. 
The "reduced industrial list" assumes that some mining loads will not be realised, whereas the "full 
industrial list" assumes that all the planned mining loads will take off as planned and will be 
connected to the national grid. Consequently, the 2001 update study recommended two least-cost 
generation expansion plans for the reduced and full industrial list load forecasts, as shown in Table 
8.3 below. 
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Table 8.3: Least Cost Generation Expansion Plan for the period 2003-2026 
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2004 1X40MW (UGTS; 1X60MW GT-Oil) 1X40MW (UGTS; 1X60MW GT-Oil) 
2005 2x60MW GT- Oil 
2006 2XlOOMW Zambia Imports 
2007 2XlOOMW Zambia Imports 
2008 
2010 4x89.5MW, Ruhudji Hydro Power 4x89.5MW, Ruhudji Hydro Power 
2016 2XlOOMW Coal Plant- Mchuchuma 2X 1 OOMW Coal Plant- Mchuchuma 
2020 2XlOOMW Coal Plant- Mchuchuma 2XlOOMW Coal Plant- Mchuchuma 
2023 3x74MW Rumakali Hydro Power 3x74MW Rumakali H_ydro Power 
2025 
2026 lx60MW GT at Kinyerezi lx60MW GT at Kinyerezi 
Source: TANESCO, PSMP, 2001 Update 
Transmission and Distribution System 
From the early 1970s T ANESCO has made aggressive efforts to extend the national grid, and as a 
result most of the major cities and towns in the country are now connected to the national grid. At a 
certain time these efforts were so assertive that the perception arose that they were being done at the 
expense of adding new generation facilities. The transmission lines, almost all of which are radial 
single-circuit lines, were built to deliver power to cities and towns from the major generation 
centres, most of which are found in a single region in the centre of the country. The voltages of the 
transmission system are 220 kV, 132 kV and 66 kV, which all are alternating current (AC) with 
50 Hz frequency. Distribution system voltages include 33 kV, 11 kV and lower voltages supplying 
different types of consumers, residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, depending on their 
electricity demands. Table 8.4 below summarises the route lengths of transmission and distribution 
lines. 
Table 8.4 Transmission and Distribution: Total Lengths of Lines in Tanzania (km) 
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The Tanzanian national grid is not interconnected with any of its neighbouring countries' grids. 
However, studies are now being carried out for the construction of a 220 kV line from Arusha 
(Tanzania) to Nairobi (Kenya), which will interconnect the grids of the three East African countries, 
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya and Uganda are already interconnected albeit only by means 
of a fairly low-voltage, 132 kV, double-circuit line from Tororo (Uganda) to Nairobi (Kenya). As 
shown in the least-cost generation expansion plan, an interconnector with the Zambian grid is also 
planned for 2006/2007. This will connect Tanzania and the other East African countries to the 
Southern African countries' grids and to the SAPP. A number of internal transmission lines to 
transmit power from the planned additional electricity generation plants to the different load centres 
have also been earmarked for construction. However, according to the 1999 power sector 
development plan and its subsequent update studies, during the 25 years planning horizon there is no 
single isolated system which is earmarked to be connected to the grid system, as doing so will not be 
economically feasible. As an alternative, a recommendation was made to investigate and evaluate 
other supply options such as local hydro and/or gas resources for the isolated load centres. 
System Losses 
TANESCO's system losses are well above the international average of 10- 12% (Marandu et al., 
1999: 94). This is firstly because some of the transmission lines and transformers are very old, and 
secondly because a significant amount of electricity is lost through illegal connections and wrong 
billing. As Table 8.5 shows, distribution losses are much higher than transmission losses because 
they include non-technical losses and have in fact been increasing over the past three years. This 
increase has been associated with increases in illegal connections, which are due to the following: 
firstly, TANESCO's failure to speedily connect new customers, and secondly, some customers 
tamper with and by-pass the electricity meters. For instance, in one region alone, Arusha, out of 
12,322 customers whose premises were inspected, 1,251 illegal electricity users were netted. 
TANESCO's ineffective billing system and non-payment have also contributed to high distribution 
losses. Table 8.5 below shows both technical and non-technical losses for transmission and 
distribution. 
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Table 8.5 System Losses 
Total Unit>s Transmission Distribmon tom~· system 
Year Generated Losses Losses Losses 
(GWh) (%·) (%} (%) 
1990 1,565.0 13.2 6.1 19.3 
1991 1,826.9 13.2 8.7 21.8 
1992 1,819.9 11.7 13.2 24.8 
1993 1,878.9 7.3 16.3 23.6 
1994 1,810.0 6.7 12.6 19.3 
1995 1,861.6 5.9 8.0 13.9 
1996 2,010.6 5.3 5.6 10.8 
1997 1,965.2 4.4 6.8 11.2 
1998 2,195.4 5.8 8.6 14.3 
1999 2,351.1 5.9 12.7 18.6 
2000 2,506.4 6.3 12.4 18.8 
2001 2,776.8 6.6 20.0 26.6 
Source: Compiled by the author 
8.3.4 Demand 
Electricity demand in Tanzania has been growing steadily over the last 10 years although the 
demand has been suppressed as a result of load shedding and lack of timeous connections of new 
customers. The annual average growth rate for the period 1990- 2001 was about 5.5 %. In 2001, 
peak demand on the grid system increased from 425.7 MW recorded in 2000 to 464.8 MW, which 
was an increase of about 9.2 %. Table 8.6A shows electricity consumption in the grid system, sorted 
by consumer categories, while Table 8.6B shows the same with regard to the isolated systems. As 
the Tables show,. consumer category one consists of residential, commercial and light industrial 
customers. This followed a decision taken by T ANESCO to regroup its consumer categories, as had 
been recommended by a tariff study, which was undertaken by the consultant, London Economics of 
United Kingdom, in 1994. Consequently it is difficult to establish amounts of electricity consumed 
by households in comparison with that consumed by businesses. 
Unlike the situation that prevails in Southern Africa, Tanzania's system peak demand has no 
seasonal variations, mainly due to the fact that there is no winter heating demand, as the country lies 
near the equator. However, there are two daily peaks, i.e. an evening peak between 19:00 and 22:00 
hours, and a mid-day peak between 09:00 and 13:00 hours, with the former being the stronger peak. 
Although it becomes very hot in summer, particularly in Dares Salaam and other coastal towns, air-
conditioning demand does not influence the peak demand. This is because air conditioners are 
mainly used in offices, and very few are used in residential areas; this is because residential 
electricity tariffs are high, and because the air conditioners themselves are expensive in relation to 
the general income of the households. 
108 
Table 8.6A: Electricity Sales by Consumer Categories (GWh) in the Grid System 
~ad.:.~ 
'1riii~ 
'"'"' g iNi~~ 
1990 575.7 255.4 364.7 6.6 52.0 1,254.4 263.7 
1991 634.2 279.0 398.5 7.2 56.8 1,375.8 297.8 
1992 683.0 255.1 365.7 10.1 60.1 1,373.9 302.9 
1993 710.5 247.2 336.6 8.7 68.3 1,371.3 311.2 
1994 762.5 279.3 292.8 9.2 54.0 1,397.8 301.2 198.8 
1995 851.4 268.2 329.8 6.4 83.6 1,539.4 332.5 114.1 
1996 1,019.1 284.7 325.3 2.8 85.7 1,717.6 337.6 1.4 
1997 924.8 343.9 369.7 2.4 95.0 1,735.8 339.0 75.4 
1998 974.0 385.2 358.3 1.0 103.8 1,822.4 367.5 0.4 
1999 1,112.7 301.5 306.7 3.3 114.0 1,838.1 394.1 0.9 
2000 1,158.0 297.5 367.0 2.4 130.2 1,955.2 425.7 29.1 
2001 464.8 2.0 
Source: PSMP, 2001 Update 
Table 8.68: Electricity Sales by Consumer Categories (GWh) in the Isolated Systems 
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1990 40.2 8.0 0.300 0.320 
-
48.8 
1991 42.8 9.0 
- 0.332 - 52.2 
1992 52.0 16.3 
-
1.149 
-
69.4 
1993 48.3 14.5 1.557 0.602 - 65.0 
1994 51.9 9.5 - 1.279 - 62.7 
1995 66.3 16.9 0.069 0.705 - 84.0 
1996 62.6 12.4 0.182 0.119 
-
75.3 
1997 43.2 12.5 0.056 0.041 
-
55.8 
1998 41.0 17.0 0.007 0.069 - 58.1 
1999 62.0 13.6 0.002 0.050 - 75.6 
2000 60.1 21.0 0.001 0.044 
-
81.1 
2001 
-
219.3 
Source: PSMP, 2001 Update 
Key: Tariff 1 = Residential, Commercial and Light Industry ,.. 
2 = Low Voltage Supply 3 = High Voltage Supply 
4 = Public Lighting 5 = Bulk Sales to Zanzibar 
Projected demand 
The forecast energy and peak demand projections for the reduced and full industrial lists presented 
in Table 8.7 below, indicate a very strong growth in early years, peaking in 2005. The rapid increase 
in 2005 is attributed to the maturing of the expected new mining and industrial loads, which are 
expected to be commissioned in the 2002- 2005 period. The country's ongoing economic reform 
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programmes and in particular power sector reforms and privatisation are also some of the factors 
behind the anticipated faster growth. 
Table 8.7 Forecast Energy and Peak Demand Projections for the Interconnected System 
2002 2,914 492 6.5 2,914 492 6.5 
2003 3,073 524 6.5 3,214 560 10.3 
2004 3,332 573 9.4 3,511 618 9.2 
2005 3,954 668 16.6 4,186 727 19.2 
2006 4,200 710 6.3 4,432 769 5.9 
2007 4,782 798 12.4 5,215 908 17.7 
2008 5,007 837 4.9 5,440 946 4.3 
2009 5,242 877 4.8 5,675 987 4.3 
2010 5,486 919 4.8 5,919 1,029 4.3 
2011 5,740 962 4.7 6,174 1,072 4.3 
2012 6,005 1,008 4.8 6,439 1,118 4.3 
Source: TANESCO, PSMP, 2001 Update 
8.3.5 Tariff 
The average electricity tariff in Tanzania has been increasing steadily since 1990; the increase was 
particularly large between 1993 and 1995, when it increased by over 62%. The reason for this 
dramatic increase was to make tariff levels equal to the long-run marginal cost (LRMC), as 
recommended by the London Economics tariff study; Tariffs were increased every January and July 
to adjust to the effects of the devaluation of the local currency, the Tanzanian shilling, against the 
US dollar, and inflation. Table 8.8 shows the trend of average tariff increases in Tanzanian shillings 
and in US cents for the period 1990 - 2001. As the Table indicates, the effects of the devaluation of 
the shilling led to decreases in the average tariff in US cents. This is because the regular biannual 
increases in tariffs stopped due to the government's reluctance to approve further increases. They 
feared negative political consequences, as Tanzania's industrial tariff was already the highest in the 
region (Katyega, 2000: 10). According to the existing licence, TANESCO is permitted to increase its 
tariffs by up to 5 % biannually, while the Minister of Energy and Minerals in consultation with the 
Ministry of Finance is allowed to raise tariffs by an additional 10 %, and any excess of this has to be 
approved by the cabinet (Marandu, 2001b:14). 
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Table 8.8 Average Electricity Tariffs in US cents 
~~~~ l LEll{:::&Lt!iili 1~--.1 -~~-~-: ~ 1 i~~) !: '~:1~l :, _{~-~l.ll&~P&lli' 
- ~. H. ---- - . ....J1 ---1 ,:_ ---'l- *'- ' J..._ j 
1990 10.50 193.30 5.45 
1991 13.49 215.10 6.27 
1992 18.38 248.40 6.46 
1993 32.43 412.80 7.86 
1994 42.97 512.50 8.38 
1995 50.20 557.70 9.00 
1996 61.37 586.59 10.46 
1997 62.77 612.8 10.24 
1998 68.76 654.11 10.51 
1999 71.06 733.21 9.69 
2000 70.43 802.34 8.78 
2001 80.00 871.53 9.18 
Source: Data for 1990 to 1995, Adapted from Marandu eta/., 1999:92 
Data on Exchange Rate (mean rate) for 1996 onwards, Adapted from Bank of 
Tanzania Economic Bulletin, Dec. 2001 
Recently, electricity tariffs in Tanzania have been one of the major problem areas ofthe country's 
power sector. T ANESCO increased its tariffs in order to meet its cost of generation. However, in 
1997 the major industrial consumers complained that the cost of electricity in Tanzania was too high 
compared to other costs of production. Following this, TANESCO took the initiative and actually 
surveyed twenty industries to compare the costs of electricity and other costs of production. The 
findings showed that what the manufacturers paid for electricity, in fact, constitutes a very small 
percentage (less than 10 %) of their totalcosts of production. Interestingly, between 1999 and 2000 
two conflicting statements were made by two top government officials regarding electricity prices. 
The first one was made by the Minister of Minerals and Energy to Parliament in his 1999/2000 
Ministerial budget speech, when he announced that that the government would reduce the price of 
electricity by 30 % - 60 %. This move was highly welcomed by electricity consumers but a shock to 
T ANESCO, as they were operating under heavy bank overdrafts as a result of insufficient tariffs. 
After a few months the President made a second statement, telling electricity users that they should 
not expect electricity prices to decrease. This time it was great shock to electricity consumers, who 
had been waiting for the tariff to go down as had been promised by the Minister, whereas it was a 
relief to T ANESCO. This is a challenge to TANESCO and the energy sector in general. 
Another development was that two investors (in the mining industry) with a total demand of 67 MW 
decided to generate electricity (using industrial diesel oil (IDO)) for their own use on the grounds 
that, and as mentioned earlier, TANESCO's power was too expensive, a situation which is 
extremely frustrating for both local manufacturers and foreign investors, and calls for an immediate 
solution. 
111 
In an effort to attract foreign investors and encourage manufacturing activities in the country, in 
March 2002 T ANESCO decided to reduce its industrial tariffs. This came after a period of some 
three years since January 1999 during which TANESCO had not adjusted its tariffs. The 
adjustments were intended to bring to an end the prevailing situation where industrial consumers 
were subsidising residential consumers. In that way all categories of electricity consumers will pay 
the actual cost of electricity supplied to them. Other reasons provided for the increase were to 
compensate for the devaluation of the Tanzania shilling against the US Dollar and to make the 
utility operate more commercially. In this case the subsidised units (kWh) were reduced from 100 to 
50 only. Thus residential customers were required to pay Tshs 25.90 for the first 50 units and Tshs 
83.00 for the units above 50. This resulted in many complaints from electricity consumers around 
the country including legislators who complained even more. As a result of these complaints, on 
April 16, 2002 the Prime Minister made a statement in Parliament instructing T ANESCO to increase 
the subsidized units from 50 to the original 100 units. 
8.3.6 Access to Electricity and Rural Electrification 
Access to Electricity 
As is the case in most African countries, access to electricity in Tanzania is very low and limited to 
urban areas, even though still a good number of urban houses have yet to be connected to electricity. 
Previously T ANESCO had been completely unable to cope with the number of customers who had 
applied for service line connections, resulting in huge customer backlogs waiting to be connected. It 
also resulted in wasted time and great inconveniences, as customers often had to follow up their 
applications in person at TANESCO's offices. In 1998 TANESCO had a huge backlog of up to 
55,000 applications, which amounted to about 16% of existing residential connections (Marandu et 
al, 1999: 84). TANESCO's failure to speedily connect customers to the service line was mainly due 
to liquidity problems and shortages of distribution line materials and transformers, most of which 
are imported. Massive devaluation of the local currency also made it difficult for T ANESCO to 
import enough line materials. 
However, during 2000 and 2001 TANESCO made extra efforts to acquire the needed distribution 
line materials, and was thus able to construct so many service lines that .almost the entire backlog 
was cleared. In May 2001, in an effort to sustain this rate of development, and with the Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals granting approval, T ANESCO decided to raise the service line connection 
charges from TShs 90,000 to 141,000 (about 57%) for a single-phase connection, and from TShs 
180,000 to TShs 180,000 to 584,000.00 (about 224 %) for a three-phase connection. TANESCO's 
aim was to make the customers pay the true cost of the service line connection. The price hike met 
with a public outcry that the hike was not realistic and that it would merely ensure that those who 
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had not yet been connected would continue to use poor energy sources. As a result, the new rates 
were applied for less than a month before the Minister of Energy and Minerals announced in 
parliament that T ANESCO should immediately revert to the old rates. It should be noted that this 
was the same government which first approved the price hike and then reversed it so dramatically in 
parliament. It did not, however, put in place an alternative means to help TANESCO to finance the 
service line connections, as the reduced rates would negatively impact on TANESCO's financial 
performance. 
Furthermore, all customers in Tanzania are required to meet certain standards by T ANESCO for 
house wiring, which many customers cannot afford. There are no differentiated standards or special 
arrangements to help urban poor households. These might help a significant number of urban poor 
to be connected to electricity, as proper house wiring is a big problem for them - quite apart from 
paying the service line connection charges. The current access to electricity in Tanzania is only 
10%. If the government does not intervene by putting in place polices and mechanisms to increase 
access to electricity - and to ensure its affordability - it is obvious that, particularly with the planned 
reforms, the low rates of access to electricity will prevail for the foreseeable future. One way the 
government could help is by making funds available so that customers can pay the full cost for the 
service line to T ANESCO or its successor but under a soft loan arrangement. The customers could, 
for instance, be asked to raise about 20 % of the costs, with the balance to be paid in instalments 
together with their monthly electricity bills for a period of time, such as five years. Such an 
arrangement has been used successfully in Botswana, and as a result, access to electricity in 
Botswana currently stands at 29 %, which is the second highest in the region after South Africa. 
Rural Electrification 
The scope of rural electrification differs according to the level of electrification of a country. In 
some countries rural electrification means the provision of electricity to rural villages, but in others, 
it entails the electrification of smaller towns far from the urban centres. In some other countries, 
where all towns have already been electrified, rural electrification involves connecting remote 
farmhouses; in Tanzania rural electrification refers to supplying electricity to district townships, 
agro-based industries and other small industries outside of the regional towns (K.jellstroem et al. 
1992). Rural electrification programmes iri Tanzania are now concentrating on supplying district 
headquarters. The target, which was set in 1975, was that by the year 2000 all district headquarters 
must be electrified by grid extensions or by their own generators. This target has not yet been met 
and at present only 87% of the target has been reached, i.e. as at 2002, 84 out of the 97 district 
headquarters have been electrified. 
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The financing for these rural electrification programmes has come primarily from T ANESCO and 
from the international donor community, mainly Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Japan, 
Germany, Spain, the African Development Bank (ADB} and the World Bank. The government 
neither has a rural electrification fund in place, nor clear policies for rural electrification, although 
when it has been required to contribute to certain donor-funded projects, it has done so from its own 
budget. Nowadays most of the rural electrification programmes, as well as other projects in other 
sectors which are being financed by foreign donors, require recipient governments to contribute a 
certain percentage, in some cases on a fifty-fifty basis. The issues of non-differentiated house wiring 
standards and high service line connection fees are also major problems in newly electrified rural 
areas and generally in all rural areas. The problem is well known to both the government and 
T ANESCO, but so far little if nothing has been done to solve it. In a move made in early 2000, 
which can be seen as an admission that the connection charges are indeed expensive, T ANESCO 
reduced both single-phase and three-phase connection charges by 50 %. Unfortunately this reduction 
lasted for only three months, 1st January - 31st March 2000, and was applied only to selected rural 
areas. Nevertheless, it is likely that a lot of customers took advantage of this reduction. 
However, there have been some new initiatives to introduce locally managed electricity supply 
cooperatives. So far Tanzania has four fully established electricity cooperatives serving about 3,000 
people. These are Urambo, Mbinga, K.asulu and Kibondo established in 1995, 1996, 1998 and 2000 
respectively. Meanwhile, a number of rural townships are looking into the possibility of establishing 
power cooperatives. This community participation is currently the best option, as less and less funds 
are now available from donor countries to finance rural electrification projects. Appropriate studies, 
however, should be done to identify optimum technology, financing options and institutional 
arrangements to facilitate these programs. 
8.3. 7 Financial Performance ofT ANESCO 
TANESCO's financial performance has generally been very poor over the past ten years. As 
indicated in Table 8.9 below, TANESCO recorded huge net losses before tax from 1992- 2000, 
except in 1997. Consequently other financial indicators such as return on assets and interest cover 
have also indicated a very poor performance. The government's tendency to over-regulate tariff and 
other operational matters largely contributed to the lack of TANESCO's profitability. Over-
regulated tariffs have led to tariffs not being adjusted in line with the devaluation of the shilling and 
increases in generation costs, thus making revenue fall short of cost in real terms. 
As regards operational matters, the utility has also shown great weaknesses in revenue collection. 
This has adversely affected TANESCO's liquidity. As a result it operates under considerable bank 
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overdrafts, which bear heavy interest rates. The government's failure to honour its electricity bills 
has greatly contributed to TANESCO's poor revenue collection. In some cases it is difficult to near 
impossible for T ANESCO to disconnect power from non-paying government departments such. as 
the army and big hospitals, because of their importance to society. For instance, up to May 2002, the 
government owed TANESCO a total of TShs 42.583 billion. However, the President of Tanzania 
said that this should not be an excuse for the company management to perform so poorly, as 
TANESCO also owed the government a total of TShs 150 billion, which is more than three times 
what the government owes TANESCO (Nyanje, 2002). Nevertheless, this behaviour illustrates an 
irresponsible behaviour adopted by the government. The Zanzibar State Fuel and Power Corporation 
(ZSFPC) is also not paying for the bulk of the electricity it buys from TANESCO. TANESCO, 
again, cannot discontinue supplying power to Zanzibar for political reasons. Reduced electricity 
generation and consequent load shedding is another factor which contributed to T ANESCO 
operating at a loss. During the dry years T ANESCO further experienced reduced generation from its 
hydroelectric plants, thus leading to load shedding as well as making it spend most of its revenue 
(up to 40 %) on buying fuel for its thermal plants. 
During the period 1990-2000, there were, however, some improvements on various staffing 
performance indicators, such as sales per employee and customer per employee ratios. The fact that 
TANESCO froze employment in 1995, saw the number of employees decreasing, mainly because of 
deaths caused by the Acquire Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) pandemic, but also retirements, 
resignations and dismissals, while the number of customers have been on the increase. However, it 
should be noted that although these staffing performance indicators have been improving of late, ·· 
they are still very low when compared to international norms. According to SAD-ELEC (2001:7) 
international standard customer per employee ratio is 161. 
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Table 8.9 Some Financial Performance Indicators ofT ANESCO 
- No. No. Total Sales Customers Total - Total 
Year of of Sales Per per _Revenue_ --A~_et._ 
Custusto ~mployee (MWh} Employee Employee - ·'~Value-
-mers MWb/Empl. (TShs' B) (TSbs' B) 
1990 172,274 6,500 1,303,186.5 200.5 27 13.70 88.12 
1991 188,905 6,500 1,427,957.5 219.7 29 21.78 105.16 
1992 221,954 6,980 1,443,339.2 206.8 32 26.54 144.02 
1993 246,668 7,500 1,436,309.4 191.5 33 47.14 200.62 
1994 259,410 7,450 1,460,466.8 196.0 35 63.69 250.92 
1995 267,224 7,493 1,623,390.8 216.7 36 85.14 741.57 
1996 261,578 7,569 1 '792,971.4 236.9 35 110.03 886.25 
1997 352,130 7,269 1,791,586.3 246.5 48 106.77 '1,102.02 
1998 371,233 7,107 1,880,412.3 264.6 52 117.57 1,216.13 
1999 396,440 6,950 1,913,767.2 275.4 57 124.20 1,281.49 
2000 431,722 6,612 2,036,284.9 308.0 65 130.77 1,254.78 
2001 440,431 6,540 2,021,935.4 309.2 67 139.21 
Table 8.9 Continued 
Year- Net Average - ·_ Returns on Debt/ IntereSt· liistt)rical 
Profit/Loss Selling Price Assets Equity_ Cover -Exthauge· 
Before Tax ofElect.- % Ratio Ratio Rate (Average) 
(TShs'M) (TShslkWh) US$/ TShs.- -_-
1990 2,665.97 10.52 0.03 0.85 1.86 196.60 
1991 1,592.8'8 15.25 0.01 1.13 1.36 233.90 
1992 (9,982.94) 18.39 (0.07) 1.13 (0.78) 335.00' 
1993 (11,540.93) 32.82 (0.06) 1.22 -(0.36) 461.31 
1994 (5 131.38) 43.61 (0.02) 1.00 0.43 536.50 
1995 (26,441.53) 52.45 (0.34) 0.27 (1.35) 591.65 
1996 (3,377.70) 61.37 (0.00) 0.30 0.51 586.59 
1997 3,094.87 59.60 0.00 0.23 1.48 612.80 
1998 (13,729.80) 62.53 (0.01) 0.28 0.07 654.11 
1999 (25,168.21) 64.90 (0.03) 0.33 (0.63) 733.21 
2000 (9,082.28) 64.22 (0.01) 0.32 0.35 802.34 
2001 68.85 - - - 871.53 
Source: Compiled from TANESCO Annual Reports 
Data ·on Exchange Rate (mean Rate), compiled from Bank of Tanzania Economic Bulletin, 
December 2001. 
Key: B = Billion M = Million 
8.3.8 Sector Reforms 
By recognising the importance of having an efficient and effective power sector for the promotion of 
industrial growth and improving its people's living conditions, the government of Tanzania has also 
embarked on a programme for liberalising and reforming its power sector. This imperative decision 
was reached by the government in 1992 and was part of the overall decision to reform and privatise 
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all the public corporations involved in the provision of services, such as water, electricity, transport 
(air, water and road), telecommunication, etc. The overriding reason for the government's decision 
to refonn and privatise these corporations was due to their failure to deliver the services as required, 
coupled with specific sector drivers. (The specific reasons behind power sector reforms will be 
discussed later in this section). The overall objective was to improve the performance of these 
enterprises in order to create an environment conducive to good business and to enable them to 
contribute substantially and meaningfully to the country's economic development efforts. 
Following this decision, in 1997 T ANESCO was officially placed under the authority of the 
privatisation commission, the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), in order for the 
commission to co-ordinate the process of reforming and privatising it. However, the PSRC could not 
immediately start the process, as there were no policies in place to guide such a process, and as it 
could not decide on its own how to reform T ANESCO. As noted in Chapter Two, there are several 
different strategies to reform the power sector of a country. A country will embark upon a particular 
strategy depending on what it wants to achieve from the reforms, and depending on the nature and 
existing characteristics of its power sector. In addition to this, unlike the privatisation of some other 
state-owned companies which can even be sold by auction, great care must be taken when reforming 
-and privatising such a vital and technical corporation, since if problems arise during the process, the 
outcome may be devastating. What happened in California in this regard was a good lesson for new 
reformers. To this effect, in October 1999, the government issued a new Power Sector Policy 
outlining the new industrial structure and the government's objectives with regard to power sector 
reforms. But before discussing these objectives, we must first consider the reasons for the power 
sector reforms in Tanzania. 
Drivers for power sector reforms in Tanzania 
Generally, reforms in most African countries are driven by poor performance of the traditional 
vertically integrated and publicly owned utilities. Tanzania is no exception to this trend. Previously, 
TANESCO performed well but in recent years it has been performing poorly, recording huge 
financial losses year after year. Consequently it has failed not only to pay dividends to the 
government, but also to effectively finance both rehabilitation and expansion of its system. Service 
quality has also been very poor. In a more systematic way, at a seminar on the privatisation of 
TANESCO held on lOth November 2001, at the Royal Palm Hotel in Dares Salaam, the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy stated the reasons for changes in the government's stance on dealing with 
T ANESCO as the following: -
• Poor service to its customers, as evidenced by substantial complaints from the public; 
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• TANESCO has continued to record losses in billions of Tanzanian shillings from 1996 to 
2000, with the exception of the year 1997 when it realised a small profit. Further, it is failing 
to repay its internal and external debts, as well as to rehabilitate the existing infrastructure; 
• Year after year, the rate at which new customers are connected, as measured by the long list 
of customers who are still waiting to be connected, is actually decreasing; 
• Continuous increases in operating costs instead of decreases, as shown by the customer-
employee ratio; 
• High technical and non-technical losses, as shown by flourishing electricity theft, and 
inefficient transmission and distribution systems, as shown by the small revenue collected 
compared to the quantity of electricity generated. 
Besides TANESCO's poor performance, which most of the government officials have stated is the 
main motivation for the power sector reforms in Tanzania, there is no doubt that external pressures 
also played an important role in persuading the government to reform its power sector. Evidence, 
suggesting external pressure, is that recently the World Bank decided to finance a major gas-to-
electricity project called Songas, through the private sector, but with the government coordinating 
the project. The World Bank is also the major financier of the ongoing power sector reform and 
privatisation process. The reforms have enabled many governments to shift their burden of financing 
new investments in the power sector to the private vital sector, which in tum has enabled 
governments to reallocate their scarce resources to other sectors, such as education and health. 
Objectives of the power sector reforms in Tanzania 
Power sector reforms, both in developed and developing countries, have generally been aimed at 
improving the sector's efficiency, hence leading to a reduction in electricity prices. However, 
according to the new electricity sector policy, one of Tanzania's power sector reform objectives is 
also to increase sector efficiency. However, this is not in order to lead to price reduction, but in 
order to meet electricity demands and provide for sufficient reserve margins. It is clear from this that 
different governments have different objectives and goals which they want to achieve from such 
reforms. According to the policy documents, the Tanzanian government's other objectives are:-
• To accelerate electrification, so as to ensure access to the broadest cross-section of the 
population and centres of economic activities; 
• To ensure the long-term economic viability and sustainability of the electricity industry, so 
that it can meet the challenges of economic development; and 
• To reduce public sector expenditure and debt by transferring to private capital the 
commercial risks which are inherent in investments in the electricity sector. 
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Reform strategies 
Although these serious efforts were only seen in the past three years, initial reform strategies, had 
been taken as early as in 1992 when the government removed TANESCO's monopoly by allowing 
private power producers to produce and sell electricity to T ANESCO or directly to consumers. This 
was a way of alleviating power shortages, which resulted from the 1992 drought that hit the country 
so severely. As TANESCO's system is highly dependent on hydropower, massive and frequent load 
shedding was inevitable, thus creating a need for new power generation sources, in which the 
government and TANESCO were unable to invest quickly enough. The removal of TANESCO's 
monopoly and the call for private sector participation saw two IPP's, Kiwira and TANWATT, 
selling power to T ANESCO only two years after its monopoly had been ended. A much bigger and 
significant private power project, a (100 MW) diesel plant in Dar es Salaam, had already been 
completed in 1999. The project was a joint venture between Malaysian and Tanzanian firms, which 
formed a company called Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL). Although the project was 
already completed in 1999, it only started generating in 2002 due to a dispute with the government 
over allegedly unreasonably high tariffs. The dispute was a result of inadequate legal and regulatory 
frameworks. It could be said that private sector participation was done in a hurry, perhaps due to the 
urgent need to solve the power shortage problem~ 
The reform agenda was developed further in October 1999, when the government approved a new 
policy and restructuring framework for the electricity industry. In this policy document the 
government articulated the following strategies, which would be adopted in order to realise the 
policy objectives ofthe power sector reforms:-
• To restructure and unbundle the present vertically integrated utility along the functional 
units of generation, transmission and distribution; 
• To introduce competition in the sector where applicable, while seeking to safeguard 
stakeholders' and consumers' interests through regulation; 
• To review the Electricity Ordinance and enact new industry legislation to capture changes in 
the electricity sector and to allow the private sector to provide public electricity supplies; 
• To establish an independent regulatory agency, which will be put in place before the 
privatisation of major state-owned assets in the electricity sector; 
• For the government to continue providing the necessary incentives to encourage private 
investments in the exploitation of different sources of energy. To encourage the 
development of electricity generation from these sources, and in so doing to follow the least 
cost basis of investment programmes, effective demand management and use of up""to-date 
and cost-effective technologies; 
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• To make provisions in the regulatory framework for the pricing of those parts of electricity 
which continue to display natural monopolistic characteristics and to develop a bulk 
electricity exchange market with the market price to be determined by the system's marginal 
cost; 
• For the government to continue accessing concessionary funds to foster rural electrification 
programmes; and 
• In the short term to improve the efficiency in the distribution system especially in respect of 
the metering and billing system. 
Even though the government clearly stipulated the strategies it intended to follow, it also had to 
appoint consultants through the PSRC to assist them. It wanted to avoid making the same mistakes 
which had been made before in other countries, and which would prevent it realising its objectives. 
In particular, consultants were engaged to advise the government on the following: 
• Restructuring and unbundling ofTANESCO; 
• Developing the electricity trading arrangements and regulatory environment m the 
electricity sector; 
• Developing an approach to improve access to electrification (rural electrification) and to 
meet universal service obligations; and 
• Advising on privatisation transactions for companies, which will. be created as part of the 
restructuring process. 
As noted in Chapter Two, often many governments commercialise and corporatise their utilities as 
the first step in reforming their power sector. However TANESCO is already a body corporate and 
is required to operate on business principles just as any ·other entity. Although commercialisation 
was not mentioned or included as one of the government's strategies in reforming the power sector, 
in 2002 the government through the PSRC initiated the process to make T ANESCO operate along 
more commercially disciplined lines. The government decided to commercialise TANESCO through 
hiring an external firm to manage T ANESCO under a management contract. The reason given for 
this was the managerial weakness identified by an external auditing firm. In the process a number of 
international firms submitted their bids and, on evaluation, Net Group Solutions (Pty) Limited of 
South Africa won the tender and is now managing T ANESCO for a two-year contract period. 
Eskom Enterprises (Pty) Limited, also a South African company, and ESBI International of Ireland 
lost the tender. 
Looking at the government's strategies for reforming the power sector, it appears that it is following 
the standard World Bank Reform Model for developing countries. This model entails 
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commercialisation and corporatisation as a first step, then restructuring by vertically and· 
horizontally unbundling the utilities, including developing of electricity trading arrangements. This 
step is often followed by establishing a regulatory framework and, lastly, privatisation of the core 
business units, namely generation, transmission and distribution. However, the government has said 
repeatedly that it will never privatise sensitive infrastructures and that they will be leased on a long-
term concession basis to private firms. In most African countries hiring an external firm to run their 
utilities before privatisation has become a common strategy of power sector reforms, perhaps due to 
the government's urgent need to improve sector efficiency and prepare the ground for privatisation 
(i.e. it is used as an in-between or transitional step). In Tanzania, however, many institutions and 
individuals challenged the government's decision to hire a private firm to manage TANESCO. They 
argued that management's failure to deliver prior to the management contractor should not be taken 
as an indication there are no other individuals in the country who are able to manage the utility as 
required. 
Despite the above criticisms the fact remains that the management contractor will most likely 
increase the utility's efficiency due to new private management skills which the firm will provide. 
Moreover, it is likely that during the contract period the government will reduce its excessive 
interference in management's operations, which will greatly contribute to the success of the 
management contractor. There will no longer be reluctance by so-called "key government 
institutions" to pay their outstanding electricity bills. Every institution in the country will be 
required to settle its electricity bills promptly. Furthermore, usually the fee of the management 
contractor is fixed or indexed with regard to operating profits or any other parameters. If this also 
applied to the management firm in Tanzania, it will provide incentives for better performance. 
However if only a small part of the management firm's remuneration is indexed to profit, then it is 
likely that the contractor will not resist excessive interference by government, and thus the 
anticipated improvements will not be achieved. 
In the same way that the advent of the IPP generated significant controversy, the process of 
acquiring the management contractor was a controversy as well. The process was declared by the 
Minister of Energy himself to have lacked transparency. It is not known why the Minister expressed 
such reservations on the level of transparency. However, in response to this, the PSRC, which was 
coordinating the process, issued a press release, denying the allegations by saying that transparency 
prevailed throughout the process and that top officials from the Ministries of Finance and Energy 
participated fully in the entire process of evaluating the bids. On the other hand, TANESCO's 
employees had earlier vowed to prevent the management contractor from entering the offices until 
the government had signed a voluntary agreement, which would guarantee their welfare. As a result, 
121 
the new management had to force its way in with the help of the armed special police force (Field 
Force Unit); this unit also patrolled outside the utility's head office building for some days to ensure 
the contractor's security. The government used force after negotiations between the government and 
T ANESCO employees had failed. 
All of these are the challenges faced by power sector reforms in Tanzania, which need to be duly 
addressed by the government. If this is not done, they may outshine the expected benefits of these 
power sector reforms. One may wonder that, if these small processes, the advent of IPP and the 
hiring of the management contractor, generated so much controversy, what will happen with the 
privatisation process, which is much bigger and even more important. However, if transparency 
prevails and the utility's employees and the public at large are properly educated on the benefits of 
power sector reforms, it is likely that the government's policy objectives will be achieved. In a bid 
to show its commitment on the issue of transparency, the PSRC's Chairman, when presenting a 
paper at a seminar on the privatisation of TANESCO, held on lOth November 2001 at the Royal 
Palm Hotel in Dares Salaam, gave the following tentative timetable for TANESCO's divestiture: 
~=-- "'- -~=][---------------::-_-__ -=~~~ ---~---_---: _---:-_-----_- ~-~ 
January 2002 Completion of the study on the new electricity sector structure and legislation 
February 2002 Government approval on the study's recommendations for the new electricity 
sector structure and legislation 
August2002 Completion of the new electricity sector structure together with new legislation 
October 2002 Legislation presented to Parliament; 
'Completion of unbundling of TANESCO into different companies; New 
March2003 companies to start trading with each other under the new electricity sector 
structure 
May2003 Hiring a consultancy to advise the government on privatisation of the newly formed companies 
September 2003 Completion of the preparation for privatisation of the electricity distribution 
companies 
December 2003 Completion of the privatisation of the electricity distribution companies 
After privatisation of the distribution companies, privatisation of the generation 
companies will follow in 2004. 
8.3.9 Regulatory Framework 
As part of the overall reform process, the government is committed to separating its policy and 
electricity industry regulation roles. The government realises that without an independent and 
transparent regulatory framework in place, its reform objectives, such as attracting private 
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investments to the sector, will not be achieved. In fact, as mentioned earlier, if a capable and 
independent regulatory regime had been in place during the advent of the IPP, the more than three-
year long conflict between the government and the IPTL might have been prevented. The conflict 
saw the country experiencing a heavy load shedding programme, while the 100 MW generating 
capacity, which could cover the shortage, was standing idle. As a result of load shedding, the 
economy suffered significant losses, quite apart from the losses suffered by the investor who is still 
fighting in a court of law to be paid by the government. Moreover it is most likely that this conflict 
scared away many prospective investors, not only in the power sector but also in other sectors of the 
economy. The conflict had to be resolved in the international arbitration court and now the 
government and TANESCO are paying, on a half-half basis, about TShs 3 million (capacity charge) 
every month over and above what T ANESCO is paying for energy charges. 
To implement its commitment and to ensure such conflict will not happen again, in April 2001 
enabling legislation to establish a multi-sector regulatory agency was passed by parliament. The bill 
provides for the setting up of a multi-sector regulatory agent to regulate energy and water utilities. In 
addition to this bill, parliament also passed another bill, which provides for the setting up of another 
multi-sector agency to regulate surface and maritime transportation. While the energy and water 
regulatory agency will be named Energy and Water Regulatory Authority (EWURA), that of surface 
and maritime transport will be named Surface and Maritime Transport Regulatory Authority 
(SUMATRA). According to PSRC (2001: 6) the issue of regulatory independence is covered under 
institutional enabling legislation, while regulatory mechanisms will be spelt out in the industry 
specific legislation, which is expected to be enacted soon. Industry specific legislation will make 
regulatory provisions to regulate each industry, including electricity, and covering such items as 
licensing, tariff quality, environment, consumer protection, dispute resolution, etc (Masalla 
2001: 30). 
At present efforts are being carried out to make these agencies start operating. The Guardian (12. 6. 
2002) quoted Bashiri Mrindoko, the Commissioner for Energy and Petroleum Affairs in the 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals, as saying that the government is in the process of operationalising 
EWURA. However, no specific date for its launch was given, although it is noted that the project 
consultant, Stone and Webster, from the United States, is currently working on the institutional and 
legal requirement before its launch (Ubwani, 2002). 
The decision to establish these multi-sector regulatory agencies followed recommendations made in 
a study, which was commissioned by the PSRC with World Bank financial support. The proposed 
EWURA is really a multi-sector regulatory agency, as it will regulate the water supply, sewerage 
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· disposal, petroleum, gas pipeline transmission and electricity sectors. Perhaps the main aim of 
establishing such a multi-sector regulatory agency is to avoid regulatory capture by politicians or the 
private sector. The fact that its chief executive officer will be working under several ministers could 
to some extent prevent excessive interference by the politicians. 
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9.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER NINE 
Comparative Study 
The power sectors of the countries discussed in the preceding chapters vary significantly in terms of 
issues such as sector efficiency, number of people with access to electricity, performance of the 
traditionally publicly owned utilities and steps taken so far to reform the sector. Some countries 
have already initiated power sector reforms and have set up the requisite regulatory authorities, 
while others are only now considering the reforms. As mentioned earlier the reforms are expected, 
inter alia, to allow for the participation of the private sector, which is desperately needed to invest in 
expansion of the electricity system to meet demand and widen access to more people. This chapter 
sums up the findings of the preceding chapters by looking at the status of the ESI of the countries 
under study in terms of issues such as potential electricity sources, installed electricity generating 
capacity, electricity supply and demand, as well as performance of the electricity utilities. Then it 
will move on to discuss power sector reforms by exploring the main driving forces behind the 
reforms and the precise objectives of the respective governments with regard to these reforms, 
before examining the different reform strategies adopted by them. And lastly, before presenting the 
conclusions of the present study, the regulatory frameworks will be discussed. 
9.1 Current Economic Situation and Prospects 
Although all the countries under study fall into the category of "developing countries", they are in 
different income groups. Whilst Botswana and Namibia are tlefined as middle-income countries, the 
rest are regarded as low-income countries. As regards economic growth in these countries in 2000, 
this was mixed. For instance, while Tanzania recorded the highest overall growth rate, Kenya 
·recorded not only the lowest but in fact a negative growth rate, as shown in Table 9.1. The effect of 
such a negative economic growth rate, and for those countries that recorded economic growth rates 
that are lower than their population growth rates, is that their inhabitants are becoming poorer. To 
make it possible for these countries to fight poverty, which is widespread, requires higher and 
sustained economic growth rates. BBC (2002) quotes the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEP AD) as saying that an annual growth rate of 7% is needed in order to reverse the economic 
decline in Africa. In view of this, in an attempt to attain these required high economic growth rates, 
most of the countries have put in place economic policies that foster economic growth and attract 
foreign investors, such as liberalisation of exchange rates, privatisation of commercial public sector 
institutions and implementation of solid fiscal policies. If such policies were actually implemented 
as planned, these countries could succeed, as they are endowed with plentiful natural resources, such 
as minerals and substantial suitable land for agriculture, including rivers for irrigation. Figure 9.1 
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shows the GDP per capita for each of the countries studied m 2000 while Figure 9.2 shows 
percentage of population living in rmal areas. 
Table 9.1: Some Population and Economic Indicators (2000) 
* 1999 data; Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002. 
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9.2 Resource Potentials for Electricity Generation 
All the countries under study are richly endowed with potential sources of electricity, although their 
resource base varies according to the quantities and types of potential sources available. For 
instance, some are endowed with as many as three different sources while others have only 011e. As 
seen in Table 9.2 below, the total hydroelectric potential of all of them together is estimated at 
9.4GW of installed capacity. However, out of this total potential only about 13.4% (1.3GW) has 
actually been developed. If it were to be developed, this hydropower potential would, in fact, 
provide enough power to these countries to last for quite a long period of time. Hydropower does, 
however, require a substantial initial investment cost, which may discourage potential developers. 
As a result, if financial solutions coupled with government guarantees are not put in place, this 
potential may remain undeveloped even after the liberalisation of the ESI. The fact that these 
countries experience frequent droughts, which pose a further substantial risk to hydropower 
development, may also be a significant deterrent to potential private developers. 
As has been the case with hydropower, little effort has been made so far to exploit the other 
resources. For example, despite the fact that Botswana has 3.3 billion tonnes of measured coal 
reserves, currently it has only one plant with 132 MW of installed capacity. Botswana's as well as 
all other countries' failure to exploit the vast energy potentials they possess, while the majority of 
their people are still using poor energy sources such as fuel wood, is due to undeveloped energy 
markets in these countries and a lack of financial resources by the governments. In order to increase 
the current exploitation levels of these potentials significantly, these countries and all other countries 
in the region will need to open up their markets to each other and to create an integrated plan on· an 
economic basis without undue regard to political boundaries. This will enable the development of 
big power plants to be carried out in one country, and the power to be sold to other countries. In this 
way the problem of low utilisation levels of big plants during their first five to ten years of operation 
due to low electricity demand growth in the individual countries, can be avoided. As a result of this 
problem most of the proposed large power plant projects have been both economically and 
financially not viable. In addition to the market reform (integration), proper legislation and 
regulatory frameworks should also be in place so as to attract private capital. In this regard, the 
current initiatives and their arrangements to develop the gas resources in Namibia and the Bujagali 
hydropower project in Uganda provide a good starting point. 
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Table 9.2: Potential Energy Sources (2000) 
*Total recoverable at less than US$ 130/k:g 
9.3 Current ESI 
9.3.1 Generation 
Existing Installed Capacity 
With the exception of Botswana the installed generating capacity of the countries under study is 
dominated by hydropower. As Table 9.3 shows, Kenya has more than one third (677 MW) of the 
total hydropower installed generating facilities, while Swaziland has less than 3% (42 %). Recently, 
these facilities have created a lot of problems for the power sectors, as these countries are prone to 
droughts. During the 1990 - 2000 period, Kenya, Tanzania and to a lesser extent Namibia have 
experienced electricity shortages several times caused by the failure of their hydropower plants to 
generate power due to a lack of rainfall. In contrast, while Uganda also depends on hydropower, it 
does not suffer from drought-induced electricity shortages, as its main river, the Nile, which is 
where the country's two major hydropower plants are situated, has its source in Lake Victoria. 
Botswana, on the other hand, has only one electricity-generating plant with an installed capacity of 
132 MW. This plant uses coal, and its annual generation has been increasing over time due to 
improved efficiency. Apart from hydropower and coal plants, most of the countries also have 
thermal generation plants, which use various types of expensive imported diesel. In some cases the 
lack of foreign exchange has impacted negatively on the generation from these thermal (diesel) 
plants and the plants have been one of the major contributors to the utilities' poor performance. For 
instance, Tanzania's T ANESCO, 28% of whose installed capacity is thermal, has been using up to 
40 % of its total revenue to buy fuel during dry years. Figure 9.3 shows existing installed generating 
capacity for these countries. 
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Figure 9.3 Existing Installed Generating Capacity (2000) 
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Units generated 
Units generated in 2000 in the countries under study are as shown in Table 9.3 below. As mentioned 
above there is a heavy dependency on hydropower generation in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and 
Namibia which reduces the available generation in times of drought. Kenya's hydro system, for 
instance, generated a total of 3,274 GWh in 1999, but in 2000 its generation was reduced to 
2,435 GWh, a reduction of 840 GWh (about 26 %). This energy, which could not be generated 
because of a lack of rainfall in the region, is more than Swaziland's total sales for that same year. 
Tanzania and Namibia also experienced a substantial reduction in units generated due to drought. In 
contrast Uganda's hydro system generated fewer units because of a lack of sufficient spares for 
maintenance, thus leading to a large number of forced outages rates. The poor performance of the 
• , • A 
hydro systems in terms of units generated led to severe load shedding programrt.fes· in'; Ugatiaa,. 
Kenya and Tanzania. On the other hand Namibia and Swaziland were able to secure their power 
shortfall by importing more units from South Africa whose system is thermal based - using 
available cheap coal. 
Imports 
Most of the countries under study import power to supplement their internal generation. The only 
countries which do not import power to feed into their grid systems, are Uganda and Tanzania, 
although the latter does receive several small cross-border supplies from Zambia and Uganda. 
Whilst Kenya imports 30 MW of continuous power from Uganda, all the other countries under study 
(i.e. Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia) which border South Africa, rely heavily on South Africa 
for power imports. In the year 2000, for instance, Botswana and Swaziland imported more than what 
they generated internally, whereas Namibia imported about 46 % of its total power requirements. 
However, the amount of power Namibia imports in any particular year also depends on the 
performance of its Ruacana hydropower plant, which is affected by the amount of rainfall received. 
'I 
With ~egard to Botswana, the units imported are increasing every year as a result of having only a 
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single power plant with limited generation capability. In this case the increased demand in a 
particular year is met by power imports from South Africa. 
However, with the exception of Namibia, which has reported a decrease in profits in all the years 
when it imports more power, the other countries are reported to have greatly benefited from these 
imports. Nevertheless it should be noted that, despite the decrease in profits reported by Namibia, 
the country has for a long time now had two power plants which have been on standby because their 
per unit costs of production are higher than the unit cost of imports. Thus, if there were no imports, 
then Namibia would have no alternative but to operate those plants, which would greatly and 
negatively affect the utility's performance and the country's tariff levels. Botswana, on the other 
hand, has managed for several years to keep on hold the expansion of its internal generation 
capacity, as it is able to get cheap power from the SAPP and South Africa. It has been established 
that, if Botswana had invested in its internal generation expansion projects, its tariffs would have 
increased substantially. 
Similarly, the 30 MW of continuous power which Kenya is importing from Uganda, has helped 
Kenya substantially, and especially so during the drought years, when its hydro system has 
generated less power. In fact, Kenya and Uganda have recently in 2002 signed a new power 
purchase agreement, which will enable Kenya to import up to 80 MW of continuous power after the 
completion of the Bujagali hydropower project in Uganda in 2006. Clearly, such electricity imports 
have greatly benefited most of these countries. As mentioned earlier, the import and export of 
electricity is highly needed in the region, to facilitate significant exploitation of the abundant 
potential electricity resources available in the region. Table 9.3 below shows the installed generation 
capacity and the units generated and imported by the respective countries in 2000, whereas Figure 
9.4 presents graphically the units generated internally, the units imported and the total system's 
energy, also for the year 2000. 
Table 9.3: Internal Generation Performance and Units Imported (2000) 
*Total Installed Generating Capacity 
130 
Figure 9.4 Internal Generation and Imports (2000) 
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9.3.2 Transmission and Distribution 
Maximum demand 
As appears fi:om Figure 9.5, the maximum demands of the countries under study are generally low, 
but also vary greatly from one country to the other. In 2000 Kenya had the highest peak demand, of 
708 MW. Although there are 3.6 million more people in Tanzania than in Kenya, Tanzania's peak 
demand in the same year was much smaller than that of Kenya. Another interesting situation is that 
ofUganda and Botswana. These two countries ' peak demands in 2000 were almost equal, i.e. that of 
Botswana was 285 MW and Uganda 280 MW. However, their respective population sizes vary 
considerably, with Uganda having almost 14 times as many inhabitants as Botswana. To equal their 
per capita peak demand Uganda should theoretically have had a peak demand of 3,990 MW. 
Further, as in the case of Kenya and Tanzania, Botswana has a larger GDP per capita than Uganda, 
meaning that Botswana is more developed as also substantiated by its higher per capital income. 
Figure 9.5 Countries' Peak Demand (2000) 
800 .------------------------------------------, 
700 +-----
600 +------1 
500 +--------t 
400 +----------1' 
200 
100 
0 
Botswana Kenya Namibia Swaziland Tanzania Uganda 
131 
Exports 
Electricity exports as opposed to imports are not common in the countries under study. With the 
exception of Uganda and Namibia, all the other countries do not export electricity. Nevertheless, 
although Uganda in 2000 exported a total of251.1 GWh to Kenya and Tanzania, it did so although 
it did not have enough power to meet its domestic demand. In other words, it exported electricity 
and at the same time its local customers were sharing power through load shedding programmes. 
This situation can be attributed to the fact that Uganda had to fulfil its Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) requirements with Kenya. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the PPA had been signed in 
1954, and in terms of this agreement, Uganda was obligated to supply Kenya with 30 MW of 
continuous power for a period of 50 years. As regards Namibia, the country exports small amounts 
of electricity to South Africa, Zambia, Angola and Botswana through cross-border supplies. Table 
9.4 below shows the electricity exports and total sales for 2000. 
Table 9.4: Electricity Sales (2000) 
Sales 
Electricity sales in the countries under study vary widely as well. There are great variations both in 
terms of electricity sales per capita as well as sales per GDP, as shown in Table 9.4 above and 
Figure 9.6 below. When comparing GDP per capita and electricity sales per capita, it appears that 
there is a correlation between high GDP per capita and electricity use per capita. Botswana, Namibia 
and Swaziland which have high GDP per capita also have high electricity sales per capita whereas 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, which have low GDP per capita, show low electricity sales per capita. 
This suggests that to a certain extent high income contributes to increase in modem energy 
(electricity) consumption. 
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Figure 9. 6 Sales per Capita and GDP per Capita 
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With regard to growth in demand for electricity in the countries under study, there has been a steady 
growth over the 1990 - 2000 period. As shown by Figme 9.8 below, Botswana and Kenya 
experienced a very strong growth in electricity demand from 1994 to 2000, although in 2000 Kenya 
recorded a decrease due to fewer units generated as a result of drought in the country. Before 1996, 
the electricity sales in Namibia were more than those of Tanzania. However, since 1996, Tanzania 
expetienced a rapidly growing demand and as a result its sales exceeded those of Namibia. Even 
though, at present Tanzania's sales slightly exceed those of Namibia, there remains a lot to be done 
in Tanzania, owing to the fact that its population is 19 times that of Namibia .. 
Figure 9.7 Electricity Sales GWh (2000) 
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Figure 9.8 Electricity Sales Growths, (1990- 2000) 
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Number of Customers 
The customer base for all the utilities in these countries is relatively low, with most of the utilities 
having fewer than 500,000 customers. In comparison with the total population in these countries, the 
number of customers is very small, which clearly indicates that the utilities, in conjunction with their 
respective governments, need to look into ways of increasing their customer base. With the 
exception of Botswana, there is no other country which has in place special arrangements to boost 
its customer base. Botswana' s arrangements of providing loans with soft repayment terms for 
service line connection should be copied by the other utilities and governments, as this would 
increase their customer base and improve access to electricity. As discussed earlier in Chapter Four 
this arrangement in fact allowed Botswana' s electricity utility to almost double its customer base 
within a relatively short period of time (1995- 2001). 
The majority of the people in these countries are poor and cannot afford to pay for the fairly high 
electricity connection charges and for wiring of their houses. On the other hand, utilities do need to 
charge connection fees that reflect their own costs so that they will be able to pay for the line 
materials, most of which are imported. This problem is exacerbated by the rapid devaluation of the 
local currencies against the major foreign currencies. As a result, utilities find themselves in difficult 
situations, with no option other than raising their connection fees. As the rates are already on the 
high side, the further hike in fees makes it impossible for many customers to afford them and thus 
they continue using inferior energy sources which have additional problems associated with them, 
such as environmental degradation, etc. Figure 9.9 shows customer growth for the period 1990 -
2000. 
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Figure 9.9 Customer Growth; 1990 - 2000 
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Table 9.5 Percentage increases of sales and the number of customers 1990- 2000- (%) 
9.3.3 Performance of the National Utilities 
In general, with exception of Namibia's and Botswana's national utilities, the other utilities 
performed poorly over the last decade. Power interruptions, coupled with insufficient power in the 
grid systems, which have led to load shedding, have become part and parcel of electricity supply in 
most of the countries under study. For instance, in Tanzania customers had used all the ways 
available to them to air their complaints at the frequent power interruptions, many of which 
happened with no prior notice. Despite this, there have been few improvements and at present 
customers are urging the government to expedite the process of selling the utility in the hope that the 
new owners will rectify the situation. Deficient maintenance resulting from a failure to raise the 
funds needed to buy spare parts and the fact that some of the systems are old, have been the main 
reasons for the unreliability of the supply. Furthermore the lack of proper maintenance and the use 
of aged systems have also resulted in high system losses, which in turn significantly reduces the 
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available capacity that could be used to meet the growing demand. 
As shown in Table 9.5 as well as Figure 9.11 on the following page, the utilities' profitability in 
2000 was mixed. While Botswana's utility, BPC, recorded the highest profit, equivalent to about 
US$ 25 million, Kenya's electricity transmission and distribution ·utility recorded the poorest 
performance, reporting a loss equivalent to about US$ 34 million. Tanzania's utility, T ANESCO 
recorded a loss equivalent to about US$ 11 million. In the previous year, 1999, TANESCO had 
recorded a net loss equivalent to about US$ 31 million. Apart from some of the utilities recording 
huge losses and even for those which realised profits, their asset bases (as also shown in the same 
table) are relatively small compared to the number of the population they are supposed to service. 
With such small assets bases these utilities will not be able to operate efficiently or be able to widen 
their services to cover more customers in all areas, urban and rural, as required. 
For some utilities such as Tanzania's TANESCO, apart from having a small asset base, a great part 
of its equity consists of debt, which means that it carries a large interest payments burden (see the 
respective ratios in Table 9.6 below). These interest payment obligations in turn reduce the utilities' 
ability to finance maintenance or new system expansion. All other performance indicators for all 
utilities as shown by Table 9.6 are far smaller compared to the respective international benchmarks 
with the exception of system losses for Botswana, which was 11.1 - parallel to the international 
standard of about 10 - 12%. However, it should be noted that figures for Namibia, which are 
substantially different, are exclusively those ofNamPower, which sells electricity in bulk. 
Table 9.5: Some Financial Performance Indicators (2000) 
334.8 0.09 -0.13 4.65 
595.5 78.1 0.033 3.22 21.66 
74.3 34.9 0.05 
1 563.9 163.0 0.08 0.32 0.35 
428.2 52.9 0.064 
1 Does not include generation 3 Bulk Sales 
2 Excludes distribution 4 1999 data 
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Figure 9.10 Average Price of Electricity in US cents (2000) 
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Table 9.6: Other Performance Indicators (2000) 
International Standards adopted from Chiwaya et al. (1999: 337- 338) 
*Excludes distribution 
1Does not include distribution losses. 
Figure 9.13 Number of Employees (1990- 2000) 
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Figure 9.14 Sales per Employee (1990- 2000) 
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Figure 9.15 Customers per Employee (1990- 2000) 
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Figure 9.16 System Losses (1990- 2000) 
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As Table 9.6 above and Figure 9.17 below show, electrification rates in the countries under study 
are extremely low with the exception of Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana, which have rates that 
are encouraging, although, in comparison with the international standards they are still very low. 
The electrification rates in these countries' rural areas are even worse. The situation in rural areas is 
worse due to the fact that the utilities' activities are, in fact, concentrated in urban areas, although 
the majority of the population actually lives in rural areas. Botswana' s high electrification rates are a 
result of the combined aggressive efforts of both the government and the utility. As mentioned 
before, the soft loan arrangement, which started in early 1990, enabled a good number of new 
customers to be provided with electricity. In April 2000 the arrangement was relaxed further, and 
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new customers are now required to pay only 5% as a down payment, with 95 %recoverable in 15 
years. 
Uganda, which has the lowest electrification rates among the countries under study, has recently 
also started to put in some more efforts with special emphasis on its rural areas in order to increase 
its electrification rates. The target set by the government for the coming ten years is to attain 10 % 
electrification in rural areas. This implies that with 85.8% of its population living in rural areas and 
given an annual population growth rate of 2. 7%, it will take Uganda quite a long period of time 
(perhaps 100 years) before it can attain a 100% electrification rate in rural areas. This is a challenge 
not only for Uganda, but for all other countries in Africa. One major problem with rural 
electrification is the dispersed nature of the population, which makes grid extension extremely 
expensive. As a result, even with the pending reforms, very few if any of the private investors will 
invest in rural electrification. It is therefore the task of the respective governments to carefully plan 
how they will enhance rural electrification. Initiatives such as establishing rural electrification funds 
should be considered by all countries and should be well administered if the intended results are to 
be obtained. 
Figure 9.17 Access to Electricity (2000) 
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9.4 The Reforms 
As the movement to reform power sectors is gaining momentum across the world, similarly the 
countries under study have already started their reform process and, compared to the rest of other 
African countries, some of them have progressed relatively far. Thus, for instance, Uganda and 
Kenya have made substantial progress in the reform process, with Kenya being among the first 
African countries to embark on the power sector restructuring and reform programmes. However, on 
the other hand, of the six countries under study, Botswana has lagged behind the others in making 
any step towards power sector reforms, although it recently started to seriously consider such 
reforms. Likewise, although Swaziland also took time before joining this movement, it is presently 
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in the initial planning stages, while Tanzania is at an advanced planning stage and has already 
started to take some key initial reform steps. Namibia has completed the planning stage and is now 
at an advanced implementation phase. All these reform initiatives have been driven by a number of 
factors, which are discussed in the following sub-section. 
9.4.1 Driving forces behind the reforms 
Basically the main driving forces for the power sector reforms in the countries under study are 
almost identical, except that Namibia has some additional country-specific driving forces, namely 
black economic empowerment and the need to deal with the problem of the existence of a large 
number of distribution entities with widely differing competencies and practice. Apart from these 
country-specific driving forces, others include the following: -
a) Poor technical and financial performance of the traditionally publicly owned utilities (Uganda 
and Tanzania) as discussed under section 9.3.4 above; 
b) Improved customer services and choice (Namibia); 
c) Attracting private capital to the power sector subsequent to the government's inability to finance 
the needed expenditure on the networks' maintenance and expansion (Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania); 
d) Generation shortages which was caused by - first, an over-dependence on hydropower 
generation, which was adversely affected by the lack of rainfall as well as the poor distribution 
of rainfall in the main catchment area; second, the high breakdown rates of both thermal and 
hydro plants largely resulting from a lack of investment between 1990 and 1996; and lastly 
failure to implement generation capacity expansion plan between 1993 and 1997- (Kenya); 
e) External pressure, especially from major lending institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. These institutions have changed their ways of financing new power sector expansion 
projects and have started to channel their loans through the private··sector, as-:evident by the t;," 
Tanzanian example given earlier in Chapter Eight (Tanzania); 
f) International environmental concerns (Namibia); 
g) Maximising financial and economic returns to the state through fiscal revenue and debt 
reduction (Namibia); 
h) Stop supporting the national utility from the government's budget hence realising the funds to 
finance social sectors such as education and health (Uganda); and 
i) Lastly, the international experience and the benefits which such reforms have so far delivered 
(All). 
However, although the driving forces behind the power sector reforms in these countries are 
somewhat similar, the pace of the reforms differs considerably. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the extent of poor performance of the traditional utilities and the resulting problems vary 
141 
significantly from one country to another. The more severe the problems of the traditional utility and 
the power sector at large, the quicker the country embarked on the reforms with expectations that 
· these would provide the necessary solutions; the reverse was true, however. The cases of Kenya and 
Uganda on one side and that of Botswana on the other side clearly explain this situation. 
In the early 1990s Kenya experienced serious generation shortages resulting from, firstly, over-
dependence on hydro generation, which was adversely affected by lack of rainfall. Secondly, the 
government's failure to implement none of the 250MW of generation capacity planned between 
1993 and 1997 saw the country being among the first African countries to embark on power sector 
reforms. Uganda- having excellent hydropower potentials which are immune to droughts and at the 
same time having a per capita power consumption of only 44 kWh/year, which is the second lowest 
in the world - embarked on the reforms far earlier than many other countries. Moreover, of the 
countries under study, Uganda's electricity utility problems were actually far more serious (see 
Chapter Three). On the other hand as a result of the consistent and relatively good performance of 
Botswana's utility, (BPC), as evidenced by the fact that the country's electricity levels (29 %) are 
higher than the SADC average and due to very small market, Botswana was the last country to 
implement reforms. 
9.4.2 Objectives 
Since the driving forces behind these reforms are similar, the countries' objectives are also similar. 
These objectives are: -
a) Increase sector efficiency (Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Kenya); 
b) Attracting private investors in the power sector (Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda); 
c) Introducing sector competition (Namibia); 
d) To make the power sector financially viable and able to perform without subsidies the 
government budget (Uganda); ... 
e) To reduce public sector expenditure and debt by transferring to private capital the commercial 
risks, which are inherent in investments in the electricity sector (Tanzania); 
f) Increasing access to electricity in a sustainable manner particularly in rural areas (Namibia); 
g) To accelerate electrification, so as to ensure access to the broadest cross-section of the 
population and centres of economic activities (Tanzania); 
h) To meet the growing demands for electricity and increasing area coverage (Uganda); 
i) To improve reliability and quality of the electricity supply (Uganda); 
j) Alleviation of resource constraints in the electricity sector (Namibia); 
k) For those countries which are well endowed with potential electricity sources like Uganda and 
Namibia, the governments want to encourage development of the sector so as to take advantage 
of export opportunities (Uganda and Namibia); 
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I) Development of an efficient and appropriate governance framework and structure (Namibia); 
m) To increase the sector's commercial performance (Uganda and Swaziland); 
n) Ensuring environmental and socio-economical sustainability (Namibia); 
o) Promotion and development of the sector as a key vehicle for investment and growth (Namibia); 
p) To ensure long-term economic viability and sustainability of the electricity sector, so that it can 
meet the challenges of economic development (Tanzania); and 
q) For those countries that heavily rely on imports and few sources of supply, another 
governmental objective is to increase the security of supply, while taking into account the risk of 
stranded investments (Namibia). 
One key objective that has been declared as priority number one is to increase the sector's 
efficiency. Not only has this been prioritised by the countries under study, but also throughout the 
rest of the world. Developed countries, too, have embarked on power sector reforms with the aim of 
improving sector efficiency, hence leading to a reduction in electricity prices. In developing 
countries such increases in sector efficiency, in addition to leading to price reductions are expected 
to help in meeting the growing electricity demand. Another key and common objective of power 
sector reforms is to accelerate electrification in a sustainable manner and to widen the area coverage 
to include rural areas. The number of people that have access to electricity in these countries is 
extremely low, thus the relevant governments are expecting these numbers to increase if the suitable 
reform programmes are implemented. Additionally, as most of the governments could no longer 
effectively finance the required new investments, the governments have formulated the further 
objective of attracting private investors to participate in all areas of the electricity industry. 
9.4.3 Reform Strategies and Progress 
Generally, before cQuntries embark on power sector reforms, they first show their intentions by 
issuing an energy policy or a sector-specific policy, which provides the broad guidelines for_the 
reform programme to be followed, and then enact the required- enabling legislation for 
implementation of the policy. This stage is followed by embarking on reform strategies, which differ 
somewhat from one country to another. However, experience has shown that a broadly similar 
model is followed in the developing countries, particularly in Africa. As mentioned earlier, this 
model entails the following steps: -
i) Corporatisation and commercialisation of the national utilities. In this step the publicly 
owned utilities are corporatised by transforming them into self-contained entities. The 
utilities are separated from direct government control and become legal corporations with 
separate managements and accounts and are required to pay taxes and dividends. Those 
which are already body corporates are transformed into more commercially viable entities, 
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as they are required to operate on sound commercial principles, a process which is known 
as commercialisation; 
ii) The second step that often follows is to establish a regulatory authority. This is required at 
the first stages so that it can work hand in hand with the government in the remaining steps 
of the these reforms, so as to help avoiding any mistakes and future problems; 
iii) The third step entails restructuring the utilities by vertically and horizontally unbundling 
them to form new separate entities on a vertical and/or horizontal basis. These newly 
formed separate companies are then required to trade with each other on a commercial 
basis. At this stage IPPs may also be allowed to enter into the power sector arena, which 
together with the generation company or companies will sell power to the transmission 
company. Another sub-step in this third step involves making the transmission company 
the sole purchaser of power from the generation company or companies and the IPPs, 
which in tum will sell in bulk to the distribution entity or entities. This sub-step is called 
creation of a single buyer; and 
iv) Lastly, privatisation of the unbundled entities, i.e. the newly formed generation, 
transmission and distribution companies. 
Accordingly, with regard to the countries under study, which have already begun to implement 
power sector reforms, they all appear to have taken the same steps. Their programmes have been 
built around this basic model, as discussed below in greater detail. 
Enabling Legislation and new ESI Policies 
The good intentions of a country to reform its power sector, which are in most cases well presented 
in a policy paper document, are clearly not enough, as it is required to commit itself through 
implementing various le~islation and laws in order to attract potential investors. According to 
,:Marandu (2000: 23), legislation is needed in order to create the legal basis for the regulation, 
• i • 
unbundling and privatisation of the power sector. It also introduces credibility to the reform process 
for investors who know that they can challenge unfair decisions in a court of law. 
In view of the above and as Table 9.7 below shows, many governments of the countries under study 
have already enacted the required legislation and others are underway. On the one hand, Swaziland 
and Botswana are yet to enact the required new laws to allow for power sector restructuring and 
setting up of regulatory frameworks. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Six, at present Swaziland has 
in place three pieces of draft legislation, which are due to be tabled in parliament this year. These 
include the Regulatory Act, the Electricity Act (which will initially be based on a single buyer 
model) and the Corporatisation Act (which will make private sector participation possible). As for 
Botswana, so far the government has only in March 2000 approved a White Paper on Privatisation 
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Policy, which earmarked the energy sector as one of the sectors where liberalisation should be 
considered. It is expected that this will be followed by enacting the required legislation, as without 
supporting legislation the policies, however good they may be, will achieve nothing as far as 
reforms are concerned. 
On the other hand, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia first issued new energy policies or 
specific electricity industry policies detailing the direction to be taken by the respective governments 
concerning the restructuring and privatisation of the industry. These policies were followed by 
enacting legislation to enable changes in structure and ownership to be effected. Kenya was the first 
to enact enabling legislation with its new Electric Power Act of 1997. Among other things, this new 
bill provides for the separation of KPLC and KenGen and the establishment of an electricity 
regulator, as well as allowing private sector participation in terms of IPPs. Uganda followed suit, 
enacting its new Electricity Act in 1999. This bill provides for the vertical separation of the 
traditional electricity utility and the establishment of electricity regulator. As for Namibia, the 
government enacted its new Electricity Act in July 2000 to replace the old South African Electricity 
Act and provides for the establishment of electricity regulator. Tanzania, too, has in April 2001 
enacted the necessary legislation to establish a multi-sector regulatory agency. It is expected that the 
new legislation to enable effecting new industry structure would be presented and passed by 
parliament in October 2002. Enacting the right legislation, which will provide assurance to potential 
investors, is one of the prerequisites for a successful power sector reform programme. 
Corporatisation and commercialisation 
Following a study, which made certain recommendations that were subsequently approved by the 
government, Swaziland is intending to start its power sector reforms through the corporatisation of 
its national utility, SEB. Currently, SEB does not pay taxes or dividends. Through corporatisation it 
will be conv~rted into a commercial entity, which will operate mider normal. company laws~ 
' ~ . . . 
regulation and taxation, and it will be owned by public and private shareholders through selling of 
shares. 
On the other hand, all the other national utilities of the countries under study, which are already 
body corporates, are required to pay both taxes and dividends. However, due to poor management 
and excessive government intervention, some of these utilities performed poorly and were unable to 
pay taxes and dividends as required. The utilities that performed poorly were those of Uganda 
(UAB) and Tanzania (T ANESCO). They had been operating at very low efficiency levels and huge 
financial losses and had also failed to either invest in new capacities or to rehabilitate their systems. 
Consequently their respective governments had to take some measures to make them operate on 
more commercial principles and deliver services at an acceptable standard. Commercialisation of 
145 
these utilities in these countries occurred by placing them under management contract. This was the 
best way that these governments could achieve the desired results within the minimum time before 
the restructuring phase. This is to say that, the aim of commercialisation is to level the playing fields 
for the new business entities, which are created as part of the restructuring step. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, by placing the UEB under management contract, a significant 
increase in the utility's value and an improvement of its service delivery was achieved during the 
contract period. Tanzania very recently contracted a private firm to run its utility, but it is expected 
that at the end of the two-year contract the management firm will succeed in turning the utility into a 
profitable entity as well as raising its value before the restructuring phase is implemented. On the 
other hand, Namibia and Kenya bypassed this first step of hiring a firm to manage the incumbent 
utility on a contract. For Namibia, this is because its utility, NamPower, had performed relatively 
well for the past ten years. In addition to this, because of the existence of many distribution entities 
and although some of them were operating poorly, it was not a better option for the government of 
Namibia to hire private firms to run them. As regards Kenya, which also bypassed this first step, the 
government decided to proceed straight to unbundling. As mentioned earlier, Botswana is currently 
considering reforming its power sector. It is most likely that it will also bypass this first step as its 
utility has been performing well too - earning reasonably increasing profits, although it has not 
increased electricity tariffs for the past six years, as well as achieving relatively high electrification 
rates. 
Restructuring 
Current Structure and Ownership 
Previously, the ESI structure was charactensed by vertically integrated and publicly owned utilities 
-· ' ·. ' . 
with monopoly power in all the segments of the industry, namely generation, transmission and 
distribution. In most. of the countries under study the same trends of ownership and st~cture still 
apply, although reforms in some countries have allowed new generators to enter the market. With 
the exception of Kenya and Namibia, all the other countries have a single utility responsible for the 
generation, transmission and distribution of electric power throughout the country, although 
Tanzania has allowed the entry of small IPPs and Namibia does so in principle. 
Uganda has just completed unbundling its utility to form three separate entities. In Kenya, following 
the government's decision to partially unbundle the ESI, there are now two publicly owned utilities, 
i.e. one responsible for the transmission and distribution of electricity and the other one responsible 
for generation; together with four IPPs, the latter sells bulk power to the transmission and 
distribution utility. Namibia is the only country which has a number of electricity distributors. In 
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terms of utility ownership, all utilities, including the newly formed separate companies in Uganda, 
are 100% owned by their respective governments, except for the transmission and distribution utility 
in Kenya, which is partly owned by the government and by private individuals who own shares. The 
IPPs, which are currently operating both in Tanzania and Kenya, are owned by private individuals, 
most of them from outside the country, although in Tanzania a joint venture between foreign and 
local firms owns one IPP and the other two are owned by publicly owned companies. Figure 9.18 
shows the current structure of ESI in these countries. 
Figure 9.18 Current Structure of the ESI in the Countries under Study 
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The expected structures of the ESI of those countries under study, which have already undertaken 
some reform initiatives, seem to be heading to a single buyer model. For instance, Namibia has 
already embarked on a single buyer (SB) model and is reorganising its distribution industry to form 
viable regional electricity distribution companies (REDs). In fact, the existence of the highly 
fragmented electricity distribution industry which has had negative implications on tarifflevels and 
entailed a loss of economies of scale, was the major problem ofNamibia's ESI. 
Th;'us Namibia'S 'reform strategy entails NamPower to continue playing~ an important role not only 
with regard to generation and transmission, but also in the area of distribution. In the generation 
sector, NamPower is encouraged to take part in IPP development, which will be introduced in the 
transmission segment; its transmission business performs the tasks of the single buyer and acts as a 
system operator albeit with a separate account. As for the distribution industry, NamPower is also 
allowed to take a key role in the REDs, which will be formed in terms of ownership and operations. 
After the REDs have been successfully created, the government is committed to looking into further 
ways of introducing competition so as to be able to pass on to its consumers the full benefits of 
efficiency gains. 
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With regard to Uganda, after it had successfully completed the restructuring of its national utility by 
vertically unbundling it to form three separate companies, it has assigned the responsibilities of 
single buyer to the newly formed Transmission Company. This is the system operator which, among 
other things, has the responsibility of co-ordinating the power supply system to insure a balance 
between the generation and consumption of electricity as well as dispatch of generation facility. In 
addition the Company will form a "ring-fenced" entity with separate accounts and personnel, which 
will be responsible for wholesale market operations. On the other hand, Tanzania has announced 
that when the two-year management contract is finished, it will restructure the utility by vertically 
unbundling it. It is most likely that the country will also create a single buyer, as currently there are 
some IPPs, which hold long-term PPAs with the incumbent utility. 
As far as Kenya is concerned, as pointed out earlier, the country has partially unbundled its two 
utilities, which previously existed as one. The unbundling resulted in the formation of two 
companies, one responsible for generation, i.e. KenGen, and the other responsible for both 
transmission and distribution, KPLC. The transmission and distribution company buys power in 
bulk from the generation company and some small IPPs by using PP As. However, the government 
of Kenya is committed to further unbundling the two companies to form separate business units in 
line with the recommendations of the market design study that is currently underway. Due to the 
e~istence of several PP As between the KPLC and the generators, it is likely that transmission 
functions will be separated from distribution to form a single buyer. It is not known as yet whether 
the distribution industry will be further unbundled to form several distribution entities. This also 
applies to Uganda and Tanzania. Figure 9.19 shows the expected structure of the ESI of these 
countries. 
Figure 9.19 Expected ESI Structures 
T 
Single Buyer 
Namibia 
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Customers 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
The two separate utilities that were formed in Kenya after the partial unbundling have so far existed 
and operated as completely independent entities for about three years. As mentioned earlier their 
business performances for this period have taken two opposite directions, profitability and loss 
making. In other words, while the generation utility enjoys positive returns, the transmission and 
distribution utilities experience major problems. For two consecutive financial years, 1999/2000 and 
2000/01, it recorded total net losses before tax equivalent to US$ 86.3 million, which is almost 
enough to construct a diesel generation facility with 100 MW capacity. This substantial amount of 
money could also have been used to connect electricity to a significant number of consumers. This 
provides a very good lesson for countries such as Botswana and Swaziland, which are now at the 
planning stages of their reform programmes. 
Kenya's case suggests that the distribution part of the ESI in these countries and in the rest of Africa 
is the main source of most of the industry's problems. Careful analysis of all the countries under 
study shows that all these countries had or have major problems with distribution as compared to the 
generation part of the industry. For instance, as seen in the chapters on the respective countries, 
Uganda and Tanzania had very poor revenue collection, coupled with flourishing electricity theft by 
customers, which led to high levels of. system losses (36 %). In addition the rates at which new 
customers were connected to their grid systems were very low, thus reflecting their very low access 
to electricity rates. 
Moreover, the relatively good performance ofNamibia's generation and transmission utility and its 
highly fragmented distribution industry with varying performances, also illustrate this fact. This 
shows that when countries adopt various ESI reform strategies, they need to pay more attention to 
distribution, as this appears to be the main source of the industry's problems. In fact, if a country·'s 
reform programme will result in a weaker distribution industry, it will in tum significantly deter 
potential investors in the generation'· ~nd transmission segments. This would most likely bring about 
a complete failure of the reforms. This is because potential investors will not be sure of selling their 
power and being paid accordingly. There is no private investor who would be willing to be owed a 
large amount of unpaid bills by a distribution company (as was the case with KPLC and KenGen in 
Kenya- see Chapter Five). Although it could not be established how KPLC was treating the IPPs in 
terms of settling their bills from the electricity, which the latter supplied to the former in bulk, it is 
likely that other potential IPP developers are looking at Kenya critically. 
Privatisation 
As regards privatisation, Uganda is about to complete concessionning out the newly formed 
generation, transmission and distribution companies. Tanzania has also announced that the 
privatisation of the new companies will be carried out by concession. As for Kenya, the government 
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is currently awaiting the consultant's recommendations on the industry's future structure and 
ownership. 
Regulatory Framework 
As mentioned earlier, previously, government departments (in most cases resorting under the 
ministries of energy) undertook the regulation of the power sector as was the case in most African 
countries. A similar trend was and is also found in the countries under study. As reforms are 
introduced new regulatory boards, authorities or commissions, which are transparent, capable and 
independent should also be introduced. So far this has only happened in. Kenya, Uganda and 
Namibia, which have full established and operational regulatory boards. These boards were formed 
as part of their power sector reforms and are expected to work together with their respective 
governments in accomplishing the reforms programmes which are still under way. Tanzania, 
Swaziland and Botswana are yet to establish such regulatory boards, but as was discussed in Chapter 
Eight, Tanzania is about to operationalise its multi-sector regulatory agency, which will also oversee 
the electricity sector. As regulators are critical to the smooth functioning of the electricity markets 
that will be created, by ensuring that prices are pushed to their lowest possible levels, the 
governments should make sure that the regulators are fully equipped in terms of skilled manpower 
and that the right laws are in place. 
As was mentioned in Chapter Five, there have been som~ concerns regarding the independence of 
Kenya's Electricity Regulatory Board. This poses a challenge to Kenya and to all other countries, as 
the need to have independent regulatory boards or authorities to oversee the sector and ensure its 
smooth running cannot be over-emphasized. All governments should support the current initiatives 
to establish both the Regional Electricity Regulator Association (RERA) and the Africa Forum for 
Utility Regulators (AFUR) as it is only through cooP,~ration and sharing of. experience that 
. regulators will be (lble to work more independently in their respective coUntries while at the same 
time maintaining common practices in the region and in Mrica at large. Under the auspices of 
NEPAD, ifRERA and AFUR were to be established as planned, it is likely that it will be easier for 
them to force the respective governments to ensure that the regulators are independent, in other 
words, that each country has a sound regulatory system. 
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Table 9.7 Status of the Reforms 
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9.5 Conclusion 
The study's findings have shown that in these countries there are very few good experiences which 
could provide good lessons for each to learn from one another and to copy in their efforts to develop 
the sector. Both in terms of the status of the various ESis and the initial steps taken so far to reform 
the industry there have been more problems than good examples and/or successes. 
With regard to the status of the ESI, the critical role played by importation of electricity in satisfying 
a country's power requirements does at least provide a very good lesson, which these countries and 
the rest of the region should find ways to enhance. Electricity imports might have been one of the 
simplest solutions to the power shortages faced by many of the countries, if all their power systems 
had been interconnected with one another. In fact, imports could even be far better than own 
generation, as evidenced by Botswana, which has been importing more than half of its electricity 
requirements and yet its utility has been the most successful one overall. Thus an initiative such as 
the SAPP, which brings together utilities to trade electricity among them, is of profound importance. 
The SAPP could also help in attracting investors to develop coal, which is plentiful in the southern 
part of the region, and cheap hydropower, which is available in eastern and central Africa. However, 
initially SAPP was established with its membership made up of the countries' national utilities. 
These countries are currently embarking on reform programmes, and ways to widen SAPP's scope 
to include private sector participation should be sought accordingly in order for the countries to 
benefit more from an electricity trade under a new industry structure and ownership. 
On the other hand, as pointed out earlier with regard to the power sector reform initiatives, which 
have been taken so far by some of these countries, their results unfortunately cannot inspire other 
countries. In fact, countries such as Kenya and Tanzania have experienced more problems than. 
before the reform initiatives, a situation whj9h does, however, provide good lesson for others to 
learn ,and benefit from, one of which being that careful planning should. be done before actually 
embarking on such reforms. It should also be noted that the problems experienced by Kenya and 
Tanzania are less a result of the failure of reforms or deregulation, but rather of poor planning and a 
lack of prerequisite capable regulators. The fact that the government of Tanzania is· now paying 
about US$ 1.5 million monthly to an IPP as a capacity charge, apart from and in addition to what the 
national utility is paying, is only due to a lack of proper planning. This large amount of money is 
currently being paid by taxpayers, many of whom are not electricity users (note that only 9 % of 
Tanzanians have access to electricity). Both. the energy charges and all the capacity charges were 
supposed to be met by electricity users through the utility and not otherwise. Assuming that this 
particular PP A will last for ten years, the government will pay a total of US$ 180 million, which 
might have been used in other needy areas such as education and healthy sectors. Clearly these are 
not the intended results of the power sector reforms and, in fact, their aim is to enable governments 
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not to finance the sector anymore. Thus countries which are now planning their reform programmes, 
should ensurt< that all the necessary prerequisite conditions are already in place before embarking on 
such reforms. 
Due to the small sizes of the individual countries' power sectors, as mentioned earlier, it is likely 
that most will resort to a single buyer model, just as Namibia did. This entails all generators selling 
their power to an entity, which in tum will be the only seller of bulk power to distributors and large 
users of power. This offers a very limited form of competition and involves signing of Power 
Purchase Agreements (PP As). As a result, if these countries are not careful enough, the power 
sectors will be tied up with high-priced and poorly designed PP As which will have profound 
implications on the tariffs levels - which are already on the high side in some countries - and thus 
overshadow the benefits of the reforms. Kenya is experiencing such a situation and is currently 
trying to revise their PP As within a short time of operation - again an exercise that could have been 
avoided if thorough study and care were taken beforehand. In order to avoid such problems when 
signing PPAs, considerable care must be taken and, most importantly, competition during entry 
should be ensured and well implemented. As the systems grow and all the necessary conditions are 
in place, this single-buyer model should be abandoned and further reforms introduced to stimulate 
more competition. As mentioned previously, competition is the only way to pass on benefits of these 
reforms to the ultimate electricity consumers. However, competition could bring even more benefits 
if there were a larger interconnected market. 
Although these reforms will not in the short and medium term be able to bring full competition into 
the ESis of these countries, as is the case with developed countries, they are nevertheless the only 
way forward for these countries and for the rest of Africa in trying to solve current power sector 
problems. For instance, participation of the private sector as a result of these reforms will help these 
countries in many ways, such as investing in system expansion, which many governments had failed 
to do, providing quality service with no power interruptions, delays and incorrect bills, etc. 
Moreover, the governments which previously had to finance the sector would then be able to 
concentrate on other priority sectors such as education and health, which are also facing many 
problems. However, for the reforms to be embraced even more, and apart from providing the 
required additional capacity, they should enable more customers to be connected with electricity. As 
has been shown in this chapter and in the chapters on the respective countries, access to electricity is 
extremely low. Ways of increasing electrification rates should be sought during the planning stages 
of the reform programmes and their implementation should also be well monitored. 
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